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Abstract 
 
This thesis studies attempts by Arab Gulf states to effectively lobby the US 
government. It explores aspects of their lobbying behaviour in order to identify the 
factors that lead to success and those that lead to failure from their lobbying 
endeavours.   
In this respect, the research utilizes two case studies: one in which Arab Gulf state 
lobbying was successful, and another in which lobbying failed. For each case study, 
the different elements involved in lobbying are analyzed and factors that lead to 
success as well as to failure are inferred. In tandem with an analysis of the 
strategies—or lack of them—behind Arab Gulf states’ lobbying, the research 
examines additional relevant factors such as the organization and activism of the US 
Arab American community, the strategic value of the Arab Gulf to the US, and the 
negative image of Arabs in America. The research then considers the hurdles and 
obstacles facing the establishment of an effective Arab Gulf lobby in the US. As a 
conclusion, the research evaluates the prospects of an effective Arab Gulf lobby, and 
highlights the research areas that should be tackled in the future. 
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Introduction 
 
Background 
 
I decided to embark on writing a dissertation in order to research a phenomenon that 
for Arabs almost represents a mystery:  lobbying. The question that intrigued me for 
years is why there is no Arab lobby despite the existence of all the components that 
are needed to construct one: the existence of a significant Arab Diaspora in the US, 
the historic strategic relationship between Arab Gulf States and the US, and the 
Gulf’s economic wealth. 
 
Though public discourse brings up here and there the idea of the absence of an 
effective long term lobby that can influence US foreign policy  (Mahmoud, 2003, 
Hishmeh, 2009, Rahman, 2011, Syed, 2011), no previous work has approached it in 
a scientific and systematic manner. The different materials I examined reflected 
cynicism about the state of Arabs and their inability to come to a collective action. 
Another category of works signalled the need to have a lobby without describing how 
to go about creating one or what a lobby should look like. But none of the works 
answered my questions.  I wanted to conduct this research in order to shed light on a 
very important aspect of American politics, an aspect that Arabs generally look upon 
as a cabal or as a conspiracy to manipulate and which we try to stay away from, 
whereas in fact lobbying is a constitutional right. We have this view of lobbying 
because we do not understand it, it is alien to our culture and our mentality, and this 
fact puts the entire research into perspective. One respondent I interviewed for my 
research, a former American ambassador to an Arab Gulf state, said: “You need a 
change in mentality.” The Arab Gulf views American politics from its own 
perspective, which is shaped by the way the Arab Gulf States conduct their politics. 
The concept of representation that exists in American politics on which lobbying is 
based does not exist in the Arab Gulf. Although traditionally the tribes, as well as 
individual subjects, plead to the ruler, this has not taken an institutionalized form as 
in the US. 
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 I will now outline the reasons that lobbying is alien to Arab culture as this will enable 
me to give a fair and objective assessment of Arab Gulf lobbying throughout the 
research. It is inaccurate to evaluate Arab lobbying without having a thorough 
understanding of the prevailing Arab Gulf political culture that shapes it. 
 
Constitutional right as opposed to a privilege 
 
The First Amendment of the US Constitution states that citizens have the right “to 
petition the government to redress their grievances” (Smith et al., 2013). At the time 
of the founding of the US, in Europe if a subject complained to a baron about a 
measure and the complaint was not to the baron’s liking, the latter could chop off the 
head of the former. This is why the US Constitution included this provision that gives 
citizens the freedom to address the government with any complaints without fearing 
any repercussions. This was the origin of lobbying. 
 
In the US, when citizens reach out to their representative or elected officials, they are 
exercising a constitutional right, whereas in the Gulf they are seeking the ruler’s 
benevolence, and this constitutes a totally different ballgame. The difference stems 
from the contrasting psyches of the Arab Gulf and the US. In the US, the individual 
citizen feels he is the source of his representative’s legitimacy as his vote provided 
the representative with his office, unless he voted for the other candidate. In the Arab 
Gulf, the individual citizen accepts the legitimacy of the ruler as a “de facto” fact of 
life.  
 
The ruling dynasties of the Arab Gulf states have legitimacy (Abdulla, 2010). This is 
one reason why, though security in the Gulf is a top priority, there has been no need 
for regimes that are as oppressive as in other dictatorships in the Middle East. Saudi 
Arabia’s “mabaheth” (Laham, 2002) is not to be compared with the brutal “SAVAK” 
that maintained security at the time of the Shah, or the “mukhabarat” of the Assad 
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regime. This acceptance of authority gives the ruler some margin in influencing 
public opinion and taking decisions that might not be to the people’s liking.  
The respect for the leader is a psychological barrier that prevents people from 
putting their demands in an aggressive manner. The psyche of Arab Gulf people and 
their relationship to the leader can be compared to the psyche of the Japanese 
people that is distinguished by a great respect for hierarchy. The relationship 
between the elected official and his voters in the US is based on a quid pro quo, 
whereas the relationship between the ruler and the citizens in the Arab Gulf is based 
on respect for authority. 
 
Representation and contribution to policy making  
In the US, the system of representation has opened the door for citizens to 
contribute to policy making. This system has evolved over time such that interest 
groups have become a main source of proposing new laws, as 80% of ideas for 
legislation come from them (Levine, 2009). Indeed, in some states interest groups 
are influential to the point that they can bypass the legislative body. Twenty-six 
states allow some form of direct legislation where the electorate has the power to 
change laws. An interest group can draft a proposition and collect a certain number 
of signatures while presenting it to the legislature for consideration. If the legislature 
does not pass the proposition, the measure is placed on the ballot for voters to 
decide (Rosenthal, 1993). 
 
 Interest groups exert power over legislatures at different levels using two methods: 
through grassroots pressure that can affect a legislator’s re-election prospects and 
through financial contributions to election campaigns (2012e).Combining influence 
on voting with financing enables interest groups to have a greater influence on their 
elected officials. Therefore campaign promises have become fully integrated with 
governing, and elected officials have become more vigilant and responsive to the 
demands of their constituencies (Smith et al., 2013).  
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In the Gulf, despite the introduction of elections, there is no similar pressure from 
interest groups. Campaigns do not depend on financial contributions from interest 
groups. Though election laws permit the candidate to take money from citizens 
(Habboush, 2011), the system has not been developed enough to have official 
conduits for financing like the PAC system in the US. Usually candidates are self-
funded or receive funds from their close family and friends. However, in the Arab 
Gulf funding has a limited effect on elections. In the UAE, for example, a candidate 
cannot spend more than 2 million dirhams on his campaign (Habboush, 2011). In 
Kuwait, though financing is neither regulated nor institutionalized, the government 
has taken measures to limit the influence of money. It has prohibited advertising in 
the streets and put a ceiling of two election offices per candidate. It has also given 
candidates free airtime on government TV in order to limit their need to buy airtime. 
This is in contrast to campaigns in the US that constitute a very expensive 
endeavour. The general election in 2012 cost 6 billion USD in total-- 2.6 billion USD 
for the presidential race, the Senate and the House races cost 1.82 billion USD, and 
the Super PACs spent an additional 613million USD (2012f). 
 
In the Gulf, the election system is still in its infancy (2011a). Citizens are just starting 
to realize that they can choose someone to represent them. However, these councils 
that have a representative value have a limited authority; therefore they cannot 
guarantee a role for citizens in decision-making. Individuals representing themselves 
or a group, a tribe, a professional group, or an institution can go to the “majlis” and 
present their case to the ruler and expect the ruler to show his benevolence and to 
redress their grievances. The law of governance in Saudi Arabia states in Article 43: 
“Councils held by the King and the Crown Prince shall be open for all citizens and 
anyone else who may have a complaint or a grievance. A citizen shall be entitled to 
address public authorities and discuss any matters of concern to him.”     However, 
this form of lobbying is not institutionalized as in the US and Western democracies 
where the citizen is given the constitutional right to contribute to decision making. 
 
However, more and more channels of communications are being introduced to make 
sure the ruler is in touch with his subjects. For example, Sheikh Mohammed bin 
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Rashid Al Maktoum ruler of Dubai has his own website where one can leave a 
comment or list a case. The Dubai government has established a station “AL Bath Al 
Mubashar,” meaning direct broadcast, in which citizens as well as expatriates 
residing in Dubai can present their concerns directly on air in order for the 
government to answer them.  However, this kind of representation does not really 
tackle policy-making.  It mainly revolves around very minor issues such as the 
increase in the price of a gas cylinder, or the fact that a certain government 
communication provider is not being responsive enough to customers’ enquiries. The 
requests sometimes border on naivety, as when students went to the station and 
complained about Hamdan University because it was two days late in releasing 
students’ grades. 
 
Consensual versus adversarial politics 
 
Another issue lies in the adversarial nature of lobbying. Interest groups compete with 
one another to persuade and influence policymakers with a ‘winner takes all mind 
set.’ This mind-set does not leave space for consensus among the different groups 
(Witkin, 2007). In contrast to the informal and consensual form of lobbying that is 
prevalent in the Arab Gulf, where the ruler shows benevolence and is sympathetic 
towards his subjects’ grievances, in the US interest groups view lobbying as a 
means to guarantee their representation. Though lobbying does not always 
guarantee responsiveness from the government, a lack of it makes desired 
responses from the government less likely (Baumgartner et al., 2009a). Interest 
groups stay on watch to ensure that their privileges are not negated by benefits 
given to others. This creates a system that thrives on conflict with a winner takes all 
mentality (Witkin, 2007). 
  
Lobbying thrives on conflict. One reason the Gulf does not understand lobbying is 
because they avoid confrontation and adopt a more consensual approach in the way 
they conduct politics. The avoidance of confrontation is visible in every aspect of Gulf 
state politics. For example, during the first Gulf war, though by invading Kuwait 
Saddam Hussein directly threatened the Gulf, the US took the lead in the war and 
was at the forefront of the confrontation with Iraq.  Though Saudi Arabia views Iran 
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as a threat to their security, they have not publicly and openly declared that they 
endorse a US strike. However, secretly, they have asked the US for such an action 
(Tisdall, 2010).This approach is alien to the confrontational aspect of US politics.  
 
Dispersed versus centralized power 
 
The power structure in the US is diffused due to two factors: the first one stems from 
the separation of powers in which different branches exercise checks on each other, 
the second factor has to do with the fact that the system empowers communities (De 
Tocqueville, 2004). 
 
The system offers numerous access points to affect policy making. The “access 
point theory” states that the multitude of access points has increased the power of 
interest groups as they have so many different points of entry to influence a certain 
policy (Ehrlich, 2008). This is different from the Gulf’s oligopolistic control over 
decision-making, where power is centralized within the ruling family.  Also, since its 
inception, the American system has been characterized by the empowerment of 
communities.  Alexis de Toqueville, the French sociologist, noticed the importance of 
communities as at the heart of American society. These communities witnessed the 
start of civic associations which became the foundation for the functioning of 
democracy (De Tocqueville, 2004). Civic engagement has increased the success of 
any program the government has launched, whether it is a program for fighting 
crime, poverty, drug abuse, unemployment, promoting healthcare, or education 
among others (Putnam, 1995).  Interest groups, their membership and activities are 
considered to be an important part of the social capital of America. They constitute a 
necessary catalyst to activate democracy (Putnam, 1995). 
 
The fragmentation of power in the US has increased since 1974. The Watergate 
scandal killed the parties’ authority because the “power barons” in the Congress lost 
their authority to “smaller” players who did not vote on a partisan basis but more 
according to their constituents’ preferences. This has increased the diffusion of 
power and increased with it the power of interest groups over  policy making in the 
US (Smith, 1996).  This contrasts with the centralization of power in the Gulf, where, 
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despite the introduction of elections, there has not been a decentralization of power.  
Even in Kuwait where the parliament, or the National Assembly, known as the Majlis 
Al-Umma, or "House of the Nation", has the right to veto government actions, it still 
does not have the authority to propose solutions to problems and hence to effectively 
contribute to policy making. On the other hand, the monarch has the power to 
dissolve the assembly, something that has become a routine in Kuwaiti political life 
(Kinninmont, 2012). 
 
In addition to the fact that power is centralized, the source of information for 
decision-making is also centralized. The government relies on advisors to come up 
with strategies and public policies, unlike the US where various privately-funded 
think-tanks provide information for policy making (Abelson, 1996). With centralization 
of authority, access becomes very valuable, especially given the fact that there are 
no other institutions to contest any decisions made by the ruler. This is why, in the 
mind of the Gulf ruler, access is equivalent to influence. If one accesses the 
decision-maker and convinces him, one would have achieved one’s goal.  
 
However, in the US, the equation is more complex. A decision-maker who is an 
elected official is accountable to his constituents; therefore, he has to balance his 
preferences and convictions with the preferences of his constituents. On the other 
hand, if the decision lies with an appointed official in the administration, the executive 
branch is ultimately accountable to the Congress, which is accountable to its 
constituents. Alexis de Tocqueville said that in America all powers centre in the 
bosom. The nation participates in the making of the laws by electing legislators and 
by their execution by the choice of agents in the executive government (De 
Tocqueville, 2004). 
 
Nature of grouping 
Another difference between the systems is the nature of people’s grouping. In the 
Gulf, clusters are around the tribe and the clan, and the association is usually by 
blood rather than by personal choice. The members view their affiliation as a duty 
and not as a conduit for material gain or to advance their personal ideology. They 
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have a high degree of loyalty to the elders of the tribes. This structure that is 
governed by loyalty and complacency leaves very little margin for these groups to 
seek politicization.  Though the Islamic culture is community oriented and 
encourages people to contribute to charities (zakat), which most of the time are run 
privately, these organizations remain limited to social services and do not seek to 
influence public policy. Additionally, the Arab Gulf permits no unions, which 
constitute a prime source for interest group formation (Berry and Wilcox, 1989). 
 
A large proportion of American citizens, depending on their profession, ideological 
affiliation, and ethnic background are part of associations that have lobbying muscle. 
Seventy-nine percent of Americans are members of some kind of voluntary 
association, with sixty-one percent associated with a group that takes a stand in 
politics and just over forty percent have four or more affiliations (Rosenthal, 1993). In 
2000, 92% of the adult population in the United States belonged to at least one 
organization (Anheier, 2005). 
 
The main difference between the two sets of interest groups is that the ones in the 
Gulf are driven by loyalty whereas the ones in the US are motivated by interest. The 
interest can be material as in the case of professional associations that seek benefits 
to their members, or psychological as in the case of citizens groups who seek to 
promote a certain ideology such as anti-abortion groups. 
 
Concept of reciprocal non-interference 
 
In the Gulf, given the border disputes and the “transnational” identities issue where 
some tribes reside across borders, the accepted protocol is that one country does 
not try to fuel factions or to mobilize people in his neighbors’ territory in order not to 
get reciprocal action. However, this does not work with the US. The US is a different 
system; when citizens with links to another country express their view on foreign 
policy, it is not seen as a foreign country interfering in American affairs.  However, 
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Arab Gulf states’ view of reciprocal non-interference has suppressed their appetite to 
lobby in the US. When the citizens of a Gulf state express their ties to another Gulf 
state they are seen as working against the government. However, in the US when 
citizens express their ties to their country of origin they are seen as exerting their 
constitutional rights and contributing to the making of public policy. 
 
If Arab-Americans advocated stronger ties with the Arab World or the Gulf and a 
more balanced approach, the government of the US would not see them as working 
against the state. They do not see Indian-Americans or Jewish-Americans as 
working against the state. And hence they do not see usually see India or Israel 
interfering in their internal affairs (in the AWACS episode, however, Reagan accused 
Israel of interfering in US affairs because Begin was personally taking a role and was 
at the forefront of the confrontation). Therefore, when Arab-Americans speak on 
behalf of the Arab World, they are seen as exercising their constitutional right of 
contributing to public policy.  
 
For all the reasons above, which highlight social as well political differences in the 
two systems, the concept of lobbying remains alien to the Arab Gulf states, which fail 
to see the complexities in the US system and look at it from a simplistic perspective. 
This is probably why none of the works that have come out from the Arab region has 
handled the issue properly. 
I am hoping  that my research will shed light on the concept of a lobby and inform the 
reader what lobbying is about, what Arabs have done so far, and give direction on 
what  is needed to have a long term sustainable lobby that can influence the 
relationship between the US and the Arab Gulf.  
 
Research problem and scope 
 
The research is concerned with the Arab Gulf States only, i.e. it does not involve the 
entire Arab world. The six Arab Gulf states are chosen because they represent a 
rather homogeneous group, with similar overall political and economic structures. 
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Throughout their modern history, these countries have faced similar threats and 
challenges (e.g. the pan-Arab wave in the 1950s, the Iraq-Iran War, the Iraqi 
invasion of Kuwait).  Arab Gulf countries have also benefited from a strategic 
relationship with the US that is defined by the same paradigms for each state: 
defence and security, oil, trade and the Palestine issue (Abdulla, 2012). To illustrate 
further, countries in the Maghreb are also excluded from the study because they do 
not have a similar relationship with the US; Algeria for instance, has a more strategic 
relationship with France.  
 
Aims and objectives  
 
As previously stated, the aim of this study is to examine Arab Gulf states’ lobbying 
practices in the US, through two cases of success and failure. 
The objectives of the research are to: 
1- Detect patterns in Arab Gulf lobbying and provide a critical assessment of 
when lobbying has succeeded and when it has failed 
2- Investigate how these outcomes occur and thus identify factors that determine 
the success or failure of Arab Gulf lobbying  
3- Extrapolate from the cases of success and failure to identify and define the 
hurdles that face Arab Gulf lobbying  
4- Determine the elements needed to establish a long-term effective lobby that 
can promote relations between the Arab Gulf states and the US  
 
Approach 
  
This research focuses on causality between events and actions, and on a specific 
problem; additionally, the research is a real world oriented practice (Creswell, 2009).  
The study’s pragmatic approach examines the dynamics of Arab lobbying, its 
patterns, and the instances of success or failure, and puts each of these elements 
into perspective in order to infer causal relationships. When assessing Arab Gulf 
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lobbying practices, comparison is made to other lobbies, particularly the pro-Israel 
lobby. The approach hence is solution-oriented, and is useful in its applicability, as it 
lays the basis for a general framework for a potential lobby (Creswell, 2009). A 
constructivist approach that studies Arab Gulf lobbying as an independent and 
comprehensive phenomenon is not possible. This is due to the fact that Arab Gulf 
states’ lobbying has been sporadic and unstructured, and does not constitute a 
phenomenon that can be reconstructed and studied in a holistic manner (Creswell 
and Clark, 2007).  
 
The study is exploratory in nature because not much has been written on the topic. 
Hence, the study will rely heavily on case studies of past successes and failures of 
Arab Gulf lobbying and on themes detected from interviews to develop propositions 
about Arab Gulf lobbying. Though the literature review on the topic is very thin, it 
does help situate the research and along with the research problem it provides 
guidance for my theoretical framework.  
 
Research questions and their limitations 
 
The main question driving the research in this dissertation is: when Arab Gulf states 
lobby, when do they win, when do they lose, and why? The set of research questions 
are directed by the theoretical framework as well as by the literature review. 
The sub questions are: 
1-What are the features of Arab Gulf states’ lobbying? Who do they use to lobby on 
their behalf? What are the dominant issues?  
2- What are the factors and reasons behind winning or losing? 
3-What are the deeper lessons for an Arab lobby illustrated by the cases of success 
and failure? 
 
18 
 
Since the present research takes a pragmatic approach, it will revolve around the 
factors leading to success and the factors leading to failure of the Arab Gulf states’ 
lobbying efforts. It will depict factors leading to success and hence the pillars on 
which a sustainable lobby could be built. However, the study does not give all the 
answers for the establishment of a pro-Arab-Gulf lobby in the US. It lays the 
foundations for future research on the subject. Also limitations to the research come 
from the fact that analysing factors of success and failure of lobbying is confined to 
two case studies and to a set of interviews to accompany the case studies, which 
rely on the experience of the interviewees.  
 
A further limitation stems from the fact that the study has a broad scope and 
therefore many aspects are not handled in detail. To some questions, the research 
can only give broad answers. For example, when examining the fact that selective 
benefits are needed to mobilize people, the case studies will confirm or refute this 
fact. However, neither the case studies nor the scope of the research will cover the 
benefits the programs needed to mobilize Arab Americans and to incentivize them to 
lobby to promote relations between the US and Arab-Gulf states.  
 
Another limitation relates to the accurate assessment of effectiveness. Measuring 
the overall effectiveness of Arab Gulf states’ lobbying is important, as the aim of my 
research is to study the lobbying environment and dynamics in the US, and Arab 
Gulf lobbying behaviour, and to investigate the basis on which a sustainable Arab 
Gulf lobby can be built. Though in the course of the research, we refer to other ethnic 
lobbies and examine their characteristics, these are different in nature to Arab Gulf 
lobbying. There is no organization that is in charge of pro-Arab or pro-Arab Gulf 
lobbying, unlike the cases of the pro-Israel, pro-Greek or pro-Armenian lobbies that 
are institutionalized and operate under registered organizations. Therefore, we 
cannot compare Arab lobbying to the lobbying done by an institutionalized 
organization such as the pro-Armenian, pro-Israel lobby in order to measure 
effectiveness. We cannot compare the sporadic lobbying that is undertaken 
whenever issues arise to the systematic and comprehensive work that a well-
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organized, well-funded institution such as the American Israeli Public Affairs 
Committee has been undertaking for several decades.  
 
Another limitation to this research is lobbying by proxy. Some lobbying for the Arab 
Gulf states is done by American companies that are interested in securing their 
commercial interests with those Arab Gulf states. One example is Lockheed Martin, 
which lobbied in favour of the UAE to pass the sale of the F-16 deal. The research 
will not dwell on this type of lobbying and will be limited to a couple of interviews with 
companies that lobbied to pass deals they had with Arab Gulf states.  
 
I have divided the chapters in the following manner: in Chapter 1, I will analyse the 
literature review, in Chapter 2 I will detail the methodology, in Chapter 3 I will 
highlight the features of Arab Gulf states’ lobbying and the factors that lead to 
success or failure. This chapter focuses on four questions: what are the patterns 
behind Arab Gulf states’ behaviour? What are the factors that contribute to failure? 
What are the factors that contribute to success? And when were Arab Gulf states 
able to exert an influence over US foreign policy? Chapter 4 features a case of 
success in lobbying and Chapter 5 a case of failure of lobbying. Grounded theory is 
revisited in the conclusion, which highlights the problems and the prospects facing 
an “Arab lobby “. The Chapter analyses the implications of the problems and the 
prospects and gives an outlook to the future. 
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Chapter 1: Literature Review 
 
Previous research on the topic 
 
Not much academic research has been done on the subject of lobbying by the Arab 
Gulf states and how their lobbying could have influenced relations with the United 
Statesi. Perhaps, the lack of research on the issue is due to insufficient interest by 
the Gulf States. Available studies have revolved around Arab Gulf-American 
relations, or on Arab Americans and their attempts to get organized so as to 
influence US government policies(Khoury, 1987). Unlike other ethnic lobbies, such 
as the Israeli lobby, that have been the focus of extensive research and attracted 
many academics(Zunes, 2006b, Lieberman, 2009, Findley, 1989, Mearsheimer and 
Walt, 2007, Mead, 2007) , the Arab Gulf states’ lobbying has been too small scale to 
attract interest.  
 
The only work that totally focuses on the attempts of Arab Gulf states to influence US 
policy was Mitchel Bard’s The Arab Lobby :The Invisible Alliance That Undermines 
America's Interests in the Middle East. This book was published as a response to 
The Israel Lobby and US Foreign Policy by Walt and Mearsheimer, which stirred 
controversy over the influence of Israel on US foreign policy. Bard’s book is an 
embodiment of Edward Saeed’s Orientalism where anything pertaining to the region 
is viewed from a perspective that is influenced by political considerations. 
 
Said explains: ‘Three things have contributed to making even the simplest perception 
of the Arabs and Islam into a highly politicized almost raucous matter: one, the 
history of popular Anti-Arab and Anti-Islamic prejudice in the West, which is 
immediately reflected in the history of Orientalism; two, the struggle between Arabs 
and Israeli Zionism, and its effects  upon American Jews, as well as upon both the 
liberal culture and the population at large; three, the almost total absence of any 
cultural position making it possible either to identify with or dispassionately to discuss 
the Arabs or Islam.’(Saeed, 1979) 
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Bard’s book fails to properly define the lobby. It hints, namely, at the missionaries 
that went to the Arab world and fell in love with it as the core of the Arab lobby: 
”Missionaries held Arabs in high esteem and fell in love with the 'exotic' qualities of 
Arab desert dwellers…These missionaries ultimately became an important 
component of the nascent Arab Lobby”(Bard, 2010) . The word ‘exotic’ reflects 
Said’s explanation of American interest in the Orient. This interest stems from 
strategic and economic considerations as well as from ‘traditional exoticism’ (Saeed, 
1979)  
 
Bard refers to anyone supporting a pro-Arab position as an ‘Arabist’. The book 
depicts any action or comment by a US official, an Arab diplomat, a journalist, or an 
academic, that is not pro –Israel as a pro-Arab lobbying activity, even if those actions 
or comments were not directed at influencing public policy. This goes back to Said’s 
interpretation of Orientalism by which any comment or issue relating to the subject 
matter is highly politicized (Saeed, 1979).For example, he describes having an Arab 
chair in an American university as a lobbying tool. Having such a chair is not a 
lobbying tool, as it does not affect public policy; it is merely a tool to promote cultural 
exchange. 
 
Another aspect in the work of Bard is the indoctrination argument, where, in one 
chapter, he points to Jimmy Carter as being part of the Arab lobby; Bard makes an 
inference about Carter’s lack of knowledge of the Bible. He says: ”Carter’s anti-
Zionism was implicit in his strain of fundamentalist faith and has led him to read the 
Bible in particular ways as granting equal claims for both Jews and Palestinians.” 
This remark is far from being an objective observation. When saying that reading 
The Bible in a ‘particular’ way led Carter to give equal rights to the two peoples, Bard 
implied that if Carter read The Bible in a correct way he would favour Jews. 
Here again, the views of Saeed are validated. Saeed says that: ‘no production of 
knowledge in human sciences can ever ignore or disclaim its author's involvement as 
a human subject in his own circumstance’(Saeed, 1979) .The ideology of the writer, 
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who sees the conflict in the Middle East from a biblical perspective, where it is the 
Promised Land for the Jews, is reflected in his writings. This aspect deprives his 
work of objective or scientific value. 
 
The other element of propaganda is the noise and falsification of facts the book 
portrays. Bard claims: “Actually, while Christians are unwelcome in Islamic states 
such as Saudi Arabia and for the most part have been driven out their long-time 
home in Lebanon, Christians continue to be welcome in Israel. In fact, it is the 
Palestinians whose religious extremism has victimized Christians” (Bard, 2010)This 
is one example of incorrect information; Christians enter Saudi Arabia and constitute 
a large expatriate community. During the civil war in Lebanon (1975-1990), Muslims 
and Christians mutually drove each other from their homes and both sides victimized 
each other. Also Christians are not always welcome in Israel. A Christian Palestinian 
wanting to go back to the home from which he was driven out is not at all welcome in 
Israel. Bard’s book does not seem to offer a solid counter-argument to the book of 
Walt and Mearsheimer, or represent the Arab Gulf States’ lobbying behaviour. 
 
While the book was praised by pro-Israel academics and activists such as Steven J 
Rosen(Rosen, 2012), the book did not get noticeable positive feedback from the 
mainstream critics. (Schneiderman, 2010). Also the book the Arab lobby by Bard did 
not receive the volume of reviews that the book on the Israel lobby by Walt and 
Mearsheimer received. The Google search engine only revealed 30 reviews for the 
Arab lobby whereas the other book had 293 reviews spread over 35 pages. Also the 
book on the Israel lobby received reviews in important international publications such 
as the The Economist (2007a) ,whereas the coverage was far less for Bard. 
 
The literature on the topic of Arab Gulf states’ lobbying in the US is thin, and the only 
work that directly tackles the issue is the book by Mr. Bard. However, the book 
appears to be inadequately researched and cannot be considered as a reliable 
source on Arab Gulf lobbying. The other book, The Arab Lobby and the Two States 
Solution, written by an Arab American scholar, Khalil Marrar, solely focuses on 
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attempts to push the two states-solution and does not look at Arab Gulf states 
specifically or investigate the potential of Arab Gulf lobbying. 
  
Also very little academic work is available on Arab Americans and their potential to 
become a base for Arab Gulf states’ lobbying in the US. The study by Khoury, (1987) 
is outdated and talks about the problems facing Arab Americans in getting organized 
and influencing the American government; however, it does not focus on Arab Gulf 
states, nor the relationship between these states and the Arab American community.   
 
A paper by Shain (1996) looked primarily at the lobbying effort of Arab Americans 
but also looks at the relationship between Arab Gulf states and the Arab American 
community. It talks about how the relationship changed and factions surfaced after 
the first Gulf War, and how the support that Arab Gulf states were giving to Arab 
American organizations disappeared. Moreover, it does not analyse, in depth, the 
relationship between these two actors, as the focus of the paper is not the Arab Gulf 
states but the Arab American community.  
 
Other papers indirectly tackle the topic. Slaita (2005) talks about the efforts of Arab 
Americans to get organized and the effects of 9/11.Considerable research was 
conducted on the effects of 9/11 on Arab American community attitudes and 
perceptions, but this research was peripheral to the issue of lobbying and no 
research  handled it directly. The Economist magazine spoke about the potential of 
an Arab-American lobby and  the potential of Arab-Americans in the US to emerge 
as a major voting bloc but not really about their influence on public policy as an 
interest group (2000). 
 
Other studies focus on the issue of Arab identity and the relevance of the Middle 
East to them. Although the studies do not handle the issue directly, they are 
important as they contribute to depicting the potential as well as highlighting the 
challenges of having a domestic Arab-American lobby focused on Middle East 
affairs. Kenneth Wald considered the issue in his paper, ‘The diaspora project of 
Arab Americans: assessing the magnitude and determinants of politicized ethnic 
identity’ (Wald, 2009)The paper discusses the issue of Arab ethnic identity and the 
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possibility of bringing the Arab American community together around Middle East 
issues. It highlights a very important point, namely political activism as being a 
cornerstone around which to build an ethnic identity and to gather the community. 
Another paper by Nassar Mc Millan (2011) researches the issue of identity in the 
Arab American community and their potential to be mobilized. 
 
Because my study is an exploratory one, and since almost no serious academic 
work has been done on the issue of Arab Gulf state lobbying, I will focus more on 
contextualization which will give direction to our research.  
 
Definition 
 
Lobbying political representatives is an age-old practice in the Euro-American 
tradition, going back to the 1870s in Britain when favour-seeking constituents would 
wait in the lobby (hence the name lobby), outside the chambers at Westminster, to 
collar their elected parliamentarians, demanding close attention be paid to their 
wishes. Lobbying goes back to the lobby of the Willard hotel where favour seeking 
citizens and groups used to meet with the  President Alexander W .Randall  9681-
9688   for a cigar and some brandy (Gelak, 2008). 
 
The right to lobby existed even before the United States got their independence from 
the British. The Resolutions of the Stamp Act Congress in 1765 asserted that 
lobbying is a constitutionally protected right: "it is the right of the British subject in 
these colonies to petition the King or either House of Parliament."  This principle was 
reaffirmed in the first amendment to the constitution. Citizens have the right " 
peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances” 
(Mathias, 1980)(Mathias, foreign affairs, 976). 
 
However, a lobbyist as formally defined by the Lobbying Disclosure Act in 1995,”is 
any individual who is retained by a client for financial or other compensation for 
services that include more than one lobbying contact.” This contact is defined as any 
oral or written communication, including electronic communication to a federal 
government official with policy-making responsibilities--including members of 
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Congress, their staffs, and high-level executive branch officials, regarding the 
formulation, modification of legislation or regulations, or regarding the adoption of a 
contract, the nomination of an individual, or the execution of some regulation.  
 
The act excludes several formal processes of lobbying--testifying at hearings, filing 
lawsuits, and submitting reports under notice and comment--since this information is 
often available to the public in the form of lists of witnesses or files of public 
comments. In addition, the list of "covered officials" includes virtually all 
congressional staff, but only the highest levels of the executive branch. The legal 
definition of lobbying also excludes grassroots lobbying as well the use of paid media 
(Baumgartner and Leech, 2001).  
 
The definition of lobbying describes it as mainly the effort to influence the legislative 
branch, i.e., the American Congress. The expression ‘influencing legislation’ is 
defined by Internal Revenue Code IRC 162 c 4 A as any attempt to influence any 
legislation through communication with any member or employee of a legislative 
body or with any government official or employee who may participate in the 
formulation of legislation (Reilly et al., 2003). 
 
The IRC defines lobbying communication as ‘any communication (other than any 
communication compelled by subpoena or otherwise compelled by federal or state 
law) with any member or employee of a legislative body or any government official or 
employee who may participate in the formulation of the legislation that does either of 
the following :communication refers to specific legislation and reflects a view on that 
legislation, the communication clarifies, amplifies, modifies or provides support for 
views reflected in a prior lobbying communication’ (Reilly et al., 2003). 
 
Whereas the act of lobbying is well defined and its definition is standardized, the 
word “lobby” remains more obscure. What constitutes a lobby? The Oxford 
Dictionary defines it as a “body of people” trying to influence legislation. However, 
Walt and Mearsheimer provide a more practical definition of the Israel lobby in the 
US as a ‘loose coalition of individuals and organizations that actively work to shape 
US foreign policy in a pro-Israel direction’(Mearsheimer and Walt, 2007) . 
Extrapolating from this definition, a lobby can be defined as a loosely based coalition 
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seeking to influence certain policy making areas in its preferred direction. Lobbying 
could be confused with advocacy. Advocacy, however, has a broader meaning than 
lobbying; (Chetkovich and Kunreuther, 2006)define s advocacy as promoting change 
on the behalf of marginalized groups through the courts, the legislature, or 
administrative agencies.   
 
Context of lobbying   
 
The executive branch, general events, as well as the general mood in the US sets 
the scene for lobbying. The executive branches and judiciary, whose members are 
appointed, are less influenced by direct pressure from interest groups (Gibson, 
2010).The executive branch sets the context and mood for lobbying. Depending on 
the administration, the lobbying effort is either accelerated or blocked. During the 
Clinton years there was a serious effort by civil rights groups to eliminate the racial 
bias in the judicial system. These groups had a fertile environment in which to lobby, 
but when Bush took over, especially after September 11 and the enactment of the 
Patriot Act, and the appointment of John Ashcroft as Attorney General, their lobbying 
efforts became futile (Baumgartner et al., 2009a). 
 
 In addition to the administration, the political and socio-economic environment, as 
well as catastrophic events such as terrorist attacks or natural disasters, can set the 
scene to accelerate decision making. It was fairly easy for Bush to go to war on 
Afghanistan following the September 11 attacks, while in 2008, at the time of the 
financial crisis, it took president Obama three weeks to pass the $800 billion 
incentive package (Herzenhorn, 2008).  
 
Effect of lobbying on policy making in the US 
 
Though lobbying is an incarnation of the freedom of expression in a democratic 
society and the conduit through which citizens “petition the government to redress 
their grievances” (Gelak, 2008), it has created a system where policy makers are 
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highly dependent on campaign contributions and are closely monitored by interest 
groups, and this has affected their positions as statesmen. Legislators are more 
concerned about the votes and the money they get from satisfying interest groups 
than the outcome of the policy or bill they advocate (Le Breton et al., 2012). It has 
created a system that is highly dependent on financial contributions, and thus where 
the affluent and the organized can have a grip on certain policy areas. It also has 
created a system that is highly sensitive to special interests at the expense of the 
general interest of the US (Davidson et al., 2011).  
 
The most flagrant example of the hijacking of general interest by special interests is 
the failure of the proposed legislation by Senator Hagel to regulate the two mortgage 
giants, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. Hagel could foresee the consequences of the 
toxic loans that the two companies were extending. However, the two companies 
properly organized a lobbying campaign to get enough opposition to defeat Senator 
Hagel’s proposed bill.... The narrative was that the legislation will make it hard for 
lower middle income group to own homes. There was no lobby for the overall 
American economy to back Senator Hagel and this led to an economic crisis that 
had severe consequences on the US and the world (Smith et al., 2013).  
 
Proponents of lobbying such as Riker, state that the various lobbies pull legislation in 
different directions in order for the legislation to end up with a happy medium; 
however this scenario is only valid when the lobbies with conflicting interests are of 
equal muscle. However, conflicting lobbies can be of unequal sizes:  the Azari lobby 
is not equal to the Armenian lobby, and Arab groups are not as strong as the pro-
Israel groups, and policy ends up being tilted in favour of the stronger lobby (Paul 
and Paul, 2009). 
But even if antagonism is present, and no interest can push its agenda at the 
expense of other groups, lobbying does not necessarily ensure a cohesive and 
consistent policy. This is simply because the national interest is not a sum of special 
interests. The problem of lack of cohesiveness mostly arises in foreign policy, where 
ethnic groups’ aspirations do not always coincide with the US national interest. Even 
if the antagonistic groups are of equal power, their fight does not necessarily mean a 
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cohesive foreign policy, because a  consistent foreign policy needs to be looked at 
from a broad long term perspective and cannot be drafted in a piecemeal manner 
(Mathias, 1980, Smith, 2000).  
 
On the other hand, some issues are too complicated or too narrow and the national 
interest is not well defined. For example, is giving the right to optometrists to 
prescribe drugs or deregulating the financial markets in the “national interest” of the 
US? In such areas, interest groups using several outreach methods such as the  
media can shape public opinion (Brill, 2010).This is also very visible in world affairs,  
where the American public, which has very little knowledge of international affairs,  
becomes very sensitive to manipulation by the elite and the media (Holsti, 2009). 
Also, in areas of low salience and where the average citizen is not well informed, 
elected officials tend to respond to the demands of interest groups without taking into 
consideration the preference of their overall constituency  (Brill, 2010, Levine, 
2009)This “rent seeking  behaviour“ occurs as the official knows that his decision will 
not affect the rest of his voters whereas, if he goes against a certain interest group, 
he is most likely to lose the support of a faction of his constituents.  
 
For example, by unconditionally supporting Israel, the average American does not 
know the repercussions on foreign policy. This is due to two factors. The first one is 
the lack of information presented to the American public. The second one lies in the 
fact it does not affect his or her day to day life. Israel/US relations will not capture his 
attention as much as other major domestic issues such as tax reform, healthcare or 
the economy. Therefore, when candidates compete, the issues they raise to the 
public and on which they compete are healthcare, tax, and plans to improve the 
economy. (Levine, 2009). 
 
While pluralists believe that interest groups enhance the representation of the people 
in the realm of the American system, rent seeking theories highlight the 
‘antidemocratic’ nature of these groups. “Rent seeking behaviour” refers to the 
practice of a group trying to push the cost of projects on the whole, while solely 
retaining the benefits(Leech, 2006) .  For example, when the pro-Israel lobby pushes 
to keep aid to Israel, the cost compared to the benefit each of the members of the 
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pro-Israel group will reap is small as all American taxpayers are paying for the aid. 
However, the aid to Israel paid by everyone will only benefit a specific group. 
Similarly, since the cost is spread among the public at large, the cost to the individual 
taxpayer is actually quite small (3 billion spread over the entire US population).  
 
Rent seeking behaviour is difficult to negate due to the cost of counter-lobbying. It is 
much easier to block than to pass legislation: it takes 3.5 lobbyists working on 
passing a bill to counteract the effect of one lobbyist working on blocking it (McKay, 
2012).Reversing the process involves high cost to the individual tax-payer relative to 
the expected gain. Therefore a rational taxpayer would likewise not have any 
incentive to try to stop such behaviour. This is why lobbying has favoured the status 
quo in the American system. Supposedly, lobbying allows dynamism in the system; 
however, because lobbying to pass a proposal initiates counter-lobbying to stop it 
and the counter-lobbying is more efficient than the pro-lobbying, legislators tend to 
prefer the status quo (Berman, 2010).  
 
Therefore even if other interest groups see that that $3 billion donated to Israel every 
year  is at the expense of other priorities such as healthcare, creating jobs, or  
education, the cost for them to reverse the trend will be too high. At the same time, 
the amount ($3 billion), if relocated to another area, such as healthcare for example, 
will not make a significant impact on the national scale. Therefore, to reverse the 
trend, a larger group should be involved in order to spread the cost and effort of 
lobbying (Atieh, 2009).  
 
Lobbying has favoured the most organized and affluent. While the poor are the ones 
in most need of government help, they have the least voice because of their limited 
financial capabilities and their ability to organize. Mills (1956) and Schattschneider 
(1960) are among those who believe that legislators are more responsive to rich and 
influential groups than to less privileged ones(Tichenor and Harris, 
2005)Contemporary examples include the federal unconnected PACs that make 
“independent expenditures only,” and are unlimited in size, and super PACs, which  
allow the groups with the most affluent means to have more visibility and to promote 
their cause to the general public (Berman, 2010).  
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Who are the interest groups?  
 
Interest groups have played an important role in the heart of the American system 
since its inception. Alexis de Toqueville noted in his book Democracy in America the 
importance of community in the American way of life. Social scientist Putnam calls 
the sense of community in America the country’s ‘social capital’ (Putnam, 
1995)President Obama, in his victory speech in the 2012 elections, praised America 
for its diversity. Communities become interest groups whenever they seek to 
influence policy making. Ordinary associations or institutions become ‘interest 
organizations’ whenever they try to influence the political process to promote their 
interests (Baumgartner et al., 2009b).  
 
Usually a political entrepreneur works to organize a latent group. The role of the 
entrepreneur usually has two aspects. The first is internal and is concerned with 
maintaining the cohesion of the group and overcoming the collective action problem 
(Olson, 2009)).The second role involves obtaining benefits for the group through the 
political process (Leech, 2006) 
 
Interest groups are an important source of information and policy ideas for executive 
agencies as well as for the Congress. In 1946, the Administrative Procedure Act was 
passed to allow groups to help in drafting regulations (Schlozman and Tierney, 
1986).These groups can serve on advisory committees, which are created by 
agencies to provide advice on a continuous basis for regulating activities or 
industries within the agency’s jurisdiction. 
 
The American system has encouraged the formation of interest groups. It saw in 
them channels for the provision of goods and services to citizens (Ainsworth, 
2002).). Additionally the system, characterized by separation of powers and where 
power is very disbursed, has provided many points of entry to interest groups and 
has facilitated their contribution to policy formulation (Paul and Paul, 2009)The 
relationship between interest groups and the government is reciprocal. 
Governmental activities lead to the mobilization of interest groups, while interest 
groups’ activism mobilizes the government (Baumgartner et al., 2011). Each $100 
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billion increase in government spending witnesses an increase of five registered 
interest groups(Leech, 2006). 
 
“Proliferation theory” suggests that as society becomes more complex new groups 
are created. For example, with the industrialization of society, the environment is 
affected, which leads to creation of groups that seek to protect the environment 
(Ainsworth, 2002) Another theory, “disturbance theory,” posits the nature of unstable 
equilibrium among groups. If something disturbs the equilibrium such as  
technological innovation, or the emergence of new concerns, e.g., proliferation of 
obesity among youth, a major terrorist attack,  new groups emerge(Davidson et al., 
2011). 
 
Robert Salisbury in 1969 came up with the “theory of exchange”. It states that groups 
form due to the efforts of entrepreneurial community organizers to rally people 
around issues. Community members get a benefit in return for joining the group, 
which could be material or non –material, such as belonging to a group that shares 
values and causes and promoting these values in the legislative system (Salisbury, 
1969).  
 
Interest groups fall into different categories, of which the most prominent ones are 
citizens groups, such as the American Association of Retired Persons. This group 
represents a subset of American citizens, who are elderly people seeking to protect 
their interests with the American government, or the gay and lesbian lobby whose 
goal is to make sure that people do not face discrimination as a result of their sexual 
preferences, and that gays and lesbians can express themselves freely. Citizens’ 
groups started in the sixties; in the next 20 years they multiplied at twice the rate of 
occupational groups (Walker, 1983) 
 
Walker did a survey of interest groups. The first wave interest groups emerged in the 
middle of the nineteenth century.  It took almost a century to create the first half of 
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these groups, the second half were founded following World War II. The fifties 
witnessed the emergence of labour groups and unions (Walker, 1991)The 1960’s 
and 1970’s witnessed the “Big Bang” of interest groups. In addition to the growth in 
size, scope and character of these groups, the lobbying that came with these 
developments  was more diverse and  professional(Tichenor and Harris, 2005).  
 
Ethnic groups emerged mainly in the 1970s, when the melting pot concept was 
challenged by proponents of multiculturalism, who asserted that cultural differences 
within society are valuable and should be preserved. They proposed the salad bowl 
concept, where different cultures mix but remain distinct. The salad bowl mix 
witnessed the revival of ethnicities among Americans. The notion of being Arab 
American, Hispanic American, Jewish American, and Greek American came to the 
surface (Salaita, 2005)and Americans started getting organized along ethnic and 
religious lines. Ethnic and religious groups started proliferating and became 
increasingly prominent in American society, such as the Council of American- Islamic 
relations (CAIR) and the Armenian National Committee of America. Ethno-religious 
lobbies who seek a favourable public policy for their coreligionists or kinsmen have 
had an effect on American foreign policy. Indian Americans organized under the US-
India Political Action Committee (USINPAC) have played an instrumental role in the 
Indian American nuclear cooperation treaty of 2005 (Freedman, 2009).  
 
Another category is business lobbying, where an individual or a group of businesses 
present their interests to the government. In addition to individual companies this 
involves business lobbies or trade lobbies. The difference between the two is that 
trade lobbies represent single industry members whereas business lobbies represent 
members from different industries. Examples of business lobbies are chambers of 
commerce, manufacturers associations, state businesses associations, and 
associations of tax payers. Such associations are usually state based but can also 
have a nationwide scope. The problem with associations is that they represent 
different businesses and sometimes different industries whose interests might 
diverge at times when members also have different priorities. Sometimes different 
members can have different positions on the same issue, which makes taking a 
stand and lobbying for it hard. Small companies are most likely to rely on business 
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and trade associations for representation. Larger companies, in addition to having 
their own lobbying arm, are at the core of business associations (Rosenthal, 
1993).Professional associations and unions are another type of interest groups. 
Think tanks, foundations, and educational institutions are interest groups that lobby. 
 
Another type of interest group represents a coalition of several groups that work on 
one major issue. The Israel lobby is an important example. As mentioned before, it is 
a coalition of individuals and organizations in support of Israel. This coalition includes 
different interest groups such as Jewish Americans (Conference of Presidents of 
Major American Jewish Organizations) as well as Christian Evangelical Americans 
(Christians united for Israel).It has civil rights groups such as the Anti-Defamation 
League, as well as think tanks such as the Washington Institute for Near East Policy. 
Although the individual interest groups differ in nature, they coalesce to form one 
large interest group lobbying for one issue: Israel (Mearsheimer and Walt, 2007) .  
 
Arab American Activism 
 
Arab immigration to the US witnessed many waves. The early wave consisted of 
immigrants who came from the Levant Area and were mainly Christians. These 
spread across the nation and were involved in different kinds of trades and 
professions. They worked in factories, opened groceries, enrolled in the military, 
formed baseball leagues, and built churches and mosques (Malek, 2010). The 
description of Arab Americans varied at different points in time. At the same time 
they started arriving in the late nineteenth century, the Arab world was part of the 
Ottoman Empire, so they were known as Turks (David, 2007). The classification of 
Arab Americans posed a dilemma to immigration officials who saw them as ‘not quite 
white’ (Gavrilos, 2002).  
 
 In 1909, Arabs were denied entry to the US as regulatory practices included the 
Arab in the nationalities that fell under the 1882 Chinese Exclusion Act that barred 
the ‘Yellow race’ from entering the US. In 1923, after a long and hard battle with the 
authorities, they were granted status as white and hence the right to citizenship 
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(Nagel and Staeheli, 2005, Suleiman, 2010) Described as white, which is a racial 
privilege, helped Arab Americans get assimilated into the American society 
(Gavrilos, 2002).  
 
The early wave of Arab Americans, which mainly consisted of Christian immigrants, 
has been completely assimilated. Inter-marriage and similarity of religion facilitated 
this assimilation (Nagel and Staeheli, 2005).Despite this assimilation, they had a few 
instances of activism where their ethnic identity was reaffirmed. Since the early 
twentieth century, the most salient single issue for the Arab community as a whole 
has been the fate of Palestine. This could be seen from the Arabic press in the US 
that reflects the views of the community(Suleiman, 2010).Arab Americans were 
active as early as 1917 and protested against the Balfour Declaration (Salaita, 2007)  
 
There are many turning points in the history of Arab Americans. The first major 
turning point was 1967. Strong feeling of nationalism were sparked in large part by 
glaring Arab dispossession  in Palestine which was reinforced by a new wave of 
Muslim Arab immigrants who had been politicized already in the Arab world and had 
no need to hide their ethnic-religious identities. However, one can say that the Arab 
awakening in the US was due to the Palestine issue and a reaction to Zionism 
(Salaita, 2005, David, 2007, Shain, 1996, Gavrilos, 2002).Also this ethno-political 
awakening coincided with the civil rights movements and the increasing tolerance of 
ethnicity in American society after the 1965 Immigration Act (David, 2007, Salaita, 
2005, Gavrilos, 2002) This encouraged Arab-Americans to get organized. 
 
Five years after the 1967 Arab defeat, the National Association of Arab Americans 
was established. The NAAA was formed on the AIPAC model and had as it main 
goal to influence foreign policy(Shain, 1996). It was established by prominent 
professionals of Arab descent ‘to protest and to register their disagreements with 
American policies of unquestioning support to Israel and total disregard for the 
security of Arab states in the Middle East (Mathias, 1980). 
 
The second turning point is the ABSCAM in 1978, or the so called Abdul Karim 
scam, when Federal agents disguised as the mysterious sheikh from the Gulf tried to 
corrupt members of the congress (Khoury, 1987)The environment was fertile for an 
35 
 
operation like ABSCAM as the oil embargo of the 1973 was used to portray Arabs as 
greedy sheikhs. According to Zbigniew Brzezinski, National Security Advisor for 
President Jimmy Carter, the embargo, “had an acute effect on the daily life of 
virtually every American never before had we felt such an impact in 
peacetime”(Gerges, 2003)( 76). Following the ABSCAM, Senator James Abourezk 
and James Zogby established the Arab American Anti-discrimination committee 
(ADC), as they saw in ABSCAM a deliberate act of racial profiling (Khoury, 
1987)However, differences between the two led to an organizational crisis and 
Zogby left to establish the Arab American Institute (AAI)(Shain, 1996). Unravelling is 
very common among citizens’ groups as it only takes a mailing list and an enhanced 
tagline to create a splinter group (Ainsworth, 2002).Another problem that such 
organizations face is that their recorded membership does not reflect their active 
membership. It is very common in citizens’ groups to have a largely silent 
membership (Shain, 1996). Zogby viewed the Arab American Institute (AAI), as 
complementary to ADC and NAAA. AAI has an electoral focus: "trying to project Arab 
Americans into the political mainstream" by helping to organize them within the two 
main political parties and to encourage Arab-Americans themselves to run for office 
(Khoury, 1987).  
 
The third pivotal point was the first Gulf War. The war sparked division among Arab 
Americans and the drying up of funds coming from the Gulf. A survey of Arab 
Americans during the first week of February 1991showed that Arab Americans of 
Muslim origin were one and half times more likely to oppose the war than non-
Muslims. Those of Palestinian or Jordanian origin were twice as likely to oppose the 
war as other Arab Americans. This divergence in positions on the first Gulf War 
created a rift among Arab American organizations; the AAI and NAAA who were 
highly dependent on Gulf connections supported the war, while ADC opposed the 
American build up in the Gulf  (Shain, 1996). Arab Americans’ opposition to the war 
was due to the fear of death and destruction that the war would inflict on their fellow 
Arabs, rather than because of support of Saddam Hussein’s invasion of Kuwait 
(Gavrilos, 2002).  
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The 1993 World Trade Centre bombing, as a result of which seven Muslims were 
convicted and an alleged plot to destroy the United Nations building and other 
landmarks in New York was uncovered (2008) contributed to the association of 
Arabs or Muslims with terrorism. The blast enticed the Clinton administration into a 
more forceful policy against terrorism. The Oklahoma bombing in 1995, although it 
was the work of a white American, Timothy McVeigh, was initially linked to Arab 
Muslims and Middle Easterners by the media. As a result, the Omnibus 
Counterterrorism Act was passed, allowing the US government to use evidence from 
undisclosed sources to deport aliens suspected of terrorist acts. A second provision 
of the act allowed the government to deport aliens who made charitable contributions 
to organizations that were suspected to have terrorist links (Gerges, 2003).This was 
a setback for Arab American political activism. 
 
The terrorist attack on the World Trade Centre in New York on September 11, 2001 
(2008) represented another turning point for the Arab American community, by 
increasing racial profiling and scrutiny facing Arab Americans and Muslim 
Americans. The Patriot Act that followed was signed on the 26th of October 2001, 
and, with John Ashcroft as Attorney General, racial profiling became the norm. In 
2003, the US government required all men between the age of 19 and 45 from 
Middle Eastern countries except Israel to register, and many were arrested and 
deported following registration (Nagel and Staeheli, 2005).The Patriot Act put any 
activity by Arab Americans under scrutiny, which frustrated previous efforts of Arab 
Americans to get organized and form a sizable voting block and to be able to put 
pressure on government (2000, Salaita, 2005). 
 
 Following September 11 the profiling put both the notion of Arab and Muslim in one 
boat, all Arabs being viewed as Muslims (Shammas, 2009). Sally Howell and 
Andrew Shryock from the University of Michigan describe the racial profiling that was 
inflicted on Arab Americans following September 11: “In the aftermath of 9/11 Arab 
and Muslim Americans have been compelled time and again to apologize for acts 
they did not commit, to condemn acts they never condoned, and to openly profess 
loyalties that for most US citizens are merely assumed” (Howell and Shryock, 2003). 
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On June 20, 2012, Rep. Peter King, R-N.Y., who chairs the House Committee on 
Homeland Security, highlighted  the committee’s key findings about severity of the 
threat of radicalized American Muslims to homeland security, the presence of al-
Qaeda recruitment in the country — specifically in prisons and military communities 
— and a lack of cooperation between American Muslims and law enforcement to 
"confront the Islamist ideology driving radicalization(2012a). Although the American 
media depicted the Arabs as hijackers, terrorists, and religious fanatics (Gavrilos, 
2002, Saeed, 1979), not all Arab Americans experienced discrimination. Many Arab 
Americans look “white” and cannot be identified as Arab Americans, unlike Asians 
who can be clearly identified by their physical appearance and hence could not 
conceal their ethnicity in order to avoid discrimination (Gavrilos, 2002, David, 2007). 
Also Christians faced less harassment and discrimination than Muslims (Howell and 
Shryock, 2003) which contributed to the lack of cohesiveness in the Arab community 
(David, 2007).However, September 11, the Patriot Act and the ensuing racial 
profiling created a sense of solidarity among Arab Americans and brought Arab 
Americans closer to each other and pushed them to offer clarification about their 
heritage (El‐Aswad, 2010).  
 
September 11 created an unprecedented racial profiling that was translated into the 
‘normalized judgment’ observed in the media as well as in government policies, for 
example in the profiling of Americans of Arab descent in airport, or  so called ‘flying 
while Arab’ (Jadallah and El-Khoury, 2010). The profiling was not only racial but 
mostly political and social, trying to control anyone who might have the slightest 
affinity with a state that does not conform with US policies (Jadallah and El-Khoury, 
2010). Three authors, Nassar McMillan, Lambert, and Hakim –Larson researched 
the ethno- identity of Arab Americans at three consecutive times, beginning shortly 
after September11, 2001. On average, each of the respondents across the three 
samples reported having one or two discrimination experiences (Nassar‐McMillan et 
al., 2011).  
 
The Arab-American community is characterized by a multitude of factions. Arab-
Americans are Muslim and Christians. Muslims are Sunni and Shia as well as other 
sects such as Druze and Baha’i. They belong to twenty two Arab countries. In their 
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lifestyle they vary from very liberal and westernized to very traditional and religious 
(Salaita, 2007). Each Arab community has its own religious, social and 
organizational setting. Author Gary David did a study in 1998 in the metropolitan 
area of Detroit and found over 60 organizations. He also found that, even in 
organizations such as the churches or mosques, people would self-segregate into 
subgroups based on elements of similarity (David, 2007). On this Howell and Shyrok, 
who studied the Arab American community in Detroit following September 11, said: 
‘The overrepresentation in Detroit of Arab minorities and politically disenfranchised 
populations (Palestinians for instance and thousands of Iraqi Shiaa, displaced when 
their US inspired uprising against Saddam Hussein failed in 1991) contributes to 
internal fragmentation. The inhabitants of Arab Detroit often find it difficult to imagine 
themselves as a unified Arab American constituency: the divide between Muslim and 
Christian Arab is a stable feature of the community politics(Howell and Shryock, 
2003).Despite the divisions among Arab Americans, the Arab element remains an 
important element of their ethnic identity. This identity is based on reconciling the 
values, belief and behaviours of the country of origin with those of the host country 
(David, 2007). 
 
Caroline Nagel and Lynn Staeheli from the University of Colorado wrote a paper that 
investigated the issue of belonging, assimilation and citizenship among Arab 
Americans. They observed that. even though identity differed among the 
respondents, the Arab element remained an important part of their identity (Nagel 
and Staeheli, 2005). In a study by Nassar McMillan, Lambert, and Hakim –Larson 
most respondents scored ethnic identity between somewhat important and very 
important (Nassar‐McMillan et al., 2011).  
 
However, even if the Arab element is important and Arab Americans do have an 
ethnic identity, this identity is not politicized. ‘Politicized ethnic identity’ is defined as 
‘the tendency of members of an ethno-national diaspora to perceive the socio-
political landscape from the vantage point of the ethnic group’ (Wald, 2009).Even for 
those who succeed politically, such as George Mitchell or John Sununu, their 
political success was based on their personal effort and their cross ethnic support; 
their ethnic identity was not the foundation for their political careers. Even when it 
comes to voting, since 1959 legislators of Arab background have voted on Middle 
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East issues similarly to Senators and Representatives who are not of Arab descent. 
James Abourezk is considered the only exception (Suleiman, 2010). Indeed, some 
Arab-American politicians have taken positions against their country of origin 
(Weisman, 2006). 
 
The natural grouping as a community has been more around charities, social clubs 
and churches rather than around political entities (Khoury, 1987). Comparing the 
political activism of the Arab American community that comes from the Middle East 
to the political activism of the Jewish community that essentially comes from Europe, 
a discrepancy is noted. Between 1990 and 2004 pro-Israel political action 
committees gave nearly $57 million dollars to candidates and parties, while Arab-
American and Muslim PACs gave slightly less than $700,000 (Walt, 2010).   
 
Arab-Americans show variance in salience when it comes to Middle East related 
issues. A candidate’s position on Middle East issues is not always a determining 
factor when they are making a choice for election.. Muslim Arab Americans have 
more of an ethnic disposition to American politics than their Christian counterparts. 
Also members who have friends in the community, who are proficient in Arabic, and 
who live in Arab American neighbourhoods, tend to show more affinity with Arab 
issues. A common feature of the Arab Americans’ communities is that they have a 
low political activism .They are usually mobilized when there is a crisis or a tragic 
event such as the bombing of Qana in Lebanon or Gaza. However, their activism 
does not constitute a continuous and coordinated effort (Wald, 2009). 
 
The Arab -American community has tried to play a role to facilitate relations between 
Arab countries and the US. In the 1980’s the NAAA had an agreement with Jordan to 
facilitate Congressional visits to Jordan (Khoury, 1987). Following September 11, 
Arab American business leaders joined Detroit Mayor Kwame Kilpatrick in 
welcoming ambassadors and trade ministers from the Arab League countries in 
order to promote investment and trade between Detroit and the Arab world. The 
American Arab Chamber of Commerce has been working on promoting trade and 
investment between the US and the Arab world (Howell and Shryock, 2003). 
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In 2000 there were about 300,000 Arab-Americans in Detroit, which represents the 
biggest concentration of Arabs anywhere in the world outside the Middle East 
(2000). Arab Americans have the potential to wield strong political power and to be 
very influential in presidential elections. Like their Jewish counterparts, they are 
concentrated in swing states, such as New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Ohio, Illinois, and 
Michigan. In the 2000 presidential elections, Gore lost many votes in Michigan, 
because of his Vice President Lieberman who was seen as very hawkish on Israeli 
affairs. A poll conducted after the election showed that 69% of Arab American votes 
were lost because of Lieberman (Helmreich, 2001, Gavrilos, 2002). 
 
Besides the candidacy of Gore, where the pro-Israel stance of Lieberman led to the 
ticket losing Arab American votes, the candidate’s stance on the Middle East is not 
the only factor that affects the community voting choice.  Also, Arab Americans are 
not seen by candidates as being as important as the Jewish bloc is. Though they are 
comparable in size, they have low activism and are not important campaign 
contributors. Therefore, even when a candidate courts the community, he tries to 
appeal to Arab American concerns that are not contradictory with his stance on 
Israel as did Bush and Gore in the year 2000 (Helmreich, 2001).  
 
Regulation 
 
Lobbying has incurred several rounds of regulation that have increased its 
transparency. Every scandal was followed by a new regulation to correct the flaws in 
the system. Unlike in the 1930’s, lobbying no longer solely depends on the skills and 
the connections of the lobbyist because legislation has rendered lobbying more 
transparent and more institutionalized (Rosenthal, 1993) . The most important 
regulations are the FRLA (the Federal Regulation Lobbying Act 1946), FARA 
(Foreign Agent Registration Act 1938) the LDA (Lobbying Disclosure Act 1995) and 
HLOGA (the Honest Leadership and Open Government Act 2007) 
 
The first general law applicable to lobbying at the federal level, the Federal 
Regulation Lobbying Act (FRLA), was passed in 1945. This law was, however, 
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overshadowed by the Administrative Procedure Act and the Federal Tort Claims Act 
that were enacted during the same year. FRLA became irrelevant and was ignored 
on all sides (Fried et al., 2011). In1954, The Supreme Court, in the case United 
States versus Harris, weakened the law even further by narrowing its jurisdiction. 
Finally, the Department of Justice abandoned attempts to enforce the FRLA. 
 
 The Lobbying Disclosure Act of 1995 was put in place after many public disclosures 
of lobbying abuses (Levine, 2009). In 2007, following the Indian Casinos scandal, in 
which Jack Abramoff and Michael Scanlon illegally gifted and made campaign 
donations to legislators in return for favours, as well as secretly orchestrating 
lobbying against their own clients in order to force them to pay for additional lobbying 
services, came the Honest Leadership and Open Government Act (HLOGA) (Suzan 
Schmidt, 2005).The act enforced the LDA which had no real sanctions  (2010b). 
However, in the case of Arab Gulf lobbying, FARA is the most important regulation. 
The law is characterized by vast amounts of disclosures that registered lobbyists 
must file as well as by control over the activities they undertake. 
 
The law arose specifically in response to a perceived propaganda drive by Adolph 
Hitler to promote the Nazi movement in the United States. The Nazis strongly 
lobbied with the Congress in order to prevent the US from joining the war. President 
Franklin Roosevelt and many members of Congress believed that Hitler was helping 
finance the Nazi movement inside the United States. 
 
Registration is required under the Foreign Agent Registration Act (FARA) (22USC 
611 et seq) for those who lobby the US government on behalf of a foreign 
government or political party. Those lobbying for foreign companies, however, may 
register under the Lobbying Disclosure Act (LDA) instead. Foreign principals include 
a foreign government, a foreign political party, or a foreign government majority-
owned company; (Bogardus, 2011) As of July 2, 2007, there were approximately 
1433 registered foreign agents (Gelak, 2008). 
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FARA’s primary purpose was to limit the influence of foreign agents and propaganda 
on American public policy. According to the Department of Justice, “FARA is a 
disclosure statute that requires persons acting as agents of foreign principals in a 
political or quasi-political capacity to make periodic public disclosure of their 
relationship with the foreign principal, as well as activities, receipts and 
disbursements in support of those activities.” FARA not only involves traditional 
lobbying, namely contacts with lawmakers by a registered lobbyist on behalf of a 
foreign entity, it also involves any attempt to influence U.S. policy on behalf of a 
foreign principal, which goes beyond traditional lobbying and often means public 
relations, strategic consulting and legal work for foreign interests. All such activities 
should be disclosed to the Department of Justice (Bogardus, 2011).  
 
However, the role played by foreign lobbyists varies a great deal. To some a foreign 
lobbyist is only a contact point between a foreign diplomat and the US lawmaker; to 
others, the lobbyist acts as initiator of a relationship. FARA does not include 
everyone representing a foreign interest [22 U.S.C. §613]: Diplomatic personnel do 
not register under FARA. The same applies for individuals working on soliciting funds 
from the US for medical and humanitarian purposes, and those who promote non–
political causes such as religious, academic and scientific causes  Foreign 
companies can also avoid FARA and register under(LDA if they are not majority- 
owned by a foreign government. In short anyone eligible to register under LDA is 
exempt from FARA (Atieh, 2009). 
 
The case of foreign private companies is interesting as not only are they are not 
required to register under FARA, but they can create their own PACs and fund 
elections as long those who contribute to the PAC are American citizens (2013a).  
Countries that engage in the most intensive lobbying campaigns include long-term 
allies like Turkey and previous adversaries like Libya. Wealthy countries like the oil-
rich United Arab Emirates are also players, but so are poor nations like Ethiopia. 
Even tiny countries such as Monaco have a lobbyist to represent them with the US 
government. Every six months FARA compiles the disclosures and sends a report to 
Congress to ensure transparency and accountability ( 2005).  
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FARA is also used to protect the US from agents acting on behalf of terrorist 
organizations. Rob Kelner, who leads the political law practice at Covington & 
Burling, the business and corporate law firm, said Justices use FARA as “a 
convenient tool in espionage and terrorism cases.” In 2010, former Representative 
Mark Deli Siljander (R-Mich.) was convicted on a FARA-related charge after not 
registering his work on behalf of the Islamic American Relief Agency (IARA) in 
Columbia, Mo. IARA is an American organization that was established in 1985 in 
Missouri. However, in October 2004 the FBI and the Joint Terrorism Task Force 
raided its offices and its operations were shut down as it was indicted because of its 
connection to the Taliban (Bogardus, 2011). FARA was used even though the 
Islamic American Relief Agency is an American organization. But the alleged links to 
a terrorist group meant the case fell under FARA. Therefore the lines between FARA 
and LDA are not very clear. Though FARA excludes many categories such as 
charitable contributions, humanitarian and scientific projects, some countries 
deliberately disclose all their activities in order to safeguard themselves from scrutiny    
 
The dilemma regarding disclosure is ongoing. Though, for example, President 
Obama introduced additional disclosure requirements to limit the influence of 
lobbyists on decision making (2010b), some claim that by increasing the 
requirements for disclosure the government pushes lobbying  underground 
(KIRKPATRICK, 2010). Also given that lobbying is an integrated process that 
involves many elements it is difficult to keep it totally under control (Fried et al., 
2011).  
 
On the other hand, though FARA  was put in place to monitor the activities of foreign 
principals trying  to influence policy making in the US, this is a difficult task given that 
many countries have engaged their kinsmen who have established ethnic lobbies 
and that influence the US government and public in favour of their country of origin. 
These ethnic lobbies file under LDA as they are American organizations representing 
a faction of American citizens (Paul and Paul, 2009, Smith, 2000). 
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In addition to government regulation under LDA and FARA, some non-governmental 
associations were created to monitor lobbying activities and ensure that lobbying is 
done in a transparent manner. The Sunlight Foundation was established in 2006 for 
this purpose (SunlightFoundation.com). Besides this governmental and non-
governmental regulation, today’s lobbying world involves more lobbies who check on 
each other. The big business lobbies are kept in check by labour lobbies, for 
example. Therefore lobbies are very careful in disclosing their activities in order not 
to entice their opponents to attack them (Smith et al., 2013) 
 
 
Factors for success 
 
Lobbying has become an integrated effort with several dimensions: grassroots, direct 
contact with legislators, issues of concern, coalition building, media and public 
relations, direct lobbying, information to legislators, strategy (Schlozman and 
Tierney, 1986) According to Shlozman and Tierney the elements that lead to 
success of lobbying are: a large membership, expertise and organizational 
capabilities, financing, well known leaders, good reputation and a good image, a 
wide circle of contacts, strategically placed allies and an appealing cause 
(Schlozman and Tierney, 1986).Today lobbies have grown in influence and the way 
they interact with the government is more sophisticated. Their role has grown 
beyond representing interest groups; lobbies contribute to campaign financing and 
provide information to legislators (Witkin, 2007). In a nutshell, the factors for success 
can be divided into three categories: the grassroots, the approach, and the financing 
 
Grassroots 
 
The most important factor for success is the grassroots. The US is a democracy and 
legislators tend to be very responsive to their constituencies. The surest way to 
influence a legislator is through his constituency. This is because the number of 
votes he receives is the sole determinant of his election. Even Baumgartner, who 
studied the effects of money, found that money has effects only because it is a 
45 
 
means to reach out to a legislator’s constituency (Baumgartner et al., 2009a). Some 
legislators have refused funds for their campaigns offered by groups for fear that it 
will be badly seen by their constituencies (Khan, 2000).Therefore a lobbyist can 
never ask a lawmaker to vote for a bill that is unpopular among his constituents 
(Levine, 2009) . 
 
Lobbies try to mobilize their own members or sympathizers in order to influence 
legislators. Ideological lobbies have high rates of activism among members such as 
in anti-abortion groups. Grassroots support is very important in ethnic communities 
that are politically active. Some communities do not have activism in their culture 
such as the Arab American community (Khoury, 1978). Associations and citizens’ 
groups are more likely to have grassroots organizations than businesses because 
they have a large number of members. However, businesses sometimes have a 
grassroots base. Businesses usually use their suppliers, their subcontractors, and 
their employees as grassroots. These are very helpful in the case of companies that 
have a negative image, such as arms contractors or alcohol manufacturers.  
 
This is why arms manufacturers try to spread their subcontractor base as much as 
possible to make sure they have enough grassroots to guarantee support for their 
positions with the Congress (Smith, 1996). Similarly, alcohol companies that have 
little sympathy from the media, and are fought by many citizens’ groups that are 
against drunk driving, find grassroots support very helpful. Their political strength is 
where they have bottling plants as they employ a large number of people. 
Additionally to their employees, they use their network of wholesalers who 
themselves have a large constituency of employees (Rosenthal, 1993). Grassroots 
lobbying is exempt from the Lobby Disclosure Act of 1995 which requires lobbyists’ 
to identify clients’ money that they spend and the policies they influence. 
 
There are two types of grassroots for an issue: one is spontaneous and one is 
induced. The first type of grassroots is of existing groups such as the American 
Association of Retired Persons (AARP) or the pro-Israel lobby and these are 
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mobilized whenever an issue pertaining to them is raised. The other type of 
grassroots is formed as a reaction to an issue. When DP World tried to manage 
ports in the US, a large portion of the public was against the deal, which created a 
grassroots base. The lobbyists in such cases press the “hot buttons” to direct public 
attention towards a certain issue or to raise its salience  (Smith, 1996).  
 
Approach 
 
In addition to having a significant constituency, a sound comprehensive approach is 
needed to make a change in policy. The approach should include a public relations 
campaign as it is very hard to lobby for an issue that has a negative image. 
Additionally, the group should have a sound and consistent narrative that is 
appealing to the general public and they should approach legislators in a strategic 
manner i.e., they should be very attentive to the venues chosen for lobbying. 
 
The best strategy to go hand in hand with a grassroots campaign is a strong public 
relations campaign and issue advocacy in which media is used to shape public 
opinion. The media’s role is to inform people. A study by Grossman and Helpman 
(1996) showed that, the more informed voters are, the more likely that their 
preferences will be reflected in their election choice, whereas an uninformed voter 
will be most likely to respond to campaign rhetoric and to make choices that do not 
totally reflect his preferences (Chowdhury, 2004). 
 
Media has evolved to become an important tool in lobbying. Interest groups’ 
representatives are sources for major TV networks. Media is used to increase the 
salience of an issue to constituents as well to officials (Cooper et al., 2007). When 
policy makers are not receptive to demands by the lobbyists, they usually try to 
increase the salience of the issue to the general public so as to put pressure on the 
legislators (Victor, 2007).  Some advocacy groups establish a website, radio or a TV 
station to disseminate their views and to mobilize grassroots. This blurs the 
distinction between media and propaganda (Birnbaum, 2012) . This was visible when 
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Fox News promoted the agenda of the advocates of war on Iraq and skewed 
reporting in their favour (Kitty, 2005). Also media is used by candidates. This is why 
candidates when campaigning keep raising the salience of issues in their favour and 
those that disadvantage their opponents. Additionally, media can generate interest 
group activity with significant news about a bill (Dusso, 2010).  In a nutshell the 
media is a main element in building a positive image of a group or an issue. It is very 
hard to lobby for an issue or a group that has a negative stigma (Baumgartner et al., 
2009a).  
 
Technology offers an additional important tool of information and has rendered the 
role of grassroots even more important as it enables them to closely monitor their 
representative (Smith et al., 2013). 39% of Americans follow politicians 
online(Suwaidi, 2013). Technology also gives interest groups a better tool to 
communicate with their members and to mobilize them whenever needed.  
 
In addition to its own constituency, successful lobbying involves gathering as much 
support as possible. This is why coalitions are an important element in lobbying. 
They increase the uniformity of the messages sent to policymakers and increase 
their impact. Coalition size provides a signal to officials on the viability of the 
proposals presented, given the strength of the opposition or of the support for a bill. 
Also a coalition allows for lobbying to be enriched with input from several sources 
(Nelson and Yackee, 2012).  
 
A study by Baumgartner, Berry, Hojnacki, Kimball and Leech (Baumgartner et al., 
2009a), found that citizen groups can earn the general public sympathy and can 
captivate the media, therefore they are an important element in coalitions that target 
major issues. The study concluded that favoring a strong coalition to achieve an 
important policy outcome often involves recruiting some major citizens’ groups to 
come along. This is despite the fact that citizens’ groups do not have the resources 
that business groups have and despite the fact that the federal reports for the year 
1996 showed that businesses make up 40 percent of registrants, with trade 
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associations in second place and citizens’ groups a distant third comprising only 
about 14% of registrations (Baumgartner et al., 2009a) .      
                                                                                                                                                                  
One factor in the success of lobbying is choosing the right venue or “access point”. 
(figure 1) It is very important to find the right access point to raise the issues. The US 
has a system that is characterized by the separation of powers and by a disbursed 
power structure, which  offers numerous access points to affect policy making 
(Ehrlich, 2008). The main venue for lobbying is usually the Congress, though interest 
groups can also lobby the executive and the legislative branches. The fact that the 
legislators are elected and are responsive to their constituents gives the interest 
groups a greater impact (Davidson et al., 2011).  
 
 
 
The former speaker of the House, Sam Rayburn, used to say that ‘a legislator's first 
duty is to get re-elected’ (Mathias, 1980).Although Congress is the most receptive 
venue for lobbying, there are other factors that drive lobbying activity. When there is 
opposition in a certain venue, lobbyists are likely to lobby in that venue to counteract 
the effect of negative lobbying. Lobbyists tend to choose the venue for two reasons: 
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first of all, to maintain their relations with the policy maker, and second, to show their 
group that they are active and vigilant (McKay, 2012, Hojnacki et al., 2012).  
 
However, it is important for a lobbyist to know who to approach. The access point 
has to be chosen strategically. Intuitively, lobbyists would look for  easy access 
points, i.e., points that are most receptive to their demands, and try to use them to 
influence other decision makers  (Ehrlich, 2008).  
 
In addition to the relationships interest groups have with different officials, the right 
choice of access point is based on the knowledge of the stakeholders involved in 
making a decision, such as the committees or agencies considering the issue and 
their members as well as the drivers behind the position these members take 
(Leech, 2006, Victor, 2007).  
 
Sometimes the drive behind a committee member’s choice of committee is 
ideological, sometimes it is populist driven by his constituency preferences, 
sometimes the choice is partisan (Levine, 2009).  
 
The choice of the lobbying venue also depends on the nature of political relations 
between Congress and the executive branch. In a time of little conflict between the 
two, or when the government is unified, interest groups tend to focus on the 
executive branch. In times of conflict, interest groups usually have more influence in 
their opposition to the administration as  they have more leeway in lobbying  
Congress to push their agenda (Bennedsen and Feldmann, 2006).  
 
The executive branch is also an important venue for lobbying; the President needs 
support from interest groups for his policy initiatives. The National Security Council 
provides the president with expert advice (Schlozman and Tierney, 1986). In  the 
seventies, President Ford realized the importance of interest groups and established 
the White House Public Liaison, a staff agency designed to reach out to organized 
interests (Schlozman and Tierney, 1986). Another channel in the White House is the 
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Presidential Advisory Commission and Task Force, on which interest groups can 
serve.  
 
Agencies are another important venue that interest groups can use. Congress has 
delegated policymaking rulemaking to executive agencies. It has also set up 
mechanisms to limit executive agencies’ discretion. The courts review the executive 
agencies’ decisions to make sure they abide by Congress’ limitations. One way to 
guide rulemaking is by having the proceedings open to the public, under ‘notice and 
comments’. This allows interested groups and their lobbyists to contribute to drafting 
proposals. Under this formula, interest groups negotiate a rule with the concerned 
executive agency, but the latter has the ultimate decision to implement it or not. This 
type of lobbying is considered less adversarial than lobbying Congress (Witkin, 
2007). As a consequence of rulemaking, executive agencies become an important 
venue for lobbyists (Bennedsen and Feldmann, 2006) .   
 
One very important agency that interest groups can approach to influence legislation 
is the Office of Management and Budget. This office oversees any rule that implies 
an outlay of $100 million and over (Smith et al., 2013). This is one way to indirectly 
influence Congress. Reverse lobbying is also practiced by executive agencies, by 
using interest groups to exert pressure on Congress. Sometimes the opposite 
applies and interest groups go to Congress to influence the executive branch 
because of its supervisory powers (Schlozman and Tierney, 1986) . . However, to 
remove the grip of interest groups on executive agencies, Congress opened the 
proceedings to the public. The Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) passed in 1966 
requires agencies to provide citizens with access to public records upon request. 
However, too much material was considered classified. In 1974 Congress modified 
the law and made it easier for the public to get information  (Schlozman and Tierney, 
1986). 
 
The last resort of interest groups is the courts. They use the courts when the 
executive and legislative branches are perceived unfavourably (Hansford, 2004) .But 
courts take a long time to solve issues, which is an important reason why interest 
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groups try to avoid them. Moreover, the justices are appointed for life which makes 
them insensitive to interest groups’ pressure. However, interest groups try to 
influence the nomination of Supreme Court judges (Findley, 1989).  
 
The most common way to influence a court decision on a lawsuit is by filing an 
’amicus brief’. This is usually part of counteractive lobbying, by which interest groups 
try to influence the environment in the court by providing justices with information on 
the case in front of them. They usually couple it with an interpretation of the law that 
is relevant to the case. Alternatively, they may present the court with information on 
verdicts concerning similar cases, which is very compatible with the common law 
tradition (Solowiej and Collins, 2009) .The Administrative Procedure Act encourages 
interest groups to go to court to overrule agencies. Interest groups can do this by 
either filing a test case by which the constitutionality of the legislative or executive 
act under consideration is contested, or they can plead on the behalf of plaintiffs 
(Schlozman and Tierney, 1986). 
 
On the other hand, when an interest group lobbies, it should know at what level it 
should lobby, whether at the local or state level. Too often advocates spend their 
time lobbying at the wrong level of government. For example, one should not 
approach Congress to have a stop sign installed on a street, nor contact the mayor 
for the Alternative Minimum Tax (Shaw, 2001). However, the different levels are 
interconnected as Congress issues legislation that affects the fifty different states 
and provides a framework for these states to issue their own legislation.  
 
At the state level, lobbyists can bypass the legislative body by taking an initiative and 
submitting a proposal directly to voters. Twenty six states allow some form of direct 
legislation in which the electorate has the power to change laws. Therefore, an 
interest group can draft a proposal and collect a number of signatures and present 
them to the legislature for consideration. If the legislature does not pass the ballot it 
is put before the voters to decide. The  voters’ initiative can either be to propose a 
new measure or to oppose a bill that has already been passed by the legislature 
(Rosenthal, 1993).  Those who use such an initiative are usually citizens’ groups that 
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enjoy public sympathy and whose issue is of general interest such as limiting taxes 
or governmental reforms (Baumgartner et al., 2009a).  
 
In addition to choosing the right level and access point, a strategy involves the 
degree of lobbying. The lobbying level, or how aggressive it should be, depends on 
many factors. Interest groups tend to lobby more aggressively when an issue has 
high salience among the general public (Victor, 2007). Also interest groups tend to 
be more aggressive when they have support from policy makers and have a sizable 
number of allies inside the beltway. The more controversial an issue, the more 
intense the lobbying that will be needed  (Leech, 2006).  
 
 
Funding  
 
Since lobbying is an integrated process that involves several elements, each of 
these elements requires funding: campaign contributions, media, research, and 
internal communication/incentives to keep the cohesion of the group. Therefore 
funding is an important element to any lobby and securing a continuous source of 
funds is necessary to the success of any lobbying effort. Non-profit organizations, 
that can engage in lobbying directly such as the 501(c) (4) category, or indirectly, 
such as  the 501(c)(3) category, obtain their resources from dues, fund raisers, state 
and local government grants and contracts. Research and advocacy organizations 
and social welfare organizations receive a third of their revenues from the 
government .However, politically active organizations rely less on government funds 
than non-political organizations (Leech, 2006) .It is noteworthy that their start-up 
funds come from private donors, while government funds are usually solicited for the 
maintenance of the organization (Walker, 1983).   
 
Some non-profit organizations have profit-oriented sister organizations. The costs of 
the non-profit organizations are shifted to the latter. Such costs are tax deductible for 
the profit-oriented organizations. In this case, the profit organization subsidizes the 
non-profit while drastically reducing its tax burden. (Ainsworth, 2002). 
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On the other hand, in Walker’s (1983) survey, membership dues were mainly from 
occupational groups, since these groups could shift the cost of the membership to 
their agencies. Citizens’ groups had little revenue from selling selective incentives or 
from dues. Most revenues came from outside sources. 
 
Walker found that for non-occupational groups most leaders set up the group by 
attracting funds from outside the group. The first preoccupation was to bring the 
group into being and to keep it going until revenues were large enough to meet 
operating expenses. This is difficult for citizens’ groups where memberships are 
large; it is more difficult to reach all potential members than for occupational groups. 
Leaders must begin with a fairly large staff to create a far flung membership base  
(Olson, 2009). Also dues come mostly from occupational groups; in citizens’ groups 
dues are less important. Dues of occupational groups are usually charged to 
employers. Without such subsidies, a lot of the members would drop out. 
 
Walker divided group income into three categories: routine income that includes 
dues, conference and advertising fees and constitutes the largest source of income; 
non-recurring contributions from non-members which include donations from 
government, foundations and individuals; and miscellaneous income that can include 
various sources such as loans, sale of assets, and investment among others 
(Walker, 1983). Another point worth mentioning regarding the dues is the so-called 
Black theorem. As shown in Walker’s sample, dues make up  a large percentage of 
the income of many groups  The theorem states that the dues that a member is 
willing to pay is equal to the utility of the benefits he gets from the membership 
(Ainsworth, 2002).  
 
The contributions to influence the election are channelled through the PAC system. 
The PACs are called political organizations or 527s. So by law they don’t engage in 
lobbying, but only in political activity   Only American citizens or immigrants with 
green cards can contribute to a federal election. However, foreign-owned companies 
with branches in the US can have their own PACs as long as their employees who 
donate money are American citizens  (2013a). 
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Federal election committees are federal PACs that influence elections and report to 
the FEC (Federal elections commission). The federal unconnected PACs that make 
“independent expenditure only” are not limited in size and are called Super PACs. 
The 527s do not have to file to the FEC but must register with the IRS (Schadler, 
2012). PACs act like single issue groups: they select a candidate based on his 
loyalty to the industry or the issue and usually allocate contributions based on the 
voting record.  PACs are more likely to contribute to the candidates in their districts, 
or to candidates serving on committees of interest to them (Gopoian et al., 1984).  
 
The structure of the American system has given to lobbying a crucial importance in 
policy making. Despite the different views on lobbying , it a fact that  groups who 
lobby have higher chance of tilting public policy in  their favour .However, lobbying is 
a complex phenomenon that is governed by multiple factors. And those who have 
the most effective and successful lobbying are those who have a vocal constituency, 
the proper approach, have the adequate funding, and plead for a cause to which the 
general public is sympathetic. 
 
Theoretical framework 
 
Identifying the key areas of concern for the research is a prerequisite for building a 
theoretical framework. The literature review will help identify the current state of 
knowledge in the key areas on which the research questions will be based. As 
discussed before, the only previous work dealing directly with the issue of Arab 
lobbying. is The Arab Lobby: The Invisible Alliance That Undermines America's 
Interests in the Middle East by Mitchell Bard.. The book assumes that Arabs Gulf 
States do have a lobby that influences the US  foreign policy  in the Middle East 
however Bard also states  that do not have an indigenous support base for a lobby 
(Bard, 2010). Those two assumptions will partly direct this research. Thus I will 
examine a set of theories on group formation and mobilization, and the barriers that 
prevent pro-Arab groups from becoming a strong lobby. Hence, the relevance of 
“subsystem theory,” which states that certain policy areas are exclusively controlled 
by some groups, will be examined. 
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Group formation and mobilization 
 
The literature on interest-group formation and mobilization underlies the theoretical 
framework for this research. In large groups, that Olson also calls latent groups, 
where no single individual’s contribution makes a difference to the group as a whole 
and will not affect the benefit of any single member of the group, different individuals 
will not be motivated to work towards the collective good unless there is coercion or 
external inducement (Olson, 2009).  
 
Another problem which arises and which is different from that of the free rider, or of 
those who benefit from the collective benefit without making any contribution, this is 
the problem of organization of the larger group. The creation of a group involves 
organization and communication costs. These costs, which represent a hurdle that 
must be overcome before any collective good can be obtained, are necessary to 
ensure the cohesion of the group. Also large groups need to create a certain 
ideology. This undertaking is called farming the ideology. It needs mass media and 
cannot be achieved by interpersonal relations alone, hence, the need for funds. If 
members are continuously bombarded with propaganda, over time social pressure 
incentives develop within the group, which can help the latent group to work for the 
collective good rather than individual self-interest. The larger the group, the more 
coercion or outside incentives are needed (Olson, 2009). 
 
Olson also explains that such incentives cannot be restricted to the collective good. 
They have to be separate and selective, in order to stimulate a rational individual in a 
latent group to act in a group-oriented fashion. Selective incentives mean that only 
those who join the group will benefit from it. However, such incentives need not be 
material. They can be emotional or social, like peer pressure or the appearance of 
being socially accepted (Olson, 2009). 
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Olson’s practical explanation of his theory extends to the success of certain lobbies 
in overcoming the collective action problem. He explains that these lobbies are 
successful in overcoming this problem because beyond their political objectives they 
are involved in non-political activities that provided direct benefits for their members 
and hence they have a captive membership. The lobby in such a case is a by-
product of whatever function an organization performs, that enables it to have a 
captive membership. He states that “an organization that did nothing except lobby to 
obtain a collective good for some large group would not have a source of rewards or 
positive selective incentives that it could offer to potential members. Only an 
organization that also offered private or non-collective products, or provided social or 
recreational benefits to individual members would have a source of these positive 
inducements. Only such an organization could make a joint offering or ’tied sale‘ of a 
collective and non-collective good that could stimulate a rational individual in a large 
group to bear part of the cost of obtaining the collective good” (Olson, 2009). 
 
Olson illustrates his case by comparing the American Medical Association (AMA) to 
that of the American Association of University Professors (AAUP). The AMA’s 
political influence is much stronger than that of AAUP, although both organizations 
represent important constituencies. The structural difference between the two 
organizations is that the AMA performs two kinds of functions for its members. In 
addition to crafting unions and protecting the interests of physicians, the AMA 
provides services to its members. These services include publishing of scientific 
journals, standardizing drugs, and organizing conferences, among others. The 
AAUP, on the other hand, has only a political dimension, which consists of 
unionization and protecting the interests of the professors. For scientific and 
professional services, members of the AAUP  look for professional organizations in 
their subject fields (Olson, 2009). 
Another way to overcome the collective action problem is for a large group to have a 
federal structure, or be formed of small closely knit groups. Small groups do not have 
the free rider problem and the organizational costs are small. This is due to the fact 
that individuals know each other and are geographically close, so communication 
costs are minimal. Federal groups consist of a number of small groups each of which 
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has a reason to join the umbrella group. The small group, since it is closely knit, has 
social leverage, or can use social inducement to mobilize its members to act towards 
the goals of the federal group to which it belongs. Olson draws on the works of 
George Homans, a leading American scientist, who argues that small groups have 
more durability than large groups. In Homans’ words: “formal organizations that 
articulated the whole have fallen to pieces” (Olson, 2009).Olson explains that in a 
small group it is highly likely that voluntary action can solve the group’s collective 
action problem. However, a large latent group cannot act according to the common 
interest of the whole group as long as members are free to further their individual 
interests (Olson, 2009). 
 
Olson gives as an example the way national unions draw their power from small 
local unions. The federation members who belong to small local unions have the 
advantages of the small group (Olson, 2009). The federation concept is a bridge 
between Olson’s theory, where a latent group can overcome the collective action 
problem by acting like a small group, and Salisbury’s (1969) theory of mutual 
exchange. Salisbury’s theory complements that of Olson. Olson talks about the 
maintenance of groups, whereas Salisbury focuses on how to motivate a group of 
people to act as an initiator for a policy change. Salisbury’s theory implies that 
rallying people around a cause for a sustainable period of time is almost impossible. 
The only way for an interest group to remain mobilized is when there is a beneficial 
exchange. This means that both the leader and the members benefit from the 
relationship.  
 
To overcome the collective action problem Walker (1983) came up with a middle-
ground proposal between Truman (1958) and Olson (1968). Whereas Truman said, 
that groups form spontaneously, and are driven instinctively to act in their own 
interests to protect themselves from threat, and whereas Olson refuted this theory by 
demonstrating how difficult it is to get people to act together, Walker found a solution 
to Olson’s dilemma. His research showed that groups resort to outside help in order 
to get funds and resources to pay for the organizational costs of the group as well as 
to induce people to get mobilized. Walker based his theory on the changing typology 
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of organizations in the American system. The sixties witnessed a growth in citizens 
groups that did not have the incentives discussed by Olson.  
 
Walker tested and confirmed this fact from a sample of 913 organizations, 564 of 
which came back with answers that helped him come up with his research 
conclusions. From the analysis of the surveys, Walker concluded that the main 
problem facing interest group organizers is how to bring these groups into being and 
to keep them going until revenues are large enough to meet operating expenses. He 
adds that unlike professional communities that are closely knit, and where members 
can shift the costs to the companies or agencies that employ them, citizens groups’ 
memberships are extremely large and the members do not know each other. Their 
common interest is not clear to everyone; therefore, they need to start with a large 
staff and sizable funds to reach enough of their far flung potential membership and to 
create a stable organizational base (Walker, 1983).  
 
Walker also found that providing start- up funds to an untested political entrepreneur, 
or patronizing a cause that might cause controversy, requires boldness. The data he 
collected showed that among all patrons, private individuals are most likely to 
provide backing for new organizational ventures, much more than organizations and 
governmental agencies (Walker, 1991). Walker also mentions the legal/ taxation 
system in a country. The fact that contributions can be tax deductible encourages the 
provision of resources from outside organization/business (Walker, 1983). 
 
The theory of Walker on building successful grassroots organizations and on 
resource mobilization ties in with the theory of McCarthy and Zald (1973, 1974), who 
demonstrated how successful social change entrepreneurs build access to needed 
resources from elites outside their immediate constituencies. Critics of this theory, 
such as McAdam (1982), say that the resources should be internal. McAdam gives 
the example of the civil rights movement, where indigenous black organizations such 
as churches and colleges and chapters of the National Association for the 
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Advancement of Coloured People, provided communication channels and the 
needed resources to mobilize people (Nyden, 2008).  
 
In a way, the theories of Truman, Olson, and Walker are compatible with each other. 
Although an initial shock is necessary to create awareness among a latent group, 
and give an opportunity to entrepreneurs to create a political interest group, the 
theory of Olson focuses mainly on maintenance and survival of the group. Other 
social scientists, Eldeman (1964), Gamson (1975), Lipsky (1970), Salisbury (1969), 
and Wilson (1973) have elaborated further on Olson’s work by demonstrating how 
difficult it is to organize groups whose members have nothing more in common than 
an idea or a broad cause. 
 
 The originality of Walker’s research stems from his investigation of how groups were 
able to overcome the collective action problem without resorting to Olson’s solution, 
which consists of providing selective positive or negative incentives. He explains that 
even if a group, such as a citizens group, cannot provide incentives to draw 
membership, such groups have flourished due to the existence of patrons. He states  
that “the key to the origins and maintenance of interest groups in the United States 
lies in the ability and willingness of the patrons of political actions to expand the 
representative system by sponsoring groups that speak for newly emerging elements 
of society and promote new legislative agendas and social values” (Walker, 1983). 
Graziano adds to Walker’s findings by saying that, in addition to locating funds 
outside the immediate group, the Olson dilemma can be circumvented if the group is 
faced with a threat (Graziano, 2001).  
 
Walker also found that financial support is provided to a group for a purpose, as 
patrons expect to receive a return for their aid (Walker, 1983). Here, the theory of 
Walker meets that of Salisbury, stating that mutual beneficial exchange is the basis 
on which groups can be maintained. This is affirmed in Friedland and Alford’s theory 
of the utilitarian economist which states that people operate with means to an end 
and that they are rational in their choices. Thus, they evaluate their participation in 
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social relationships based on cost versus the benefits they get from these 
relationships (Friedland and Alford, 1991).  
 
Barriers to entry 
 
The decision of a group to be active politically is related to the socio-economic and 
political environment, and whether or not this environment promotes such behaviour 
or raises barriers to entry and prohibits new groups from lobbying. Two relevant 
theories to be examined in this context are: 1) subsystem theory, in which one small 
group has control over certain policy areas; and 2) the theory of how to break this 
subsystem and allow for new entrants. 
 
The first theory is the one of the dominant system; whereas one interest group has 
developed a special relation with legislators which create a kind of barrier preventing 
other groups from accessing those legislators and hence they become the prime 
source of information and funds to those legislators. As a result, they dominate the 
discourse in this specific policy area. The dominant subsystem or the inertia is 
broadly discussed by Roger Friedland and Robert Alford (1991). They speak of 
organizations exploiting niches that the political environment provides in order to 
create inertia, a state of ‘isomorphism’ in order to preserve their interests (DiMaggio 
and Powell, 1991). The theory of ‘isomorphism’ states that in certain fields the 
government works through private organizations. It also explains the ‘homogeneity’ 
in certain government institutions, the lack of change and the ‘irrationality’ in certain 
decisions that the government makes (DiMaggio and Powell, 1991). 
 
Di Maggio argues that in the process of creating a system, organizational actors 
develop practices that in the long run create a certain environment that constrains 
their ability for further change (DiMaggio and Powell, 1991). So as legislators start 
relying on certain interest groups to fund their campaigns, get information, and liaise 
with their constituencies, they create a system to which they became captive. Di 
Maggio speaks of ‘structuration’ of certain policy areas. Due to the increase of 
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interaction of organizations with government actors, an ‘inter-organizational’ 
structure emerges .This structure is dominated by patterns and set coalitions  
therefore the decision makers tend to take their information from fixed sources. This 
is how some groups control the discourse in certain policy areas, such as the pro-
Israel lobby and the discourse on Middle East policy. This creates a common 
understanding among the different stakeholders that they are together in a ‘common 
enterprise’, which makes it difficult for new players to penetrate such set structures 
(DiMaggio and Powell, 1991). 
 
Additionally to the pre-established relations, the dynamics of lobbying favours the 
status quo as it is harder to lobby for a change than to lobby to keep the existing 
status. McKay noticed that it takes four times the effort to introduce change than to 
fight it. It takes 3.5 lobbyists to work towards a new proposal in order to counteract 
the effect of one lobbyist opposing it. (McKay, 2012). Dominant subsystems are 
referred to as ‘iron triangles’, and involve issues of low salience to the average 
American, i.e. issues that have little importance to the life of the average American. 
In such a situation, the legislator can respond to the lobbyist’s narrow interest, act 
ideologically, or return a favour to a colleague. He can do that because he knows 
that whatever position he takes, it will not affect his re-election (Thurber, 1996). This 
subsystem can be linked to Ken Kollman’s theory, which examines shared policy 
preferences among legislators, the executive branch, and interest groups .He 
concludes that these shared preferences create inertia in certain areas of public 
policy. For example, agricultural committees are manned by members coming from 
agricultural areas. Those members usually show interest because such committees 
have a direct relevance to their constituencies. These elected officials, who occupy a 
position on the committees, will tend to steer public policy in a way that is favourable 
to the interest groups in their constituencies. Kollman finds the relationship between 
committees and interest groups to be rather consensual. He also finds a correlation 
in ideology between interest groups and the committees they lobby. This correlation 
does not stem from a choice to lobby with friends but from the fact that interest 
groups and committee members that share jurisdiction with these groups tend to 
share a similar ideology. He states that ”what looks like friendly lobbying is biased 
representation by interest groups and committees” (Kollman, 1997).  
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Therefore subsystem theory represents an embodiment of the control of a narrow 
interest over public policy in certain areas. However, Luigi Graziano  has found that 
lobbies have broken down ‘triangles’, which has led to more democratization. The 
entry of new groups and their interest in certain issues has broken the congressional 
monopoly over some areas. This has led to the disruption of ‘safe havens’for many 
interests. The ‘triangle’ as described by Graziano has a defined program, people with 
direct interests and well-defined actors. However, he introduces a new concept, 
namely the issue network, where there are new polices with vast social implications 
and direct and indirect interests but where the actors are not well defined (Graziano, 
2001). 
 
Another consequence that stems from the sub-government model is rent seeking 
behaviour. This behaviour, as highlighted by Olson and Krueger (1974), refers to the 
practice of a group trying to spread the costs of a project while solely retaining the 
benefits for themselves. The theory has two aspects: one has to do with the costs of 
a certain policy, and the second part is concerned with disclosure of information 
regarding a certain policy. However, on such issues reversing the trend involves a 
high cost to the individual payer relative to the expected gains due to the costs of 
lobbying or campaigning against such policies. A rational taxpayer would likewise not 
have an incentive to try to stop such behaviour. Olson’s problem then re-occurs 
because in order for the total expected gains of the collective to outweigh the costs, 
the group of taxpayers must be significantly large (Atieh, 2009). 
 
 Therefore, to reverse the current pre-established relations between policymakers 
and interest groups, a larger group should be involved and affected by the policy in 
order to spread the costs and efforts of lobbying. One example Thurber gives is oil 
policy. Prior to the 1973 embargo, oil politics were controlled by producers. The 
embargo, which affected the average American through long waiting lines at petrol 
stations, and led to an increase in the costs of air tickets, among other effects, 
launched oil policy into public discourse. A policy that was controlled by well-
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organized subcommittees and administrative agencies became television headline 
material and started affecting the day to day life of the average American. (Thurber, 
1996). Thus, Thurber concludes that one way to break through the monopoly over a 
policy area created by the subsystem is to increase the salience of an issue in the 
eyes of the average American. 
 
From the literature review we see that there is no real lobby in action for Arab Gulf 
state. The Arab Gulf does not have an indigenous base; the Arab American activism 
cannot be considered as an important force in US politics. Therefore, the theories 
that guide the research revolve around what it takes to mobilize people   and what 
can prevent them from taking this action. This theoretical framework as well as the 
literature review will direct the research questions and will frame the objectives of the 
dissertation that will be fulfilled by a mixed methodology. The methods used to 
conduct the research will be detailed in the following chapter. 
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Chapter 2: Methodology  
 
Synopsis of the research project 
 
This project aims to investigate the lobbying patterns and practices of Arab Gulf 
states in the United States. To that end, it considers two cases—one successful 
case of lobbying and one failure—examining the factors behind these cases of 
success and failure and draws broader conclusions from them. The case studies as 
well themes that will be detected from interviews conducted will be reconciled with 
the theoretical framework and the literature review in order to come up with proper 
propositions and conclusions as well as recommendations regarding Arab Gulf 
lobbying.  
 
Methodology 
 
Since this study is exploratory in nature, and since not much has been written on the 
topic of the Arab Gulf state lobby, a qualitative approach to the research is used .A 
qualitative approach is used to explore new areas and develop hypotheses, while  
the quantitative comes later on to test and validate those assumptions (Miles and 
Huberman, 1994).  
 
Triangulating the findings using different methods is a good way to check for validity. 
This is similar to looking at one topic from different angles and seeking 
complementary information at different stages of the research to get rigorous 
evidence (Wolf, 2010). Triangulation may be used at the theoretical, methodological 
and data levels. The theories comprising the theoretical framework will be 
triangulated with themes that are extracted from the research through a grounded 
theory method (Stake, 1995). The research will try to find whether the general 
theories in lobbying are applicable to the Arab case or not, and also whether the 
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themes identified conform to existing theories. Three qualitative methods will be 
embedded and integrated: cases studies, discourse analysis, and grounded theory. 
 
On the design of a mixed methodology there is no blueprint because there is no ideal 
structure to mix subjectivity and objectivity, deduction and induction (Evans et al., 
2011). Frieder Wolf reviewed literature that uses mixed methodology, and 
recommended not to subscribe to a ‘one-size-fits-all’ solution, but to use ‘tailor-made 
triangulation strategies’ that fit the research questions in hand (Wolf, 2010). My study 
starts with grounded theory guided by a theoretical framework. Case studies are 
used to validate and elaborate on the propositions extracted from the “grounded 
theory”. This methodological triangulation minimizes a researcher’s subjectivity 
(Parmelee et al., 2007). Discourse analysis will be used to analyse elements of the 
case studies, including interviews, media coverage, official statements, and official 
documents. 
 
 “Grounded theory” is the anchor method for the present research. Grounded theory 
is used when there is very little research on a subject (Creswell and Clark, 2007). 
From in-depth interviews I will generate concepts or themes or propositions 
regarding the Arab Gulf states’ lobbying in the US. However, the concepts generated 
from the grounded theory are contextual. The data collected from interviews is value 
laden and subjective and is governed by many factors such as the socio-economic 
and political environment, the interviewee’s perception of the issue under research, 
personal experience, even the interviewee’s mood at the time of the interview. 
Hence, on their own they cannot be used for generalization. Triangulation is needed 
to enhance the validity of the findings.  
 
I start with grounded theory to try to detect patterns or features in Arab Gulf lobbying. 
Then I go back to some of the grounded theory propositions and test them with 
another qualitative method which is the case study. The case studies show how the 
different elements of lobbying interact with each other and affect each other to lead 
to a case of success or failure.  
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The purpose of triangulation is to offset the biases from one method by cross 
checking with other methods in order to converge towards a single perspective 
regarding an issue or a phenomenon. However, mixed methodology sometimes 
results in contradictory findings which require further in-depth analysis for resolving 
such inconsistencies (Jang et al., 2008). At the data level, triangulation will be 
undertaken to improve the validity of information used in the analysis. The same 
information will be checked using different sources. For example when inferring that 
Arabs have a negative image in the United States the statements of opponents of 
the deal that were given in the Congress will be analysed in addition to coverage in 
the US media. This will increase the validity of my findings. 
 
Grounded theory 
 
The research problem, literature review, and the theoretical framework make the 
conceptual framework of the grounded theory. Those components also give a 
perspective to the themes emerging from the grounded theory. The emerging 
themes give an indication of the elements to be examined in the case studies. These 
patterns are verified in the real life situations that the case studies represent. Some 
of the findings from grounded theory will be checked by consulting records from the 
Sunlight Foundation (a watchdog that records all lobbying activities of foreign 
lobbyists). For example, when one proposition of the grounded theory states that 
Arab Gulf states do not work jointly on any issues, I consult with the records to see 
whether this proposition is valid.  
 
Grounded theory was developed by Glasser and Stauss, who saw it as a more 
systematic procedure to collect and analyse qualitative data (Charmaz, 2003). The 
phrase means the theory is grounded in the behaviour, words, and actions of those 
being studied, and that the theory is grounded in data that have been systematically 
obtained through research. Grounded theory derives from a general abstract theory 
of a process, action, or interaction that is grounded in the views of the participants 
(Creswell, 2009). Grounded theory has an inherent tendency for verification as the 
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researcher stays in the field until the interviews/observations become repetitive and 
no more new themes are generated (Goulding, 2002). 
 
Grounded theory enables prediction and explanation of behaviour. It comes up with 
well-defined categories and hypotheses that can lay the foundation for future 
research. Also grounded theory is used when the area of interest has received little 
attention in the literature.  
 
Grounded theory was a reaction against grand theory that couched sociological 
theories at a very abstract level. It is grounded in the behaviour and the action of the 
group investigated, hence the name (Goulding, 2002) 
According to Corbin and Strauss, a theory is not absolute it is rather an interpretation 
made from given perspectives (Charmaz, 2003). A theory is provisional and subject 
to future elaboration. It is limited in time and may become obsolete. From this 
perspective about theorizing, grounded theory emanated. So subjectivity and limited 
validity are common elements between discourse analysis and grounded theory.  
 
The method is also useful in detecting patterns, which makes it appropriate for the 
identification of patterns in Arab Gulf states’ lobbying. David Ellis employed a 
grounded theory approach to derive models of the information-seeking patterns of 
academic researchers, for example. Although academic researchers had received a 
good amount of attention in the research literature, the problem itself was not 
adequately investigated in the literature (Ellis, 1993). Therefore the focus of the 
research was novel. The research problem was depicting the factors that affect the 
retrieval of information in social sciences from computer-based systems. The 
findings of grounded theory derived inductively from empirical data gave an 
indication about social scientists’ information seeking patterns. The findings were 
applied to give recommendations for an enhancement of the information retrieval 
system design (Ellis, 1993). Grounded theory provided clear propositions that led to 
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further research and resulted in practical recommendations to enhance computer 
systems (Goulding, 2002). 
 
One difference between discourse analysis and grounded theory is that grounded 
theory allows the conceptualization of data, therefore raising the level of thought 
about data to a higher level, whereas discourse analysis only allows us to analyse 
causality in a situation in which discourse is being analysed. Grounded theory 
transcends previous theories by inclusion and integration of data to come up with a 
dense integrated theory, while discourse analysis uses such previous theories only 
as frames to explain a situation (Goulding, 2002).  
 
Grounded theory presents a theoretical conceptualization of the patterns of 
interaction of the different social units or actors. It reveals processes as well as 
causality in incidents (Goulding, 2002). The data used for grounded theory has to be 
sufficiently large to allow constant comparison and theoretical sampling. What 
characterizes grounded theory data collection is that it is done simultaneously with 
analysis. The research in this dissertation relies on in-depth exploratory interviews. 
 
The conceptual framework is the basis on which questions are compiled and the 
initial sample is chosen. The interviews are in-depth interviews with respondents 
whose experiences can give us different perspectives on Arab Gulf lobbying: 
lobbying experts, Arab Gulf diplomats, US statesmen with experience in the Gulf, 
and Arab Americans…   
 
Interviews were transcribed line by line, and NVivo was used to extract “codes”. 
Codes are similar ideas that can be aggregated into a theme. The first batch was 
fully transcribed and codes were extracted; however if repetition was noticed in the 
second batch of interviews, I only transcribed and extracted codes when there was 
the potential for a new concept to emerge (Charmaz, 2003). Also interviews of the 
first batch were in–depth and covered all the range of questions handled in the 
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research. The second batch was more targeted and interviewees were asked 
questions pertaining to their experiences and of relevance to the case studies. As 
the research progressed the interviews became more targeted. 
 
I analysed the data using Nvivo, software that supports qualitative as well as mixed 
methods in research. Nvivo helps to depict the themes emerging from the interviews 
as well as to organize and analyse unstructured information in the interviews. When 
analysing interviewees’ answers, similar ideas and themes are grouped under one 
node. New nodes can be created as new themes occur. The analysis is done 
question by question, synthesizing the different emerging themes.  
 
I follow the approach that David Ellis (1993) used to display his analysis of the 
information-seeking pattern of academic researchers.  
 
Case Studies 
 
To test the theoretical framework, as well as the themes generated from grounded 
theory I use case studies. A case study represents a real life situation; therefore it 
offers a critical test for a theory. It gives a concrete real life reflection of the theory 
(Biketine, 2008). Case studies also are an experiential method of research, 
representing an overall empirical experience (Stake, 1995) as they feature how the 
different elements involved in a case interact with each other. I follow the 
instrumental approach where the case offers a mean to come out with findings 
concerning elements of the research, and is not by itself the object of research 
(Stake 1995). This contrasts with an intrinsic approach, in which all contents are 
important, as the aim is to deal with the case as an independent phenomenon. In this 
research, the unit of analysis is what makes lobbying succeed and what makes Arab 
Gulf lobbying works regardless of the country (UAE, Oman, KSA, Bahrain, Kuwait, 
Qatar) and regardless of the sector (defence, oil, trade, foreign policy , human right).. 
Therefore, I chose one case of lobbying success and one of lobbying failure. The 
AWACS episode is the case of success. This deal was different from other arms 
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deals, such as the sale of the F16 to the UAE. The AWACS deal was passed despite 
strong opposition from the pro-Israel lobby. In this case, the Saudis used their 
lobbying muscle to the full and it resulted in an iconic victory. The other case, the 
Dubai Port World (DP World) deal, in which the Dubai-owned company was denied 
the acquisition of six US ports, represents a failure in lobbying. Also the issue of DP 
World was not restricted to the business deal, as it had public relations 
repercussions on the UAE, and it was used to vilify the UAE and the Arabs. 
 
 The two cases, one representing an arms sale and the other a commercial 
transaction, do not represent all the elements of lobbying. Though each of the case 
studies represent a holistic view of the lobbying process (Stake, 1995), the elements 
that can be studied are limited to the content of the case. Therefore, the findings of 
the case studies will not provide complete answers, however they are more of an 
attempt to rationalize the facts with knowledge of the subject matter (Hamel et al., 
1993). 
 
One important element I will study is having grassroots interest: in the case of the 
arms sale it was workers who were involved in the deal who supported the deal and 
greatly contributed to its success, while in the case of DP World it was the American 
people concerned about the safety of mainland America who opposed the 
acquisition and led to the failure of the transaction. Neither of the cases involved an 
Arab American constituency, the constituency that is usually needed to have an 
ethnic lobby such as the pro-Israel, pro-Greece, pro-Armenia lobbies. In addition to 
the domestic base, the other variables I will examine are the role of foreign lobbyists, 
strategy and planning, support from the administration, the role of the media and the 
salience of the issue, and the strategic value of the Arab Gulf to the US. Analysing 
these elements gives an important input to critical assessment of the factors that 
have led to the success or failure of Arab Gulf lobbying. 
 
In addition to the fact that the elements to be studied are limited to the content of the 
case and hence  can only give partial answers to the reasons for success and failure 
71 
 
of Arab Gulf lobbying, the cases are circumstantial in nature; therefore they cannot 
be used to deduce with certitude a proposition (Stake 1995). Yinii states that an 
explanatory case study cannot prove anything with the certainty of true experiments. 
However, it is better than not making any inquiry at all  (Yin, 2003a).  
 
In this research I resort to theoretical replication as a means for triangulation. One 
theory or proposition generated from grounded theory will be checked in different 
situations to ensure its validity (Yin, 2003b). For example, to check the proposition 
about the importance of an indigenous base, I examine the F15 case, in which there 
was a domestic base to pressure the government, and contrast it with the DP World 
case, where such an indigenous base was lacking but where highly paid lobbyists 
were used. Comparing those two case studies that had contrasting elements allows 
me to build an explanation of the importance of having a constituency. 
 
Cross case analysis involves validating findings across several explanatory cases. 
This analysis starts by clarifying the proposition, the unit of analysis, and the nature 
of the relevant outcomes related to the difference in episodes (Yin, 2003b). My 
research presents two different episodes: one revolves around selling arms to 
another country and the other episode involves another country coming and 
managing ports in the mainland US. One is a case of success and one is a case of 
failure. In one case, the Arab Gulf states had an American constituency speaking for 
them and countering the opposition (AWACS). In the other case (DP World) no 
domestic constituency supported the deal. In both cases the deal had the support of 
the White House, however Reagan and Bush faced different circumstances. Making 
the comparison will allow me to more rigorously analyse my findings.  
 
Discourse analysis  
 
Discourse analysis is used in the case studies, namely in Chapters 4 and 5, that 
feature cases of success and of failure. It is used to analyse the interviews, 
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documents and media reporting (Alba-Juez, 2009) surrounding the cases. It is also 
used to test and validate the themes extracted from grounded theory regarding the 
factors that lead to success or failure. 
 
Discourse analysis is important as it helps to give a meaning to a certain 
phenomenon. It is based on the fact that the way people talk, and the way 
documents are drafted, reflect social relations among people. Discourse analysis 
explores patterns in oral and written statements, as well as in related practices 
(Scollon, 2008).  
 
In the process of analysis, the research will not stick to the linguistic oriented 
approach to discourse analysis but will use a broader approach, focusing more on 
the content of the discourse (Alba-Juez, 2009). Focusing on the content more than 
on the structure is more appropriate given that not all interviews were conducted in 
English. Some were translated; therefore applying the linguistic version of discourse 
analysis would not be appropriate. Critical discourse analysis bridges the gap 
between micro and macro levels of social order (Alba-Juez, 2009) i.e., from 
analysing a certain discourse one can conceptualize the bigger picture that this 
discourse represents. For example, at the hearing of the DP World case the 
transaction was questioned, however the larger picture the discourse represents 
puts into question the relationship between the US and the UAE. The discourse 
analysis method allows us to understand what arguments underlie the Arab Gulf 
states’ approach to lobbying. Through analysing interviews, hearings, and the course 
of actions in the two case studies I am able to develop a rational explanation for the 
Arab Gulf states’ approach to lobbying (Wodak and Meyer, 2009).  
 
I use critical discourse analysis (CDA) as it depicts power relations among people. 
This is crucial when undertaking stakeholder analysis, and when identifying who and 
what determines the course of events. For example in the course of the DP World 
episode, Eller& Co, a commercial company who had a legal feud with P&O, 
highlighted the acquisition to Senator Schumer and to the press. Schumer was a 
main stakeholder as he raised the salience of the issue and brought it to the level of 
public discourse. The interview analysis depicts the social language, the dominant 
themes, words, omissions, rhetorical strategies, or whether the interviewee uses an 
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anecdote or statistics to validate his/her point. The flow of argument, the strength of 
the arguments presented, the confidence shown by the different interlocutors, shows 
who is in the position of power. 
 
Studying the discourse of UAE officials, the language and expressions used, the 
information revealed, and the arguments presented and their sequence can show 
why the UAE was not able to defend its position before the American public, which at 
the time was generally against the deal. Similarly, in a study by Hanrahan, textual 
analysis of the discourse in science classrooms was used to see why teaching 
methods were failing. Discourse analysis was used assuming that the nature of the 
discourse in secondary classes could be a factor leading to the failure of the 
teaching methods (Hanrahan, 2006). 
 
Critical discourse analysis also shows how subjectivities are shaped and how the 
background and general perception of people makes them frame issues in a certain 
way. Discourse analysis reveals people’s perceptions. The strength of discourse 
analysis resides in its ability to analyse opinions and attitudes, put them in proper 
context and to understand the subjectivities that underlie them. Moreover, it allows 
the analysis of a certain situation without coming up with a generalizationiii.  
 
This is done by analysing the hearings in which the different officials presented their 
opinions on the issue, as well as official statements and reporting by the media. By 
examining reporting on how the American people viewed the DP World issue, we 
can see how their perceptions of Arabs shaped their opinions about the deal. In the 
same vein, the social and material conditions that influenced their view of the deal 
will be examined, such as the fact that the US has been subject to terrorist attacks, 
or the fact that the acquisition might mean a loss of jobs for American workers.iv 
 
Critical discourse analysis also deals with the issue of social power from the 
perspective of the ability of members of certain groups to control the acts and minds 
of members of other groups. Here, Van Djik (1993) introduces the concept of 
ideology. Ideologies are like languages, they are a shared social tool to solve 
communicative problems among members of a group. They constitute a basis to 
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coordinate social interaction with members of other groups (Alba-Juez, 2009). DP 
World shows how the political elite represented by Schumer and members of the 
Democratic Party were able to force a direction on public discourse that incriminated 
DP World, Dubai and the UAE.  
 
I will show how politicians took over the public discourse in the case of the DP World 
deal, and how they shaped the general image regarding it. To illustrate this 
statement, Nancy Pelosi claimed that the ports’ “security” could not be in the hands 
of a foreign government, even though the contract with DP World did not involve 
ports’ security as it was restricted to operational aspects (Zunes, 2006a). However, 
the general perception was that the UAE would be in control of the security of six 
American ports. Van Djik defines ideology as “the basis of cognitive beliefs that are 
the basis of social representation shared by the members of a group” (Alba-Juez, 
2009) v 
 
 The negative reaction to the DP World deal can be explained by the ideology that 
regards Arabs as terrorists. My research will also analyse how much of what is said 
is applied in practice. This application of discourse analysis is used to study policy 
making in a multi-actor context.  Runhaar, Dieperink and Driessen used this 
interpretation of discourse analysis to study the improvement of educational 
programs. They analysed perceptions and opinions of the different actors involved in 
the policy making process, looking at the discourse emanating from the different 
actors and saw how it affected the policy that was put in place (Runhaar et al., 
2006). 
 
In my research, in order to give background information on the case under study, key 
incidents that shaped it are identified and put in chronological order at the beginning 
of the analysis. Then discourse analysis is used to see how those incidents/actions 
created frames that shaped the course of events. Scollon used a similar approach 
when he analysed Alaska’s Beaufort Sea sale. (Scollon, 2008).  
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Outcome of mixed methodology 
 
In the conclusion, the theoretical framework, the inducted pattern, and the findings of 
the case studies are analysed to come up with a set of lessons about Arab Gulf 
states’ lobbying. The most important questions that the conclusion will address is the 
factors that make Arab Gulf states lose and what makes them win and why. The 
conclusion will also enforce external validity as propositions extracted from case 
studies and interviews will be set against existing theories. The academic 
contribution of this study lies in incorporating its findings with existing theory to come 
out with a dense theory regarding Arab Gulf lobbying (Charmaz, 2003). Internal 
validity will be ensured through methodological triangulation where several methods 
come out with the same finding.  
 
Data sources and collection 
  
The first set of data is derived from interviews with stakeholders in the lobbying 
process. The initial interview sample consisted of Arab diplomats in the US, 
American diplomats who worked in Arab Gulf countries, Arab-American heads of 
organizations, lobbyists handling Arab Gulf States clients, and lobbying experts. 
They were asked a set of eighteen questions that covered all of my research 
questions. Those are the core of my in-depth interviews from which I detected the 
patterns that govern Arab Gulf lobbying. 
 
The case specifics data set consists of interviews with insiders who were directly or 
indirectly involved in the cases. The interviews cannot involve all the main people 
who took part in the lobbying for two reasons. One reason is that they may no longer 
be on the job. The DP World issue happened seven years ago, while AWACS 
happened in the eighties. As for DP World, given that the case represented an 
embarrassment for the UAE and Dubai and the Bush administration, all my interview 
requests for people involved in the transaction were rejected. However, I was able to 
interview a member of the media who covered it and two “outsiders” who were 
familiar with the issue. For the AWACS case study, though it happened in the 
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eighties, I was able to interview two people who were involved in the transaction, in 
addition to observers. 
Figure 2 
 
 
 
Interviews 
 
Since grounded theory is the anchor method used in this research, I use the 
theoretical sampling by Glasser and Strauss, where the sample choice evolves as 
new concepts emerge in the course of the study. Ellis used this strategy when he 
researched the information-seeking patterns of academic researchers (Ellis, 1993). 
Therefore, the exact number of interviewees or the exact groups that make a sample 
was not determined in advance. Basically, interviewing stopped when interviews 
became repetitive. However, the theoretical framework and the research issue 
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dictated the first batch of interviews. I took the snowballing approach, in which by 
highlighting a fact, one interviewee guided me to interview someone else. 
 
Initially for the case study, two or three interviewees were identified as “helicopter 
interviews”(Runhaar et al., 2006), since these people gave an overview of the 
situation. The rest of the interviewees fell into two groups: the “insiders” and the 
“outsiders”. The insiders’ group is composed of people who were involved directly in 
lobbying for Arab Gulf states and includes lobbyists retained by Arab Gulf states or 
organizations, Arab diplomats and former diplomats in Washington, and 
congressional staff in the US government that dealt with Arab lobbying among 
others. Individuals who were directly involved in each of the case studies were 
potential interviewees and were targeted for interviews. The category of “outsiders” 
consisted of people who had observed Arab Gulf states’ lobbying and could give an 
informed opinion, though they did not participate directly in the lobbying process. 
These included journalists who covered issues such as DP World or had covered 
US-Gulf relations, heads of Arab-American organizations, prominent members of the 
Arab-American community, and members of “watchdog” organizations that oversee 
and regulate lobbying. It also included academics who have either conducted 
research on lobbying and its dynamics, or who have interests in Arab Gulf-American 
relationships. 
 
Interviews were conducted face to face or by telephone. Most interviews were 
recorded for convenience. The research featured three types of interviews. The first 
ones were long and went over all Arab Gulf lobbying and the case studies. The 
second type of interviews only posed questions regarding the case studies. A typical 
respondent of the second category was a journalist who covered the DP World case; 
he was informed on the DP episode, however he was not eligible to be asked 
questions about Arab Gulf lobbying. The third type of interviewees were asked very 
specific questions, such as for example, calling a political scientist in Kuwait to ask 
him about funding elections in the country, as literature on the subject was not 
available.  
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The nature of the research and the scope of the interview were revealed to the 
interviewee at the time of the request for the interview and a consent form was 
signed by both the interviewee and the researcher. However, in the case of the 
interviews conducted over the phone, the interviewees did not send back the 
consent form filled in and signed. In the case of very targeted and short interviews I 
obtained the verbal consent of the interviewee. Upon request, a copy of the 
transcript was sent to the interviewee. Also, upon request, one of the interviewees 
asked for the information sheet and the questions were sent prior to the interview. 
Unfortunately, in this particular case, after receiving the questions, the interviewee 
changed her mind and declined the request for interview.  
 
I used a semi-structured approach in my interviews, which gives flexibility while 
retaining some structure. Structure is needed for NVivo analysis. The semi-
structured approach ensured some consistency across the interviews, and enabled 
me to identify trends, and to compare and contrast the findings while giving a chance 
to the interviewee to become a participant in the study and not a mere respondent to 
a set of questions (Miles and Huberman, 1994). Sometimes the interviewee gives 
the researcher a new perspective on issues as well as flagging up new ones that 
were not on the researcher’s agenda.  
 
The duration of the in-depth interviews lasted from half an hour to two hours 
depending on how much the respondent elaborated, and how much time he was 
willing to allocate. As discussed before, some interviewees were asked a few, very 
specific questions. In their cases, the interviews were very short.  
 
Media coverage 
 
Media coverage is an important source of secondary data for the case studies. It 
allows me to gauge perceptions of the general public or the salience of an issue as 
well as giving me an account of events. The recurrent themes, the terms used, and 
the facts highlighted reflect public discourse on the issue at the time. In addition to 
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the reporting, interviews conducted by media outlets are an important source. I was 
able to retrieve interviews with Sheika Lubna Al Qassimi and Mohammed Sharaf 
with Wolf Blitzer on CNN. These interviews reflect the position the UAE took in its 
defence. It also shows what sorts of accusations it was facing.  
 
Foreign lobbying database 
 
Records of the foreign influence tracker are prepared by the Sunlight Foundation and 
Propublicavi . The information that the tracker features includes the date of the 
contact, name of the lobbyist, the firm, country, client, issue, level, method and the 
office, and the name of the lobbyist initiating the contact. The method reveals how 
the contact was made, e.g., by email, telephone call or meeting.  At the field level 
they show the contact and, in the case of contacting a congressional office, whether 
it was with a staff member or with the congressman himself. The information in the 
influence tracker is compiled from the updated lobbyist registrations in the 
Department of Justice. The Sunlight Foundation reports the names of members of 
the Congress and of the administration and their staff that were contacted by a 
registered foreign agent. However, the activities reported under FARA by those 
foreign lobbyists to the Department of Justice include all contacts with government 
officials, reporters, policy analysts at think tanks, academics and others (Shaheen, 
1997) An additional table lists the fees and expenses paid to each lobbyist. However, 
the data provided does not allow me to conduct a statistical analysis in order to infer 
patterns of Arab Gulf lobbying. The issues related to the contacts were not very 
clear. For example, a telephone call for a senator is recorded as bilateral relations. 
But contacts that do not involve lobbying are also recorded, such as invitation to a 
wedding reception. In addition, the table for fees was not consistent. However, 
consulting them allowed me to make broad inferences such as about the intensity of 
lobbying of each country and the bodies that lobby in each country.  
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Original documents 
 
Some original documents were also retrieved to enhance the accuracy of the 
information about the cases. In the case of the AWACS deal, different accounts do 
not detail the role of the lobbyist (Bronson, 2006, Simpson, 2008, Levins, 1983) and 
some works contradict each other. Therefore I retrieved the registration form for the 
Department of Justice of Fred Dutton in 1978 and the Crawford registration in 1981 
to see the scope of work the fees paid. This enabled me to evaluate the role of 
lobbyists and to see how Saudi lobbying evolved in terms of sophistication and 
scope. 
 
In the case of the DP World case, since the basis on which Eller & Co. started the 
whole issue was not very detailed in the media, and was blown up by Schumer and 
the Congress, I retrieved the case from the Florida court and compared it to the case 
in the British court. The lawsuit was presented to the British court as a business feud 
whereas in the US it had a completely different basis. In the US, the UAE was 
portrayed as being associated with terrorism and therefore as an ineligible business 
partner. 
 
Hearings records 
 
Hearings and Congressional reports constitute another extremely important source 
for my case studies. The hearings contain the arguments presented by each actor 
and enabled me to analyse the narrative that the Arab Gulf countries as well as the 
opposition used. The hearings are important as they allow me to see the different 
stakeholders in action and the position of power among them. While in the AWACS 
episode I can see that the Saudis represented by NAAA had a confident assertive 
approach and a comprehensive narrative, I show a weak narrative in the case of DP 
and that the DP representative got intimidated by opponents of the deal. 
However, due to the large numbers of documents I could retrieve from the 
Congressional library, I was selective in the analysis. In the case of DP World, I 
focused on a hearing in which DP executives testified and one in which the 
administration testified and tried to link the arguments of both parties defending the 
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deal and see the arguments of those opposing it. In the second case study, from the 
1978 episode, I analysed a speech by Jim Abourezk, as he was instrumental in 
securing approval from the Carter administration. In the AWACS episode, I focused 
on a hearing in which NAAA (National Association of Arab Americans) testified 
supporting the Saudis facing AIPAC (American Israeli Public Affairs Committee) who 
were defending the Israeli side. 
 
In a nutshell, given there is little literature on the topic and given that lobbying has 
been sporadic, I used grounded theory. Grounded theory is used when little research 
is available on a certain topic. This method will help me detect the patterns of the 
features behind Arab Gulf lobbying namely the factors that lead to the success and 
to the failure. The grounded method is the anchor method for this research and it will 
be the base which I use to check the theoretical framework. The next chapter is the 
product of grounded theory where various interviews where analysed to come up 
with themes regarding Arab Gulf lobbying. 
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Chapter 3: Patterns of Arab Gulf states’ lobbying and 
factors for success and factors for failure 
 
Patterns of Arab Gulf States’ Lobbying  
 
Patterns of Arab Gulf lobbying were inferred from the various interviews using a 
grounded theory approach. 
 
An Overall Poor Lobbying Effort 
 
The general impression of Arab Gulf lobbying is that it is poor. In a series of 
interviews held in 2012 and 2013, the following comments were relayed: “Based on 
my 12 years of experience on The Hill from 1982 -1994, I did not sense there is an 
active lobby”; “I have not seen any serious lobbying”; “There is no interaction”; 
“Zero”. The general impression is that Arab lobbying is poor to the point that is not a 
noticeable phenomenon. Another respondent, a former American statesman, said 
that the concept of the Arab lobby, or the fact that the lobbying is substantial enough 
to constitute a lobby, is an invented concept; he said: “I don’t think the Arabs do 
lobbying in any serious sense.  It is a joke.  I think the Israel lobby invented ‘the Arab 
lobby’ because they need to pretend there is an opposition.  But there is not anybody 
else on the other side of things.” 
 
Lack of a Coherent and Unified Strategy 
 
The other theme that emerged from the interviews is that the Arab lobbying effort is 
sporadic, unorganized and does not have a consistent strategy. “Even today Arab 
Gulf lobbying is very sporadic. It is not organized. It is, and I use the phrase a hit or 
miss. It is not sustained by a strategy, whether economic or military”. The same 
respondent, a lobbying specialist, characterized Arab efforts as “spurts of energy”, or 
a “blitz”, and as” not sustainable.” Further, as soon as the interviewees discussed 
Arab lobbying, they compared it immediately to the Israeli lobby in order to show the 
disparity in power. The same respondent who characterized Arab lobbying as “not 
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sustainable”, “sporadic”, and described efforts to date as a “blitz” said that Israeli 
lobbying is “very sustainable”. An American scholar that I interviewed said that Arab 
lobbying happens in a “piecemeal way”. He spoke of the initiative by Prince Al 
Waleed Bin Talal to fund the building for the Arab American Anti-Discrimination 
Committee as one good gesture to promote Arab Americans in the US but 
commented: “There are not many gestures like that”.  
A former Arab Gulf diplomat who participated in this research, acknowledged the 
different efforts by various Arab governments and individuals to promote a positive 
image of Arabs and the Gulf; however, he said that the problem does not lie in the 
lack of effort or will, but in the lack of a coherent strategy. He said: “I think there is an 
effort by everybody, but what we lack is a strategy of combining the best of what we 
have and going forward with that, so it comes out fragmented, because of that it is 
not effective”. 
 
To illustrate this point, one respondent, a communication specialist who works on 
Arab Gulf governments’ clients, compared the sporadic and case-by-case Arab 
lobbying effort to someone who has holes in his wall, and tries to stop the leakage by 
spreading his fingers to plug each hole. She added: “There is no strategy; there are 
incidents based on incidents. I need to do some work, I run and try and fix that, 
meanwhile there is another incident taking place that is also damaging; but they are 
busy with this one and go to that other one and try to do both of them but not fully 
right.” 
 
In describing the patterns behind Arab Gulf lobbying in general and how it fits within 
the dynamics of lobbying in the US, the response was almost unanimous: there are 
no patterns to talk about. The interviewees’ responses were: “I don’t know if there is 
a pattern”;  
 
“I don’t think there is a pattern”; and “It is almost nonexistent”.  One communication 
specialist said strategic Arab lobbying should be done by a body similar to the Arab 
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League and pointed out that the Arab league unfortunately has no money and is a 
dysfunctional organization. Arab countries do not typically channel money through 
the Arab League and that each country does its own bit separately. She said: “They 
do it individually, bit by bit”. 
 
 The inconsistency and lack of a unified and coherent strategy or position as 
described by one of the respondents is more of a reflection of the overall behavior of 
Arab countries and has filtered into their lobbying efforts. He gave as an example the 
case of joint anti-ballistic missile discussions between Arab Gulf states, saying, “To 
enable [a joint Gulf] anti-missile system to intercept Iranian missiles, interoperability 
and integration of the different systems are needed. The problem is that Arab Gulf 
states do not want to give up their sovereignty or decision making to Saudi Arabia. 
Despite GCC promises of unity, the project is facing difficulties. The UAE and Saudi 
Arabia are beginning to work together pretty well. Qatar, Kuwait, and Oman have to 
follow and they are not jumping into this. The Pentagon has been pushing since the 
eighties for a joint anti-missile system. The Saudis are all for it but the other Gulf 
partners are not”. 
 
Bilateral lobbying 
 
Most of the lobbying on the part of Arab Gulf states is bilateral lobbying. None of the 
issues are pan-Arab in nature such as the issue of Palestine. One respondent 
highlighted the lack of “collective work” between Arab states, and said that neither 
the Arab world nor even the Gulf countries are “on a single page”, and that they do 
their lobbying individually. One participant in this research commented that bilateral 
lobbying is a by-product of the way the Arab Gulf countries conduct their foreign 
policy with the US.This respondent mentioned as an example the antiballistic missile 
system that for years, the US has been trying to convince the GCC countries to 
adopt. One respondent, a former statesman who worked on this issue, said: “I was 
unsuccessful because they fight among each other”. He explained that each Gulf 
country independently, has a “wonderful lobby with the US”, working on narrow 
national interests. The respondent related this style of conducting foreign policy to 
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the tribal nature of the GCC societies. When asked about the UAE, he said, “Their 
tribe is doing fine; they don’t want to share anything with any other tribe. In a lot of 
ways it comes to the question of pan Arabism”. He explained further that if 
multilateralism was working in the Gulf, why is the GCC not as strong as NATO? 
Where is the GCC lobby?” Although there have been calls by different heads of state 
to have a common stance on certain causes such as the Palestinian issue (WAM, 
2012), each country conducts its foreign policy in an independent manner. From the 
www.foreignlobbying.org  data base records, lobbying is limited to bilateral lobbying; 
issues listed include UAE-US relations, and Kingdom of Saudi Arabia –US 
relationships. There is no lobbying for US-Arab Gulf relations.  
 
This is a feature that does not exist in the pro-Israel lobby where the lobbying effort 
is focused on a single country. In the case of the Arab world, or even the Arab Gulf 
countries, with the latter constituting a smaller and more homogenous universe, each 
country has different priorities as well as country specific interests it wants to push in 
front of the US administration. The general impression from the interviews is that 
each country tries to excel in its relations with the US, and does not seek to 
cooperate with its neighbors in order to have a better and collective bargaining 
power with the US. 
 
Short Tenure of Lobbyists 
 
Another feature of Arab Gulf lobbying efforts that came out of the interviews is the 
short tenure of lobbyists. A lobbying specialist that I interviewed said: “A lot of them 
[lobbyists] are short term, [hired] for a specific issue. The classic [case] was Dubai 
Ports World; they hired Bob Dole and a bunch of people very quickly because they 
realized they have a public relations problem”. This comment provided a clear 
example that lobbyists are hired by Gulf States on an ad-hoc and short term case by 
case basis. Due to the lack of a long term strategy, lobbyists have been hired as the 
need arises. Lobbyists have therefore not been hired to promote an overall narrative 
about the Gulf or any specific country. Their function is narrowed down to serve 
“tactical” objectives, most often commercial ones, and is complementary to bilateral 
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diplomatic relationships. Because the use of lobbyists depends on a specific tactical 
objective, they need to specialize in certain areas of expertise, depending on the 
issue at hand. The word “situational” was used by one of the respondents to 
characterize Arab lobbying. He said: “It seems situational; there are many [lobbyists] 
who had the embassy as a client for a long time. They hire a firm for a couple of 
years for a certain purpose, then go to another issue and [hire another] firm; that is 
somehow smart. Not every lobbying firm has the same strength and expertise and 
connections to government officials, so in a way, it makes sense”. 
 
Nevertheless, there have been some exceptions. Some lobbyists have developed 
relationships with embassies and have been working for them for a number of years. 
For instance, Patton Boggs has been the lobbyist for the US Saudi embassy since 
2001. This, however, is the exception rather than the norm.  
 
Inconsistent Messaging  
 
In addition to the features of Arab lobbying listed previously, another respondent, a 
lobbying specialist pointed out that messaging is sometimes contradictory, which 
“leads to people questioning [it]”. She added: “It gives the signal of weakness or 
inconstancy, and that is not acceptable”. Even with an individual Arab country’s 
lobbying efforts, the messaging is not consistent. One of the respondents, a 
communication specialist, said that Arab countries’ messaging does not have 
“continuity” since it tackles specific business interests, and does not include a 
narrative or general message of that individual country. To illustrate this, one of the 
respondents, a former senior congressional staffer, said that Arab countries spend 
money on hiring the top firms and focus on a specific issue they want to resolve, 
whereas the right approach is to build a “narrative”, a story that encompasses the 
issue at hand. 
 
Previously, the chief of staff of a prominent senator, and currently heading a lobbying 
organization, this respondent said that Arab countries give priority to high profile 
contacts over the message to be conveyed, and that this is a mistake. He added: “In 
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my opinion, I view Arab states make the number one mistake in lobbying; they hire 
some big name and pay them a lot of money and get little results. We want to have 
some big meetings! And they think that will make things work, as opposed to building 
the narrative.” 
 
A consistent long term narrative is related to the previous issue of the short tenures 
of lobbyists hired to accomplish tactical objectives. This has not allowed lobbyists to 
develop an overall narrative for their Arab clients. A lobbying specialist said that “the 
general trend among Arab Gulf States is to hire a big name”. He added that, “They 
think if we [Arab Gulf States] hire an important firm, then they will be able to take 
care of things. But this is not the way things work. The truth is you do a lot of 
education”. 
 
Moreover, clinching a meeting with a US congressman does not guarantee the 
passing of a deal. The key is to help the staff, who are mostly young graduates, 
formulate the proper brief to the congressman. The lack of a comprehensive 
message or “coherent narrative “, on the part of Arab countries was sharply 
contrasted by respondents to AIPAC’s messaging. One communication specialist 
said: “If you look at AIPAC, their narrative is promoting the Arab-Israeli relationship; 
but underneath the big tagline you have many small stories.”  
 
Another respondent, a former senior congressional staffer, highlighted that the lack 
of messaging is contributing to misconceptions in the minds of legislators, as well as 
in the mind of the average American. He gave the Pakistani ambassador as an 
example of a good diplomat who can portray a “positive image” of her country. When 
the respondent was informed that Pakistan is not an Arab country, he answered: 
“This shows you how badly the job is done; there is no discrimination. In the Middle 
East, there is Israel, then everybody else. So you have Israel [on one side], and 
every other nation is lumped into this other category. [In the] example of Pakistan, 
any country that is a Muslim country gets lumped into the Arab world. There is no 
coherent narrative”. He added: “there is no story. There is this sense of this 
undifferentiated mass that Americans think of in the Arab world“. “You need to 
develop your own story. You want Lebanon to be lumped with Pakistan? That is 
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what people think”.  
 
Furthermore, the Arab voice in the US is described as “quiet”, which leads to 
Americans viewing Arabs as a monolith. “They think Arabs are all the same”, one 
interviewee said. He asked: “How many congressmen have passports? Not many”. 
Therefore, given the nature of American society where the majority of Americans are 
engulfed in their own culture, Americans need to be taught about the Arab world.  
 
According to various respondents, the US needs continuous and consistent 
messaging about the Arab world. Neither Arab Americans nor Arab governments 
have accomplished this task, which remains an obstacle to lobbying. A former 
American statesman participating in this research  characterized the ministries of 
information in Arab Gulf countries as ministries of non-information, and that all that 
they are interested in is protecting the image of their respective royal ruling families 
rather than promoting the image of the country as a whole. 
 
Another theme that emerged from the interviews is that the reason why Arab Gulf 
States have not focused on their messaging is that they see no pressing need to do 
so. This is in stark contrast to Israel whose mere survival depends on US support. 
This was evident in the 1973 war. One respondent, a former senior congressional 
staffer said: “Israel’s got to do it because Israel is a small country. Their sole mission 
in their opinion is to survive; fear is a better motivator than greed. So they are very 
fearful. This bands their vision together. When you have an abundance of wealth, 
you’re not so motivated. When you are starving for a piece of bread, you are willing 
to do anything.” Contrary to Arab states, Israel has expended significant efforts over 
decades to promote a good image of the country and reaching out to Americans at 
various levels (Friedman, 1995). As a result, Israel has reaped the rewards: the 
Gallup polls conducted in February 2012 found that 61% of Americans sympathize 
with Israel (Mendes, 2012). 
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An inability to differentiate Arabs as distinct from other Muslim countries was sensed 
throughout the interviews with American respondents. When asked whether they 
were aware of any active Arab American organizations, respondents identified the 
Council for American Islamic Relations (CAIR), even though CAIR is a 
representative organization of Muslim-Americans and not Arab-Americans. To 
exacerbate this problem, profiling procedures adopted by the US government 
following the September 11 events have put Arabs and Muslims in one boat, with the 
perception that all Arabs are Muslims (Shammas, 2009). According to one 
respondent, an American scholar, Arabs are all lumped with “terrorists, wahabis, 
jihadis, or Salafis.” 
 
Another respondent, a former American diplomat to the Arab Gulf, described the 
messaging  of Arab Gulf governments as a “narrow band of communication” seeking 
to reach out only to the US State Department, with no attempt to reach out to the US 
Congress and to the American public at large. This is a key deficiency, because 
lobbying is a comprehensive and integrated effort. A former ambassador to an Arab 
Gulf country, commented by saying that the “supreme example is Prince Bandar Bin 
Sultan.  He had such a close relationship with the White House. If something 
happened, he could get the White House to fix it.  But that does not work anymore.  
You have to communicate with the masses -- with the whole country.  There is no 
one-stop shop anymore....There has been no lobbying with the political system. 
There have relations with the Secretary and Department of State.” 
 
No Domestic Support  
 
Another feature of Arab lobbying is that it does not have any domestic US support, 
as opposed to other country lobbies such as the Israel lobby and the Armenian lobby 
which have a domestic support base they can rely on to advocate a specific issue. 
The general impression therefore is that Arab Gulf states have distanced themselves 
from Arab American communities. The head of an Arab American organization tried 
to explain the lack of the Arab Gulf engagement in Arab American communities by 
saying: “I think the Arab Gulf has great interest to have the US protect it and work 
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with it. I want to say they need each other, I think they feel in their own way that they 
have been taken care of in the United States, they don t need us.” One respondent 
stressed that Arab states prefer to hire Jewish lobbyists rather than Arab Americans. 
She said that the general idea is that Arab American lobbyists are not as well 
connected as Jewish lobbyists. Another respondent, formerly the chief of staff of a 
Jewish senator, confirmed this point by saying Arab diplomats would be eager to 
meet with his employer, the Senator, because he is Jewish, and because their 
general idea is that Jews have the access and the connections. 
 
The answers given by Arab American groups reveal a yearning for support from 
Arab Gulf governments. One Arab American activist, explained: “You have to 
convince the Emiratis that Arab Americans are sophisticated, they are active and 
know their stuff, and that is what you have to convince them of”. This distant relation 
or bond between Gulf States and Arab Americans is in stark contrast with long 
running Israeli efforts to nurture relations so to create a bond between Jewish-
Americans and Israel. The classic example is the youth that spends summers in 
Israeli Kibbutz. There is no similar effort by Arab Gulf governments to appeal to the 
Arab American youth. 
 
When asking whether Arab American organizations have historically pushed 
politicians on Arab Gulf issues, the general answer was that they keep a low profile. 
The only exception from the responses was when one interviewee highlighted the 
crucial role of Senator Jim Abourezk in pushing for the F-15 deal. His role will be 
detailed further in the following Chapter. Abourezk used his bargaining power with 
the president, and gave a concession on another issue, in order to garner the 
support of the White House for the F-15 deal. 
 
This is not to say that Arab American organizations have not had any role in 
connecting Arab Gulf governments and the US. One respondent , an member of an 
Arab American organization, gave me the example of a trip organized by the 
National Council on US Arab relations (NCUSAR) for several US intelligence 
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analysts to come and visit the Emirates Center for Strategic Studies and Research, a 
UAE government sponsored think tank. The government of Abu Dhabi covered all 
costs of their visit to come to exchange ideas on intelligence gathering to fight 
terrorism. The interviewee described this activity as a “subtle” way to influence 
policy. She added: “These people have never been to the Middle East; their job is to 
analyze the Middle East and they have never been there. Here they are in Abu 
Dhabi. Here is a perfect example of the government using their money for 
educational purposes that influences policy. That is the perfect example.” The 
respondent gave another example where the NCUSARs took twelve American 
women to visit Saudi Arabia in the hope they could become advocates of Saudi 
Arabia in the US. These two examples are instances where Arab American 
organizations helped educate the US public and government on the Arab world. As 
good as these initiatives are, they pale in comparison with the role the American 
Jewish community or Evangelical Christians have played and continue to play in 
promoting Israel. The Israel lobby has a multitude of American organizations that 
work on creating a bond between Israel and the US (JINSA, Jewish Institute for 
National Security Affairs). To illustrate, JINSA is an institute dedicated to bringing US 
military personnel, ranking from retired officers to cadets, to visit Israel, as opposed 
to the one-off US intelligence officers’ trip to the UAE that was organized by the 
NCUSAR. In summary, past efforts using Arab American organizations to educate 
the US public about the Arab world and the Arab Gulf have not been consistent and 
continuous.  
 
Reliance on Diplomatic Relations 
 
The general response gathered from the interviews is that Arab Gulf states work 
their issues “quietly in Washington”. US relations with the Gulf were characterized by 
one respondent as varying from “very good” to “quite good” saying that Arab Gulf 
states have got their issues addressed through diplomatic relations. Some of the 
responses included the following: “They don’t need a lobby”; “Why would they need 
a lobby?”; “You have to ask them whether they really want a lobby”. The general 
assessment was that the Gulf has enough leverage through oil and military 
cooperation not to rely much on lobbying; it is seen as secondary to their diplomatic 
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effort. All the responses conveyed an idea in line with the following two quotes: 
“They send their officer when they have an issue”; or “They work through their 
established contacts with the State Department”. Again, this approach / attitude 
differs greatly from Israel’s, where reliance is placed heavily on the Israeli lobby to 
strengthen and govern the diplomatic relations between the US and Israel 
(Mearsheimer and Walt, 2007). One respondent said that Arabs do not lobby using 
the US system effectively, including building grassroots support, media relations, 
drip-feeding the US Congress with pertinent information, and so forth. Instead, Arab 
Gulf states rely on their relations with the US State Department through normal 
diplomatic channels. The respondent, a former American statesman, added: “They 
do not build support for any particular idea”. 
 
 Nonetheless, Arab Gulf states seem to have been able to push their interests 
forward with the US through normal diplomatic relations. The strategic importance 
that Arab Gulf states have through supplying the Western world with a large part of 
its oil requirements, and the permanent US military bases stationed in the Arabian 
Peninsula has provided these countries with strong leverage with the US. One 
respondent, a former statesman, said that even when the ambassador of a country 
as small as Bahrain addresses the US State Department, politicians pay attention. 
This is because the US military has a base in Manama. Another respondent 
described US relations with Saudi Arabia as follows: “A country like Saudi Arabia has 
a lot to offer financially in term of its oil industry”. Therefore the United States, even if 
it disapproves of some of the actions or polices of Saudi Arabia, the respondent said: 
“It weighs its options and thinks very carefully before coming out with a critical 
statement vis-à-vis Saudi Arabia.“ The US will not compromise its relationship with 
Saudi Arabia simply because this is not viable; you cannot cut off the person or the 
country providing most of your oil” A further example where diplomatic relations have 
been successfully used, according to another respondent, was the Emiratis who 
were able to achieve their objectives of signing an Aerospace agreement with the 
US. He said DP World was an exception to the smooth relations between the US 
and the UAE.  
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On the US front, decisions are driven by strategic objectives or concerns on certain 
key issues. It is diplomatic relations between the US and Arab Gulf states that set 
the mood for lobbying. For example, in the case of the F16 arms sale to the UAE, 
clearance was given for the deal because senior officers from the UAE interacted 
with senior officers in the US and explained why the deal was important for the 
stability of the UAE and the region. One respondent, previously a lobbyist for a 
military company said: “Yeah... at a very senior level, what matters is the relationship 
between the Arab Gulf states and the United States, at the diplomatic, foreign, and 
military policy levels. That had some good effect”.   
 
Another instance where diplomacy was successfully used according to a respondent, 
an Arab American activist is the 123 Episode, which is an agreement between the 
United States and the UAE on nuclear power development. She said that the 
success of the deal was not due to lobbying, but to the fact that the UAE government 
hired American advisors on the deal. These “smart” Americans created a program 
that is pro-American. She used the expression, “They served a program that they 
knew Americans will eat”. Then lobbying came as a formality. The respondent 
qualified the lobbying for the deal after it had already been negotiated and agreed 
upon through diplomatic channels, as an “easy job”. 
 
Despite the previous examples of successful Arab Gulf achievements through 
diplomacy, diplomatic relations are not always a guarantee for a flawless 
relationship. One respondent, a former statesman, was of the opinion that the 
relations Arab Gulf states have with the White House or the US State department are 
not sufficient to allow them to promote their issues or to “fix” the damage in case 
“something happens”. He said: “That does not work anymore.  You have to 
communicate with the masses -- with the whole country.  There is no one-stop shop 
anymore.”  
 
A case in point is the DP World example, where even the US president was not able 
to “fix” the damage caused by the anti-Arab campaign that criticized the deal on 
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security grounds and targeted the UAE. The DP world debacle made the UAE 
government aware of the importance of having good relations with the US Congress, 
as well as portraying a positive image of the UAE to the general American public.  A 
former American statesman who currently holds a position in a lobbying firm said, 
“Dubai was trying to buy ports in the US. They were rejected because they were 
labeled. We can’t deal with them because we can’t trust them; we are giving our 
security to an Arab nation that can fund or overlook terrorist attacks. That was huge 
blow”. After the DP World debacle, the UAE government started hiring lobbyists and 
giving consideration to this approach; prior to DP World, the UAE had only relied on 
commercial advertisements to promote Dubai as a tourist destination.  
 
Another factor, according to one communication specialist, that pushed the UAE to 
be more aggressive in its public relations and lobbying efforts, is the Dubai (property) 
crash. The UAE government wanted to rebuild international investor confidence in 
the UAE and in Dubai in particular. To accomplish this task, the UAE did not use 
Arab American organizations or constituencies to promote their interest. The UAE 
created hybrid entities to further their economic interests. The National US Arab 
Chamber of Commerce (NUSAC) is run by a seasoned lobbyist named David 
Hammoud.  NUSAC goal is “to strengthen Arab US business economic cooperation”, 
working with individual Arab countries and the US, or companies that want to expand 
overseas (wamda, 2011). The US-UAE Business Council has a similar function, as 
well as the Harbour Group, a quasi-lobbying, quasi PR firm that serves the business 
interests of the UAE. The latter handles public relations issues in order to improve 
the image of the UAE; examples include publicizing the UAE Embassy funding of a 
soccer field for the Boys & Girls Club of East LA in 20011. Other more politically 
focused issues include launching a website dedicated to support President Bush’s 
visit to the UAE in January 2008.  
Moreover, there are other entities involved in lobbying and PR efforts such as 
Qorvis, an offshoot of lobbying firm Patton Bogs. One of the respondents said: 
“Saudi Arabia made Qorvis a [full-fledged] company by investing so much money in 
it”. In a nutshell, even though Arab Gulf states do not have the PR and lobbying 
machinery that the pro-Israel lobby has, and that comprises  a host of non-profit 
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organizations under 501C(3) and 501C(4) status to promote Israeli-US relations on  
various levels, there has been some investment in commercial outfits to promote 
Arab Gulf business interests. 
 
Throughout the research I noticed divergence between those who think that the Arab 
Gulf are well represented and have their interests well taken care of by their 
diplomatic staff and their hired lobbyist and those who think that the Arab Gulf is not 
being well represented and is not exerting the influence it should have . The 
difference also lies on the level the different respondents view Arab Gulf interests. 
Those who define the interest of the Gulf as the sum of each country’s narrow trade 
and security interests seem to be satisfied with Arab Gulf lobbying. However, those 
who view the Arab Gulf interest as their ability to affect the US foreign policy on 
major issues such as its position from Iran or the Arab-Israeli conflict, tend to view 
Arab Gulf lobbying as deficient. 
 
Hiring Star Lobbyists 
 
“They hire lobbyist to do their bidding for them”. One respondent said that Arab Gulf 
states hire big names, thinking they can get influence in US policy circles, whereas 
these big name lobbyists do not provide influence but merely secure access. 
Describing the hiring of star lobbyists, a former chief of staff of an influential Senator 
explained: “They give access, but influence, not as much as you think”. The factors 
that drive the choice of lobbyists were judged by respondents as a “simplistic way” of 
looking at lobbying. The general impression by respondents was that Arab Gulf 
states are impressed by the big names, and they have the misconception that having 
access means achieving the desired influence. One respondent, an Arab American 
activist, said that one Arab Gulf embassy was interested in hiring someone to go and 
play golf with members of the US Congress. 
 
There are cases when a lobbyist can influence issues, such as job creation, when 
96 
 
dealing with a US Congressman on a particular committee; in this instance the 
lobbyist is not only representing the interests of the foreign government, but he or 
she is also indirectly representing the thousands of employees who might lose their 
job if the deal being lobbied for does not go through.  
 
One respondent, an Arab American activist, criticized Arab Gulf states for hiring 
lobbyists who were anti-Arab in their former government posts. She said Arab Gulf 
states hire people who do not know or care about the Arab world; they are only hired 
because of their perceived “connections”. The respondent gave Bob Dole and Jack 
Abramoff as examples; both were hired by Arab Gulf governments although they had 
adopted an anti-Arab stance at certain times. She added that “money talks”. 
Instances like these showcase the fact that lobbyists are used to achieve tactical 
goals rather than promoting an idea or supporting a narrative, whereby lobbyists’ 
negative stance towards the Arab world is irrelevant to their Gulf states clients. 
 
Another respondent, the head of an Arab American organization said that Arab Gulf 
states hire large prominent companies, but end up with a twenty-five year old doing 
the work for them. He thought that Arab Gulf states would actually be better off hiring 
smaller firms where the main person or partner behind the organization handles their 
account. He added: “They pay a lot of money but they end up ill-served by the 
companies they hire.” 
 
Furthermore, Arab Gulf states hire several lobbyists at a time. A member of an Arab 
American organization I interviewed said: “The United Arab Emirates, do you know 
who lobbies for them? They have 5, 6, 7, 10 lobbying organizations. They have 
many people on their payroll to get their interests forward. Heather and Tony 
Pedesta, Patton Boggs, they represent their legal interests, but they also lobby for 
them. There is DLA Piper; there is a law firm they created: the US-UAE Business 
Council, which takes money from the Emirates and lobbies for them. They go to the 
firm and say we want the 123 agreement; we want the free trade agreement with the 
UAE; they hire, they hire…”  
 
On the issue of money, Arab governments usually pay what a respondent qualified 
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as, “a handsome amount of money for a public relations organization, legal firm and 
so forth to work on their behalf.”  Asked whether the big names are worth the money 
they are being paid, most of the respondents said hiring the big names does not 
make a substantial difference. What actually matters is the narrative that a particular 
lobbyist is working on rather than his prominence as a person. The respondent 
added that value for money is not an issue for Arab Gulf countries because money is 
not an issue for them. Another respondent said: “It is stupid of them to spend so 
much money, but they do have money. I agree it is a waste of money, but money is 
like water to them.”  
 
Lobbying by Proxy 
 
Other than the hiring of lobbyists, there is a large amount of proxy lobbying on 
commercial issues of interest to Arab Gulf governments. These governments depend 
on their US counterparts to do their lobbying for them. One respondent who was 
involved in a military deal with the Arab Gulf said: “We used to do the lobbying for 
them”.  
 
One other respondent, a former UAE statesman who was involved in the F-16 sale 
to the UAE, said the lobbying for the deal was totally delegated to the three main 
contractors: Northrop Grumman, Lockheed Martin and General Electric. He said the 
UAE military was more involved in the technical specifications of the warplanes.  
 
Lobbying by proxy is effective because companies that indirectly lobby for Arab Gulf 
governments are domestic American companies. However, these companies’ 
lobbying is restricted to their economic interests and is focused on the deal at stake. 
Arab Gulf states’ reliance on their American counterparts to do the lobbying on their 
behalf is, according to one of the respondents who is a former statesman, a 
reflection of the nature of Arabs who, “don’t do things for themselves, they get others 
to do things for them. He added: “They don’t like to air their differences in public.  So 
they don’t come here and argue.”  
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Dominant Issues 
 
With regards to the issues that have been lobbied for by Arab Gulf governments, 
these have consisted of the issues that frame the relationship between the US and 
Arab Gulf states and they fall in the following categories: oil and trade, security, 
overall US foreign policy, and human rights. Most of the effective lobbying has 
revolved around commercial issues and military sales. UAE lobbying has been more 
sophisticated than that of the rest of the Arab countries, covering foreign policy 
issues such as Middle East policy and Iran sanctions. Lobbying by the Kingdom of 
Saudi Arabia has involved areas such as the war on terror, Middle East issues, and 
the Arab-Israeli Peace process. 
 
Bahrain’s lobbying was only initiated following the start of turbulence in the country in 
2011, and has mainly revolved around public relations efforts in order to improve the 
country’s tarnished image, accused of oppressing the opposition. All contacts 
reporting in the foreign lobbying influence tracker were contacts with the media. 
 
Arab Gulf states’ lobbying typically revolves around an arms deal which is vital for 
the particular country’s national interest, as well as around commercial issues. To 
push these issues, Arab Gulf governments adopted a much more targeted lobbying 
approach and they were able to achieve success. In these areas they were judged 
as “effective”. A lobbying specialist I interviewed said: “They were able to work their 
issues quietly in Washington”. He added: “They were trying to get into the stock 
market and were able to do that”. One respondent focused on UAE issues said: “The 
only issue where Arabs were not able to pull anything off was the Dubai Ports World. 
They were sand bagged and a company [Eller & Company, a Florida firm] was not 
able to work with them and play the terrorism card with [Senator] Schumer. 
Otherwise their lobbying has been effective lobbying.”  
 
On trade issues, Arab Gulf governments were able to score some success. One 
respondent said: “The most effective Arab Gulf lobby is that of the US-UAE Business 
Council, set up by Sheikh Mohammed himself. Danny Seabright did put forward the 
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123 agreement, [the nuclear agreement between the UAE and the US] he is the 
most effective lobbyist in town”.  
 
However, one lobbying specialist that I interviewed, pointed out that “it is a bit tricky” 
to say whether Arab Gulf states lobbying is effective or not, because of the nature of 
the issues that have been advocated. These issues are mainly commercial or relate 
to an arms deal, and are usually negotiated and agreed upon before they reach the 
approval stage. So saying that Arab Gulf states have been effective in their lobbying 
is misleading; again the issues they have typically opted to lobby for are “small 
issues” and none of these has an effect on US public policy. This could also be a 
result of the Arab Gulf’s mainly apolitical stance towards lobbying, and therefore the 
general attitude is to restrict lobbying to narrow national security and commercial 
interests.  
 
Client  
 
On the typical client representing Arab Gulf states, a lobbying specialist said: “Most 
of the time the client is the government itself, because it has enough money to pay 
for the lobbying effort, and one big reason for lobbying is to bring in more business 
trade or change [the country’s] image or perception; or it can be a group of 
companies that forms a group, and then hire a lobbying company in [Washington] 
DC to help them.”  
 
The foreign lobbying database shows that the different Arab Gulf countries have 
different strategies when it comes to the entities lobbying on their behalf. Each of 
Bahrain, Qatar and Kuwait is represented by two entities. For example Qatar is 
represented by the Government of the State of Qatar and the Qatar Financial 
Authority; Bahrain is represented by the Bahrain Economic Development Board and 
another entity registered as “Bahrain through Bell Pottinger”; and Kuwait is 
represented through the International Counsel Bureau and through the latter, the 
Kuwaiti Counsel for the Families of Kuwaiti Citizens at Guantanamo Bay. Oman 
does not have any lobbying representation as it does not show up on the records of 
the database (www.foreignlobbying.org). 
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Saudi Arabia and the UAE are a different case since their lobbying is more 
decentralized. Whereas each of their embassies is registered as a client, other Saudi 
and UAE government entities lobby separately. Examples comprise the King Abdulla 
University of Science and Technology or the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia Ministry of 
Commerce and Industry. 
 
The UAE appears with the largest number of clients. In total, the UAE features 30 
registered clients. It was described by one of the respondents as the most “active” 
embassy in Washington. In addition to lobbying at a UAE federal level, different 
emirates such as Dubai and Ras Al Khaimah are registered as clients (the UAE is a 
federation of seven emirates). Various government organizations are listed, such as 
the Dubai Civil Aviation, the Abu Dhabi Investment Authority, Borse Dubai Limited, 
even RAK ceramics, the publicly listed company. In addition to the various entities 
mentioned, some high profile personalities are listed as clients, such as The 
Executive Office of Sheikh Mohammed Bin Rashid Al Maktoum (Ruler of Dubai), or 
his wife, Princess Haya Bint El Hussein.  
 
Factors for winning  
 
As one respondent said, winning cannot be attributed to one element; it is a number 
of factors that come together and that result in success. He said: “I think the win 
cannot be attributed to one or two things; it is many things, and all the things have to 
come together to present a really effective story.” 
The key to successful lobbying and to winning on key issues advocated is to have a 
comprehensive strategy spanning the different aspects of lobbying. One respondent, 
a former Arab Gulf diplomat, said: “strategy, singleness of purpose, not deviating 
from the strategy, and not having a retort to any surprises”. He added that the reason 
they won on the F15 fighter sale was that they had a “clear strategy” that 
encompassed multiple fronts. “Not just money! People, media companies, 
everything, and publications, etc.” This respondent added that they had a 
comprehensive plan, and a contingency plan to manage unexpected incidents.  
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One respondent said that the most effective form of lobbying is aggressive lobbying. 
Lobbying is an art that revolves around confrontation.  The landmark case where 
aggressive lobbying was effective was the AWACS fighter sale to Saudi Arabia. One 
respondent described the attitude at the time as follows: “We marshaled our 
resources to the fullest extent.”  
 
A case illustrating the need for aggressive lobbying to win is the case of DP World, 
where one respondent said the way they handled the crisis was by keeping quiet and 
maintaining a low profile, which ultimately led to failure. DP World was advised by its 
lobbyists to keep quiet and to let the US president handle the issue for them. Despite 
the president’s efforts, the US acquisition of ports did not go through.  
 
Grassroots support is a crucial factor in winning issues. A former senior 
congressional staffer said “America is not so driven by money but by people and 
organization. Labor unions are very powerful because of their [grassroots] 
organization, not so much money. So many people are out there [Arab-Americans] 
but they are not organizing their message out. This is very important, this is more 
important than writing a cheque for 50000 USD, much more important.” 
 
 In the case of arms deals, Arab Gulf States have a constituency represented by 
people in the defense industry whose jobs are at stake. With regards to the F-15 jet 
fighter sale to Saudi Arabia, Prince Bandar Bin Sultan, Saudi Arabia’s ambassador in 
Washington DC, went to the different unions and organized them to voice their 
interests to their representative and push for the deal. This goes back to what 
Thomas Philip "Tip" O'Neill Jr., the former speaker of the US House of 
Representatives (1977-1987) once said: “All politics is local”. Each representative is 
interested in getting re-elected and therefore the grassroots are a crucial factor.  
 
One respondent said: “The arms sale is the only one [Arab issue] that has a 
constituency; it is not an arms constituency, it is an American constituency for jobs.” 
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Another respondent, a former long-time advisor at the US Ministry of Defense said: 
“These big programs like the F15 AWACS, and other large defense programs; these 
are usually related to defense issues and are important because there is an 
underpinning of jobs. Those kinds of things prevail when other things elude”. This 
quote highlights the importance of having a constituency. Nothing can beat the 
argument of the interest of the average American. When the respondent said “other 
things elude “, he indirectly pointed to other factors such as strategic considerations 
or opposition. This can be linked to the National Rifle Association (NRA) in the US; 
though many opponents have linked the rise in crime to arms possession in America, 
there has not been any action against arms possession due to the strong pro-gun 
movement that is supported by a large grassroots base. 
 
Coming back to the AWACS sale to Saudi Arabia, closing this deal represents an 
iconic victory. Prince Bandar of Saudi Arabia was able to link the deal with the jobs 
created or preserved in the making of the fighter jets and effectively conveyed it to 
the relevant constituency so to gain grassroots support for the deal. Success in 
gaining grassroots support was achieved on other arms deals, such as the UAE’s 
purchase of F-16 planes. A former advisor at the Ministry of Defense explained the 
reasons behind the success of the deal by saying: “The F-16 deal was won because 
the companies that make those machines employ a lot of people in a lot of 
congressional districts. This is why Gulf countries were able to get concessions and 
win on arms deals, whereas they were not able to achieve the same results in other 
fields. The key here is the grassroots [support] they were able to garner for the arm 
deals.” 
 
However, when Arab American organizations were asked whether Arab Americans 
played a role in achieving grassroots support for the Arab Gulf arms deals, the 
response was: “We had no dog in the fight”. The Arab-Americans had no interest, 
whether economic or ideological, that motivates them to push for these arm deals. 
They are however interested whenever the issues deal with the general US policy 
towards the Middle East, such as the war on Iraq, which according to one 
respondent breached “the American principles of democracy and freedom”; or the 
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plight of Palestine. In summary, for arms deals, grassroots support was by an 
economic constituency and not an ethnic one. 
 
Another factor in successful lobbying is to garner the vote of the Senators and 
members of the House Representatives who are on key committees. According to a 
former senior staff on the foreign relations committee, “The point is if you can get few 
key senators and House of Representatives people in key positions; a committee 
head or people on the Armed Services Committee make a big difference”. This is 
very visible in arms sales where the defense companies build factories in districts 
whose representatives serve on key committees.  
 
One respondent pointed out that arms companies have directors and shareholders 
who are in government, which helps to give a push to the deal they want approval 
for. She said:” The arms companies have a big lobby, and have people who have 
shares and who are on their board who are from the Congress”.  
 
Another respondent said that having a senator whose constituency benefits from the 
arms sale is key, as the politician will push hard for the sale and try to convince other 
members of the US Congress, the executive branch, as well as the Pentagon of the 
importance of the deal. This is a phenomenon that applies to foreign arms sales as 
well as to domestic sales. A former advisor to the Ministry of Defense who 
participated in this research said:” getting some key senators that control committees 
on your side is important; we constantly see a Congressman pushing an arms sale 
for the Pentagon that the Pentagon does not want. But there is so much pressure 
from state delegations or combinations to build weapons that the Pentagon does not 
want.” 
 
Another factor is the importance of the issue being lobbied. Going back to the 
AWACS deal to Saudi Arabia, the issue was “too big”, “to cave in to the opposition”, 
and therefore the magnitude of the issue and the multiple and important interests 
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involved superseded the counter-lobbying effort. One respondent, a communication 
specialist who worked for Arab Gulf clients said: “If the deal is too big to lose, they 
will not agree with AIPAC; but if the deal is too small, like the Lebanese artillery deal, 
they will go along with AIPAC.” In the case of the F-16 fighter jet deal to the UAE, the 
argument that was presented to the Bush administration by the defense companies, 
as well as by the representatives of the districts where arms companies housed their 
factories, was that these fighter jets were made in America, during a time when 
Americans needed jobs. “It was the question of America; American jobs and the 
American economy”, she added. 
 
The same respondent pointed out an area where Arab Gulf states can exercise 
leverage:  “Let me tell you what is tied to that issue in the US; because of our 
downturn, you are cutting spending on all defense fronts across the board. No more 
defense spending. So all of those big companies like Boeing, BEA are going to lose 
a lot of money because the government is cutting spending; they are going to the 
Gulf to make up for this money. The Gulf has got to keep the companies afloat; the 
Gulf has got to buy; the Gulf is going to create jobs. If the Gulf buys their product, it 
is going to keep American factories working. That is a very positive thing between 
Arab Gulf countries and Americans.” So in a time of downturn and defense budget 
cuts, arms sales to the Arabian Gulf have more salience because the manufacturing 
jobs are needed, and there is no other client to replace the lost orders. Hence, the 
salience of the issue increases, and can be effectively marketed to the general 
American public; in addition, the political representatives in the relevant districts tend 
to be more aggressive in defending a particular deal. There is a clear opportunity 
since, when times are better for the US economy, the orders placed by the US 
government are sufficient to create jobs and generate profits to the defense 
companies, and political representatives are not as adamant about supporting arms 
deals with Arab Gulf states. 
 
One respondent explained the key driver behind the support as follows: “How much 
money can they get out of it if the [defense] industry is working, jobs are being 
created, the planes are being sold? It is a lot of money. In front of AIPAC, you have 
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lobbyists for the planes, the engines, the Department of Defense (DOD); all these 
people go and lobby. When the deal is too big, those people have a strong case.” 
 
One common occurrence on big issues is the sort of negotiation that takes place with 
the opposition on arms sales to the Arabian Gulf, namely the pro-Israel lobby. One 
lobbyist detailed how the dynamics of lobbying work: “They say this is good for 
America; then they give up to AIPAC on something else if there is something else. 
They tell them we will refuse this deal but we can’t refuse that [other one]. Bottom 
line it is a business. It is not going to let go the billions in arms sales, or upset unions, 
the DOD, and defense companies.”  
 
One key factor that leads to the success of a lobbying effort or the passing of a deal 
is the sidelining of the opposition. A former statesman highlighted the role that Israel 
plays in arm sales to the Arab Gulf, he said: “In order to be successful in arms sales 
to the Gulf, you have to work with Israel, because the Israelis have always tried to 
veto weapons sales out of their fear at some point it would turn against them. I 
suggested to look at this arms sales deal for sixty billion dollars because of the way it 
was negotiated; it took three to four years to do it. The Saudis, through the 
Americans, explained to the Israelis what was going to be sold; what it would be 
used for. The Israelis agreed, and AIPAC did not put up a fight to stop it. That tells 
me that is an interesting way to lobby when it comes to arms sales to an Arab 
country anywhere near Israel; you have got to see how to work with the Israelis so 
they don’t oppose it”. A similar situation took place with the F-16 jet fighter sale to the 
UAE; although the planes requested were quite advanced, the deal went through 
because the Israelis were sidelined. At the time of that deal, Iran was the common 
enemy; therefore Israel was not interested in blocking the deal and denying the UAE 
an instrument to defend itself in the case of a potential confrontation.  
 
 In describing how the military sales are conducted, a former staff of Ministry of 
Defense said: “There have been very few military sales that have been denied”. So 
prior to reaching the “public discourse” or the issue that is to be voted in the US 
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Congress, a consensus will have usually been reached and a “story” will have been 
developed. This story will typically include “answers to the question”, in order to 
respond to the concerns of the possible opposition, namely opposition from AIPAC.  
 
In summary, the impression from the interviews is that there is a tacit agreement 
between Arab Gulf states and the pro-Israel lobby, that Arab Gulf States will keep a 
low profile on Pan-Arab issues, namely the issue of Palestine, and in return the pro-
Israel lobby will not block any deal that serves the national interest of Arab Gulf 
countries, such as an arms deal. 
 
Besides highlighting the impact of arms deals on the American economy, Arab Gulf 
states have relied on their diplomats to convince the American administration of the 
importance of the different arms sales. The strategic considerations are an important 
factor when legislators make decisions. This is what a respondent described as a 
“convergence of arguments”.  He pointed out that the United States is interested in 
keeping its allies “stable” and in maintaining their security. The fact that certain 
weapons are necessary for the security of an Arab Gulf country is an argument that 
is frequently used when those sales are being lobbied.  
 
One interviewee, previously the chief of staff of a US Representative, said that when 
she wanted to convince the legislator of a certain issue, she would say: “You have to 
vote this way because of all the Arab Americans back home in Michigan that are 
waiting for you to vote that way. You have all those Arab Americans that we raised a 
lot of money from, and you have to vote that way if you want to continue to raise 
money from them. And it is in the best interest of the United States; I would never 
want him to vote on an issue that is not in the best interest of the United States. Most 
of times this approach worked, but sometimes it didn’t, because there was pressure 
from the other side”. Our respondent thus placed strategic US considerations on 
equal footing with votes and money.  
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Nevertheless, US national interests or strategic considerations are presently more 
complex and more difficult to gauge, especially after the fall of the Soviet Union and 
the absence of a “concrete” enemy. A professional working for a lobbying watchdog 
and a former journalist said that there has not been a rewriting of US foreign policy 
following the cold war, which leaves a lot of margin to domestic lobbies to steer 
foreign policy. In this case, think tanks and lobbyists have a lot of room to present 
their ideas in order to “define” US strategic considerations. The pro-Israeli groups 
have been very active on this front, where they have promoted Israel as America’s 
ally in the “war on terror”. One respondent said: “Here, comes the role of Arab 
Americans who can work as one voice or through one organization to brief Congress 
and the American public”. However, the respondent noted that neither Arab Gulf 
States nor Arab Americans have presented the US government or public with a 
narrative in order to promote their views. 
 
An Arab American communication specialist elucidated that it is not really the ability 
of Arab Gulf governments and their American counterparts to define and position the 
strategic importance of a certain deal to the US government that matters, as much 
as it is the desire of the US government to engage with certain Arab Gulf countries: 
“Basically it is not an Arab nation’s ability in lobbying the congress as much as it is 
government thinking and weighing their options, when it is good to accept and when 
it is good not to accept [a certain deal]. The DOD is the department of defense; why 
would the government lobby the executive branch to clear an AWACS or F-15s 
deal? Because they have a base there, and if those planes are sold, they can send 
their teams to train and maintain the planes. It is a big thing for them.” 
 
So these deals are looked at as foreign policy tools to cement US relations with its 
allies. Another respondent said: “The government decides that it is in the best 
interests of the United States to provide this technology to Arabs. Many other 
countries consider it as an industrial issue; in the US it is a tool of foreign policy”. 
President Bush, when trying to veto the blocking by the US Congress of the DP 
World acquisition, argued that the Congress’ decision would alienate the UAE from 
the US, and would distance a strategic ally from the US (Zunes, 2006a). 
108 
 
Under arms sales, technology is sensitive to strategic consideration. Buying arms is 
an easy task, however getting the advanced technology is the hard part. A 
respondent who works for an arms contractor said that when approving an arms 
deal, the question that the US administration asks itself is: “If you are going to 
engage a country and give it advanced technology, what are you going to get out of 
that? The US takes a real-politics look at the arm sales”. The technology transfer, 
whenever approved, has to support US foreign policy and national security interests. 
 
Technology transfer is also dependent on the specific relationship between a country 
and the US. One respondent said: “My personal opinion is that it comes out of hard 
politics: I mean what is the standing that this country has with the US government?” 
Another respondent said: “The US is not likely to release important technology to a 
country it looks at with suspicion”. 
 
One of the key factors that lead to the passing of a US arms sales deal is the support 
of the executive branch, namely the White House and the State Department. One 
respondent said: “This arms sale to Saudi, at some time, will require congressional 
approval. On this front, they are quite successful, although I don’t think the deal goes 
through due to lobbying; the dominating factor is that the Secretary of Defense goes 
to the Hill and says Saudis need these F-15 planes”. An American scholar added: 
“They win when the White House is with them; this is crucial.” In order for Saudi 
Arabia to get the F-15 planes, at the time President Reagan exerted great pressure 
on members of the US Congress. However, in the mid-eighties, when the Saudis 
requested add-ons, Reagan retorted by saying he had used all his political capital on 
this issue, so the Saudis were not able to get what they wanted. One respondent 
explained why the support of the White House is “very important”. He said that the 
US Congress has 535 members; among those there is always going to be some 
opposition, and in order to achieve balance on a particular matter it is important to 
have one strong ally, and that is the executive branch. 
 
Having a US partner is an important factor for winning on an issue and this is 
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prevalent in arms deals. Typically in military sales, the US partner helps push the 
deal with US legislators. One respondent, a former staff of the Ministry of Defense 
said by acting “selfishly”, the various US partners help the cause of the Arab Gulf 
States. 
 
Another said that having a US corporate partner “makes things easier because you 
have lobbying on both sides.” Here the respondent indicated how the lobbyist usually 
joins US defense companies together with their foreign clients when they want to 
make a case. She gave an example of how the Livingston Group and Pedesta Group 
met with US military leaders and five US defense contractors that included Lockheed 
Martin and GE, to discuss Egypt purchasing US weapons. The lobbying firm 
represented the interests of both the Egyptian government and of all those US 
companies. She said: “They are facilitating a meeting between two sets of their 
clients; the domestic clients and the foreign clients. And that is why those arms deals 
work so well because there is a mutual interest represented.” One respondent said 
about the F-16 deal: “It was not the UAE that supported that deal as much as it was 
the aircraft manufacturer.” 
 
Arab Gulf States can benefit from the equity their American partners have built 
throughout the years with members of the US Congress. These American 
companies have employed a significant number of their constituents and have 
created segregated PACs to contribute to these members’ political campaigns.  As 
further proof of the importance of having a domestic partner, DP World lost out on 
the US ports acquisition because the Dubai-based entity did not work the political 
channels with a domestic partner.  
 
In a nutshell, Arab Gulf states win “when they play on the same playing field; or 
when they play by the same rules and use their advantages, of which there are 
many”. 
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Factors behind losing   
 
The overall reason why Arabs have lost out on issues in the US according to an 
interviewee is that they have not played by US rules.  One respondent elaborated on 
this point by saying: “we are a county run by institutions and not by families”. This is 
a fundamental difference between the American system and Arab Gulf states. 
According to various participants in this research, one reason why Arab Gulf states 
lose is due to their ignorance of the American “rules of the game”. Politics works in a 
very different way in the US when compared with the Arab Gulf, and Arab Gulf states 
are not in sync with the American system. They said that Arabs act in a reactive, 
tactical way as opposed to Israel’s strategic proactive way. For example, the Israelis 
have set up the Jafee center to study the dynamics of American politics and follow 
closely its developments and to forecast and influence events before they unfold 
whereas Arabs do not have a similar structure to keep up with the American system 
(Terry, 2005).  
 
Arab Gulf governments have not worked on the narrative and their image, they have 
not used the system the way Israelis have used it.  A former American statesman 
said that the Israeli lobby “is not a wizard of Oz”; it is simply well organized and well 
planned. He added: “Play by their rules, quit (complaining), play by their game 
(American), and set up a lobby as effective as AIPAC so you can present the same 
argument as they can”. He added: “Why aren’t Arabs there, convincing Americans 
that they have better values? This is Coca Cola versus some [unknown] product you 
can buy at Cosco. You have to put energy to it, so the Arabs become the Pepsi to 
the Israelis’ Coke, and frankly you have got a better story, or as good a story, as the 
Israelis do. So quit [complaining], grow-up, and take responsibility. Quit saying ‘I 
have no influence in Washington DC’. Go there and lobby. Arabs lose when they 
don’t play by the rules, if you don’t play, you don’t win.” All of the American 
respondents in the interviews blamed Arabs for their failure, because of not putting in 
the requisite effort, nor designing a strategy and marshaling resources the way the 
Israelis have.  
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The majority of respondents said the American system has no inherent preference 
for the Israelis, but that the Israelis have gained the privileges they have with the US 
because they play by American rules and they use the system. The Arabs have not 
even seriously tried. A former statesman who has worked with Arab Gulf government 
thought that Arabs have imposed double standards on themselves. He said: “If you 
have a game of football, and you have a bunch of Israeli kids out there, and you 
have people cheering for them, it is because they are a better team. The way [to win] 
is not to put artificial rules to weaken them; it is to be a better team.” 
 
Another respondent criticized the way Arabs fight the system instead of using it. He 
said: “The Arab boycott: what a silly, silly way. Makes you look small don’t you think? 
Don’t you think you can compete on any basis?” An interviewee pointed out at the 
embargo which alienated the US instead of winning it over. Several participant to this 
research said the oil embargo of 1973 was a byproduct of the Arab governments’ 
ignorance of the way the American system functions, and in the end it had an 
adverse effect. The embargo contributed to portraying Arabs and the Gulf as 
“greedy” and seeking to blackmail the US using oil. This increased the strategic 
value of Israel as a surrogate fortress to protect American interests and to keep 
Arabs in check (Laor, 2013).  
           
From the interviews, one respondent said that one of the main deficiencies of Arab 
Gulf states’ lobbying is the lack of strategy and of long term planning, as well as 
consistency in messaging. This has led to failure of the lobbying effort according to 
him. Another one added: “That is a very important component. Most Arab Gulf states 
are very short sighted”. Another comment was: “The fact is that they don’t have a 
strategy,  that they don’t follow through, and in some cases that they don’t prepare.” 
 
One important factor that stems from having a strategy is organization; organizing all 
of the existing assets in pursuit of a goal. Another contributor to this research, a 
former chief of staff of a prominent Senator, elaborated on the value of money. He 
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said: “Raising money is important but not that important. AIPAC is very well 
organized; it raises money broadly all over America. It is not their money that is so 
important, it is their organization.” As mentioned earlier in this chapter, one of the 
respondents described Arab Gulf lobbying, in contrast, as someone trying to stop 
leaking in a wall by inserting their finger: as soon as they close one hole, another 
hole opens. So Arab Gulf governments don’t have a team to fix the whole leaking 
wall, and only do “periodic maintenance”. That respondent said that is why Arab Gulf 
states are overwhelmed whenever multiple issues arise, and therefore fail to deal 
with them properly. 
 
In contrast, with the pro-Israel lobby, every move is well researched and well 
designed. One head of an Arab American organization gave as an example of 
coordination an organization called “the Israel Project”. He said it is “Israel’s best 
kept secret”. The Israel Project undertakes periodic polling of US public opinion, and, 
based on the poll results, provides recommendations to the Israel lobby as well as 
the Israeli government on the type of statements they can issue. Neither Arab Gulf 
governments nor Arab American groups have reached that level of organization or 
level of coordination to have such well-planned and strategic messaging. 
 
The various interviewees highlighted that Arabs negative image has created a barrier 
to lobbying. However, this misconception is partly caused by the failure of Arab Gulf 
States to reach out properly to the American public and government. A respondent 
said, comparing the image of the Israelis to the image of the Arabs: “They [Israelis] 
did a fabulous job with politics and media whereas we let ourselves be associated 
with Bin Laden”. 
 
One respondent spoke about his experience with the Arab League that 
commissioned his organization to conduct a study and put a public relations plan to 
improve the image of Arabs in the US. Shortly after the research was finished, 9/11 
happened. Instead of rushing to put the plan into action to counter the post 9/11 
effect, the Arab League decided to put the plan on hold. Until today, the plan has not 
113 
 
been activated. 
 
Respondents said that the Israelis were able to portray themselves “just like 
Americans” while Arabs remain alien to them; therefore Arab issues do not have the 
same kind of appeal as Israeli ones and are not easily defensible. One respondent 
said that the prevailing mentality in the US is a Judeo-Christian one; Israel can 
always play on the biblical background to create a sense of familiarity and 
resemblance with Americans, whereas Arabs, seen as Muslim, don t have this 
advantage.  
 
An Arab American that I interviewed said: “They are afraid of Muslims and of Islam. 
Islam is alien to them. Islamophobia increased after September 11. It was there but 
before 9/11 it was not so bad before.” However, the misconception does not only 
block lobbying, it also blocks any initiative to engage with American society. An 
American scholar spoke about the local population’s opposition to the opening up of 
a school in Virginia by Saudi Arabia; the residents of Montgomery Maryland refused 
the idea saying they did not want a school for “terrorists”. He said: “Even something 
as benign as that has been politically sensitive.” He added: “any gesture can be 
misinterpreted” and “It is extremely difficult for them to help”. 
 
An Arab American activist gave the example of the current trials by Arab American 
Muslims to integrate some of their material into the schools. She described their 
trials as “a tough battle”. She said: “Americans that are Muslims are fighting the 
battle of building a new mosque. Even though we have freedom of religion we don’t 
want to see a mosque coming out”. One respondent used the term “deeply rooted 
hostility and a suspicion” to describe the reaction of mainstream Americans to 
anything Arabs or Muslims do. 
 
One respondent said that she went to a fund raiser of a Republican candidate and 
she told him that she had visited the region. When she spoke about the Muslim 
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Brotherhood getting elected he was appalled and he said that it was “terrible” and 
that all “Muslims want to kill us”. The remark of the respondent was that “this is a 
politically active person” which means that the reaction of the average American is 
likely to be even worse.  
 
Even though politically Saudi Arabia is an ally of the US, one of the people I 
interviewed said that if you conducted a poll you could be almost certain that most 
Americans do not think of Saudi Arabia as an ally. This misconception is across the 
board. An Arab American communication specialist said: “The think tanks, the 
journalists, the politicians they say things that are so, so off mark.” Arabs have a 
negative image in comparison to Israel. As mentioned previously, the polls 
conducted by Gallup in February 2012, found that 61%of Americans sympathize with 
Israel (Mendes, 2012). However, respondents signaled that Israel is currently facing 
a public image crisis due to the continuous building of settlements and to the lack of 
commitment to human rights. 
 
An illustration of the misconceptions and negative image in the minds of Americans 
is the DP World case. One of the interviewees summarized the issue by saying: 
“One company was not able to work with them so they played the terrorism card with 
Schumer”. To illustrate the misconception, one respondent said about the DP World 
case: “The issue politically had a lot of problems associated with it. So we, the 
United States are going to allow a third party, a non-American entity to manage our 
ports”. However, if the Dubai Company did not win the bid it would have been a 
Singaporean company which is also a foreign company. An Arab-American activist 
said cynically: “Does it matter what the facts are? After 9/11 it is a very sensitive 
topic.”  
 
Also another factor featured by respondents is that “they let others define them”. One 
of them highlighted the issue by saying: “Debate has been defined by the pro-Israel 
side”. Whenever there is bad publicity about Arab there is no coordinated effort to 
respond to that the image, which makes them more vulnerable to any negative 
publicity. 
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Also there is ignorance about the Arab world. One respondent described how 
Americans think of Arabs as a monolith. He said: “There is this sense of this 
undifferentiated mass that Americans think of when it comes to the Arab world.” One 
respondent highlighted this fact by saying the DP World loss was due to the fact that 
Americans are “uneducated” about the Arab world; therefore it was very easy to vilify 
the UAE and to block the deal. This is despite the fact that the UAE is one of the US’ 
staunchest allies, especially when it comes to fighting terrorism. He said: “The big 
loss was because the DP World was caught off guard, they did not realize how 
uneducated American policy makers are about the Arab world and misconception 
about terrorist activities that flow through there. They thought Dubai Port was not 
secure enough as an institution.”  
 
However, some respondents said that the way Arabs face bad publicity does not 
help in educating the American public. The head of an Arab American organization 
mentioned to me the DP World case as an example. He said that when the bad 
publicity started spreading around, instead of going to every media outlet and trying 
to correct the prevalent misconception, the UAE kept quiet and waited for the 
president to “fix” the damage. The respondent said that at the end the UAE agreed to 
send Sheikha Lubna Al Qassimi to the US to talk to the media and to the Congress.  
 
A former journalist mentioned CAIR and he said they lose many battles to AIPAC. 
He described the way they function: “When CAIR gets on TV it is because there is 
some outrageous MEMRI video about a crazy cleric saying about stoning women 
who don’t wear the veil .They say what is wrong about the Arab world, then the CAIR 
person is trying to defend the indefensible or trying to say this is not what all (Arabs) 
are like, but then they get one expert who will say but this is exactly how (Arabs) are 
all like they make blanket assertions. But it does not do anything to advance 
anybody’s agenda or cause.” Though CAIR does not represent Arabs by defending 
Islam, indirectly it defends the image of Arabs, since as explained before Arabs and 
Muslims are seen by the American public as well members of the government as 
one. 
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The respondent described CAIR as “ineffective” as opposed to pro-Israel groups who 
are judged “very effective”. They work in a targeted way; they get their message out 
through social media to the right people in order to advance their ideas. The 
respondent mentioned MEMRI (Middle East Media Research Institute) as a nemesis 
to CAIR. MEMRI promotes news about the Middle East in a very pro-Israeli manner. 
Basically there no one on American soil to present a consistent narrative that can be 
sold to the average American. One respondent said there is no “counter-narrative” 
and “there is this quiet Arab voice”. 
 
Regarding the misconception there are two views that converge at a certain point. 
The first view is that misconceptions about Arabs hinder their lobbying and that any 
effort to appeal to the American public gets blocked by these misconceptions. So if 
they want to fund Arab American groups in order for them to be vocal in promoting a 
positive image of the Arab, due to prevalent misconceptions they risk tarnishing their 
image. A American scholar spoke about the risks of associating with a foreign 
government, he explained: “Well looking at it the other way, if you are the head of 
ADC or another Arab American group you want to be careful about how much 
money you get from foreign governments if you are engaged in any business of 
political work then you have this foreign registration act. You don’t want to be 
scrutinized and people say you are the tool of Saudi government or Qatar or 
whatever that does not help you whether that is technically legal or not”. He added:” 
it is little bit tricky because you cannot have Arab government coming in and 
throwing money around without tarnishing the image of those who they are trying to 
help”. So the misconception issue in trapped in a vicious cycle. The other view is that 
there has not been serious, well planned, long term work on the image of Arabs in 
the US in order to correct this misconception.  
 
It is easier to oppose a deal then to let one pass. Therefore having an opposition 
makes the deal much more prone to being blocked. This is why the F 16, though the 
technology granted was quite advanced, did not require intensive lobbying. The 
lobbying was mainly conducted by the arm contractors. The UAE government did not 
have to put an effort to lobby for the deal, similarly to the Saudis at the time of the 
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AWACS. This is mainly because the Emiratis did not face the opposition that the 
Saudis faced in the eighties. Paradoxically, this applies to the DP World deal; the 
deal was blocked due to the presence of an opposition. 
  
Given that the Arab Gulf States do not have a constituency to vouch for them, they 
make their case by promoting economic interests. Therefore the deals that have the 
most chance of getting passed are arms deals because of the impact they have on 
job creation. However, when the deal is small and has no economic impact then it 
can very easily be sabotaged by the opposition. One respondent said it would be 
difficult for the pro-Israel lobby to stop a multi-billion dollar deal such as the F16, 
however they can easily block a small deal for the Lebanese artillery because the 
deal itself will not have an economic impact and will not significantly contribute to job 
creation. One respondent summarized this fact by saying: “If you say something is 
the right thing to do but you don’t show how it will benefit the United States or 
ordinary Americans, you don’t get it.” 
 
Perceived Subsystem: An Arab State of Denial 
 
However, when asked whether there is a subsystem that is putting the Israelis at an 
advantage over Arabs, which in some cases leads allegedly to failure on the part of 
Arab Gulf states, one respondent, a former American statesman, said: “The nice 
thing about a conspiracy theory is that it explains a lot, whether there is a validity to it 
or not. Don’t they say this it is beyond my control? It is not my fault?” 
 
The lack of strategy, the lack of follow up, and the lack of organization have been 
pointed out by American respondents to the interviews as key factors leading to 
failure. They said this failure is a natural and obvious result of Arab Gulf states’ 
practices. These respondents added that whenever Arabs fail, it is a result of their 
incompetence and not of any perceived barrier to entry erected by the system or 
based on prejudice against Arabs. One respondent dropped an object on the floor 
and asked why it fell; he answered his question by saying: “What would Arabs say? 
Inshallah”. He added: “Isn’t inshallah a sort of a denial?” He explained that Arabs are 
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in denial about their incompetence, and justify their failure to have any significant 
influence to the opposition or the subsystem that is preventing them to lobby. This 
however, is not true. 
 
In order to investigate the above topic further, respondents were asked about the 
existence of a subsystem or a barrier to entry that has hindered the establishment of 
an effective pro -Arab Gulf states lobby similar to the pro-Israel lobby. All 
respondents claimed that there is nothing that can stop Arab Americans from 
establishing a lobby to influence foreign policy. One respondent said: “That is a 
shame; the US is set up in a way that even minorities have their rights protected and 
can influence foreign policy. They [Arabs] should be able to be part of the public 
discussion; there is nothing preventing them from doing that”. Another respondent 
said: “Anybody can lobby the [US] government, especially going to your point of 
building a grassroots organization. Let us say you are an Arab American; you are an 
American citizen. Not only can you lobby, but it is a constitutionally protected right as 
part of the First Amendment, so there is definitely not any impediment to doing that.” 
Other respondents gave similar responses: “A complete misconception: anybody can 
lobby”;  
“That is ridiculous, anyone can lobby”;  
“There is no prohibition”; and “it is absolute nonsense”.  
 
The unexpected feedback from the interviews was the enthusiasm Americans 
expressed for an Arab lobby to help create a balance in US public debate. Several 
American respondents said that a pro-Arab lobby would be welcome as it would 
create a balance in the public discourse regarding the Middle East and it is needed 
as American politics thrives on confrontation. These comments contradict the implicit 
theory in the minds of Arabs and what is conveyed by certain anti-American 
politicians and public figures that the US uses Israel to keep Arabs under control 
(2012b).  
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Nonetheless, some respondents admitted that if Arab Gulf governments were to 
have a sustainable lobby that seeks to influence US foreign policy, they would face 
opposition from the pro-Israel lobby. One respondent said: “No one can prevent 
them (Arabs) but probably they will fight them”. However one respondent said that 
usually the existence of an opposition should offer an incentive to lobby in order to 
preserve their privileges from competition. The Turks established a domestic lobby 
after the Armenian lobby gained momentum in pushing for the issue of the Armenian 
genocide by the Turks.  A former staff in the Congress said: “I assume if you have a 
local opponent that will encourage you to lobby”. In the Arab case, the existence of 
an opponent has created a disincentive to lobby instead of enticing them to push 
their views forward. 
 
Conclusion: Arab Gulf Lobbying’s Impact on US Foreign Policy 
 
On Arab Gulf lobbying’s impact on US foreign policy, a lobbying specialist I 
interviewed said: “I don’t think they have had an impact in the sense people think 
differently about the Gulf or the Middle East. In fairness they are effective in what 
they are focused on. In terms of having a wider impact on the US, no, they have no 
impact at all”. All of the respondents gave similar answers with regards to the effect 
of Arab Gulf lobbying on US foreign policy. Comments included: “not so much”;  
“In my experience they did not have a major impact”;  
“It is not in existence”; 
“I don’t think it has been very effective”;  
“I can’t point to anything specific where the Arab lobby changed the mind of the US 
Congress or the government; I can’t see it had any effect on the Palestinian talks, I 
can’t see.” 
 
A former Arab diplomat was categorical: “Absolutely not, they have no strategy, no 
common effort, no follow through“. He said that changing or affecting US foreign 
policy requires a long term consistent effort, and this has never existed, whether 
through lobbying or normal diplomatic relationships, namely because of the lack of a 
strategy and of long term planning. Another respondent, a lobbying and 
communication specialist, explained this lack of strategy by saying the Arab Gulf 
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states’ effort “has not been strong enough or targeted enough, or funded well 
enough, or consistent enough” in order to affect US foreign policy. However, the fact 
that the Arab Gulf states have not had a major impact on US foreign policy is due to 
the fact that their lobbying never focused on overall foreign policy, and that they did 
not work on building a consistent political narrative.  A former American statesman 
said: “They stay away from politics, especially those that put them at cross purposes 
with Israel”. 
 
The respondent said that the reason why Arab Gulf countries have avoided lobbying 
on US foreign policy matters and hence “to influence [policy] developments in the 
US” goes to the fact that: “Gulf Arabs don’t do things for themselves; they get others 
to do things for them”. In case of commercial interests or arms sales, Arab Gulf 
governments rely on their American counterparts and take the back seat. In the case 
of US foreign policy, they have to do the talks themselves, and this is something they 
avoid as it puts them in a direct confrontation with other parties, namely the pro-
Israel lobby. One respondent said: “They spend money like water on that but not on 
support for broader efforts to promote US-Arab relations.  They will spend money to 
put through specific weapons purchases but they will not spend it on US-Arab 
relations.” 
 
The respondent mentioned the Gulf Arab summit meeting in Doha in 2000 in order to 
showcase the reluctance of Arab Gulf countries to work on any broad issues.  During 
the summit, GCC member states agreed to contribute $2 million each to a common 
fund of $12 million, to be administered by the embassies of the 6 Gulf countries for 
the purpose of educating Americans about issues that are important to Arabs. Only 
two out of the six countries funded their pledged amount, and failed to fund similar 
amounts the following year. A former American diplomat told me: “You pay nothing 
you get nothing”. The respondent meant by paying not only the monetary amounts, 
but also efforts invested in the matter. 
 
Again, whenever Arab Gulf States have had foreign policy demands, they have 
pursued them through personal contacts their embassies have with US government 
officials. One respondent, a former American diplomat to the Arab Gulf, said: “In my 
experience with the Gulf, it was more personal contact with embassies than a lobby 
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for the Gulf”. Another respondent explained how Arab Gulf lobbying has never aimed 
to influence US foreign policy to take a certain direction and said: “There has been 
no lobbying with the political system. They have relations with the Secretary and the 
Department of State. That is normal diplomatic relations.  It is not building any 
support for any particular idea.” 
 
In some instances, there have been situations that one respondent described as a 
“coincidence of interests” in US foreign policy. So when the US adopts a position 
advocated by say Saudi Arabia, it is “not because the Saudi lobby is powerful and 
can change people’s minds; it can’t do it, it is because the Americans know it is 
important for America’s strategic interest.” An American scholar added: “I don’t think 
it (lobbying) provides value added to the relationship; they don’t have an organized 
constituency”. Affecting general foreign policy needs to have a domestic 
constituency. Another respondent, a former statesman, said: “Effective lobbies, like 
the Israeli lobby, have deep domestic roots”. These domestic lobbies work on 
strategic issues that set the frame for US foreign policy. 
  
 On the issue of domestic lobbies that can steer US foreign policy in a certain 
direction, one of the respondents, a former statesman, mentioned the Qualitative 
Military Edge. The pro-Israel domestic lobby was able to advance the Qualitative 
Military Edge policy, which states that for all arms sales to any Arab Gulf country, 
Israel would have a qualitative comparative advantage. This policy was devised to 
protect Israel in case one of these Arab Gulf countries were to reverse its current 
policy and decide to use US acquired arms to fight Israel. In 1968, with strong 
support from Congress, U.S. President Lyndon B. Johnson approved the sale of F-4 
Phantom II fighters to Israel. This act created a precedent for U.S. support to ensure 
Israel's qualitative military edge over its neighbours .  
 
When Arab American groups were asked whether Arabs have affected US foreign 
policy issues, the answer was no. One respondent, an Arab American said: “I don’t 
think it is doing that much; if it were, we wouldn’t be in the situation we are in right 
now. Foreign policy is so tainted against us, because no one is doing anything”. 
When asked why there is no effort by Arab American organizations to influence US 
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foreign policy, the general answer was that these organizations focus on their issues 
as a community; they focus more on improving their status as an ethnic community. 
They are struggling with money; therefore they prefer to channel their scarce 
resources to promote their own welfare as Arab Americans. In order for such 
organizations and groups to focus on US foreign policy issues, they would need 
additional funds. The respondent, who is the head of an Arab American organization, 
said “to move forward Arab issues to the Congress, we need funding to be able to do 
that”. Another respondent said to tackle Arab issues at large help from Arab Gulf 
countries is “crucial”, however he said: “They [Arab Gulf Countries] are not doing it”. 
 
Another interviewee, a specialist in foreign lobbying, said that the more immigrants 
from a particular country migrate to the US, the better relations this country has with 
the US. The natural development of lobbying by a community starts with local issues 
related to its own welfare as a community, and then the political activism evolves to 
tackle US foreign policy, or relations between the US and the community’s country of 
origin. Therefore, the general impression is that Arab American organizations have 
enough domestic issues, such as discrimination that they are struggling with, and as 
a result have not dedicated efforts to tackle foreign policy. 
 
Furthermore, respondents had a common answer that US foreign policy is skewed 
against Arabs because Arabs have not put in a serious effort to influence foreign 
policy. The Arab Gulf has not tried to use the lobbying mechanism with all its 
elements (media grassroots, direct briefing to legislators, and so forth) to influence 
US foreign policy.  
 
Arab Gulf states have been very effective in getting US support on their own security 
issues, which are crucial to US foreign policy. A former American statesman said: 
“So when Saudi Arabia talks to us about their concerns, their attempt to influence the 
United States to get us to understand what threat they are facing and what weapons 
they need. We have to pay attention to them because they have oil. We have very 
good relations with most countries in the Gulf, except Iran, and it is getting better. 
There is military interdependency, against common threat, and a military 
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interdependency to ensure economic prosperity in the Arab Gulf region. We have 
economic interdependency between the Gulf and the US; it is called oil. If you can’t 
sell oil, our economy collapses, your economy collapses. I would rate military 
interdependency as strongest with Saudi and UAE; the UAE very much so, along 
with Kuwait, and very strong with Bahrain.”  
 
When US companies that transact with Arab Gulf States were asked whether they 
would use their lobbying muscle to help their partner on issues that do not involve 
them directly, the answer was that they usually limit their lobbying to the issues in 
which they have a vested interest. US companies can help, however it depends on 
the issue. They usually help on smaller issues and would not flex their lobbying 
muscle for issues related to US overall foreign policy towards the Middle East. One 
response was: “We consider the relationship with the UAE to be an enduring 
relationship; we look at ways to assist this partner, but it depends. It is on a case by 
case basis. The lobbying by proxy is exaggerated [by the Israel Lobby], which claims 
that through oil and defense interests, the Gulf has control over US foreign policy in 
the Middle East”. This was suggested by Bard in his book The Arab Lobby: The 
Invisible Alliance That Undermines America's Interests in the Middle East (2010). 
 
However, as inferred from the interviews, US companies’ influence on their 
government’s foreign policy is very limited. When asked if they can help steer US 
policy in a favorable manner to their Arab Gulf partner, the answer of a respondent 
who works for an arms company was: “In my experience it is not true. It would be 
nice if it were that easy”. He added on the issue of US foreign policy: “We will not 
have a meaningful effect. We are a US company; it is easy to think that we have this 
kind of influence but we do not.” He added: “We engage the US government only in 
things we do”. As such, US companies work within the boundaries of US foreign 
policy; they do not seek to influence it. When asked about the general perception 
that US companies influence US foreign policy in order to win concessions from their 
Arab Gulf partners to whom they sell arms, he answered: “It is a strain of conspiracy 
theory but I don t think it is quite common, but it is out there.” 
 
This chapter came out with many propositions regarding Arab Gulf lobbying. The 
most important ones are that their lobbying is weak because they are not well 
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organized and have no domestic base and that they suffer from a negative image. 
These propositions will be revisited and checked in the next two chapters.  
 
Chapter 4 and 5 represent cases of failure and of success of Arab Gulf lobbying. 
Hence, I will be able to see whether the propositions generated from the grounded 
theory are applicable in real life experiment that the case studies represent. The 
following chapter embodies a story of success where lobbying was effective because 
Arabs had a comprehensive strategy that involved grassroots as well as full-fledged 
communication plan in addition to other external factors that played to their favor.  
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Chapter 4: AWACS (Air Warning and Control System) Sale 
to Saudi Arabia Case Study 
 
Value of the case study 
The only case that represents real success for Arab Gulf lobbying is the F15 and the 
AWACS from thirty years ago. This was the time when Saudi Arabia marshalled its 
assets to influence the making of public policy in the US. I am taking this as a case 
of success, as ousting and opponent is a reason to evaluate winning... In this case, 
the Saudis were able to win, despite strong opposition from the pro-Israel lobby, by 
virtue of orchestrating a constituency in support of the sale. The pressure exerted by 
the coalition of American businesses and unions that the Saudis put together 
resulted in breaking up the opposition. 
 
Throughout this chapter I will analyse the different factors that led to the success of 
the deal, starting with the strategic considerations that played out in favour of Saudi 
Arabia, then moving to the gaps in the approach of the opposition, before discussing 
the well planned strategy of the Saudis. The Saudis were successful because they 
had a strategy and were aggressive in their approach. The core of their strategy 
relied on garnering domestic support for the deal, whether from unions and the 
business community or Arab American organizations. Finally, I will discuss the 
crucial role of the President who pushed for the deal by pressuring the Congress and 
by publicly endorsing the deal in front of the American public. 
 
Despite several factors that led to the success, the key factor, I will argue, was the 
constituency.  This case study is important as it illustrates how the Saudis were able 
to beat the opposition by creating a constituency to support their issue and by 
marketing it to the average American.  
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The case study handles briefly the 1978 F15 sale that took place during the time of 
Carter, with more emphasis on the 1981 sale of AWACS that occurred at the time of 
the Reagan administration. These two episodes are related and will therefore be 
analysed as one case study. The subsequent attempts to upgrade the AWACS 
arsenal in 1986 will not be analysed.  
 
Background 
In an interview with a member of the Saudi Royal family, the respondent said that the 
F15 was the first effort made by the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia to lobby the US 
government. President Nixon visited Saudi and Egypt in 1974 and agreed to sell the 
Kingdom F15 airplanes. However, when he resigned, prospects of the deal died out. 
When President Ford took over, the Kingdom applied for the purchase of weapons. 
More than 76 senators brought a letter to Henry Kissinger, the Secretary of State, 
expressing their opposition. Because of that, the package did not get approved. 
President Ford asked the request to be deferred until after the elections (Smith, 
1996). Eventually, Ford lost the 1976 election. During the Carter term, Saudi Arabia 
renewed its request. Carter refused their request for Airborne Warning and Control 
System (AWACS), however he was cooperative for the F15  request (Bronson, 
2006).  
 
In an interview with a member of the Saudi Royal family, the respondent explained 
that when President Carter came to power in 1977, he had a very good meeting with 
Crown Prince King Fahd and he agreed to the Kingdom‘s need to purchase the 
weapons. The US government expressed approval to pursue this request, but it 
explained that the deal would face a lot of opposition in both houses of Congress. 
 
On January 1978, Carter announced his intention to sell sixty F-15s to  Saudi Arabia 
and fifty F-5s to Egypt and fifteen F-15s, along with seventy five F-16 fighter 
bombers to Israel (Levins, 1983). The late King Fahd ordered Prince Saud  Al Faisal, 
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the foreign minister, to set up a team that would come to the United States to lobby. 
The lobbying started with a team of three headed by Prince Turki Al Faisal, and later 
on Prince Bandar, who was a pilot, joined the team (Bronson, 2006). The team set 
up an information office in Washington to dispatch information as promotion to the 
sale. This was the first effort to lobby. The effort involved producing booklets and 
leaflets setting up a meeting program with senators and congressmen of all sides, 
Republicans, Democrats and independents. The Saudis also used business 
connections as they asked for the help of American companies that worked in Saudi 
Arabia. The Kingdom was experiencing a boom and companies like Bechtel had 
many projects in Saudi (Bronson, 2006).  
 
Prince Bandar-Bin Sultan became unexpectedly immersed in helping the Saudi team 
provide assistance and information to the Carter administration in securing approval 
from Capitol Hill for the sale of sixty F-15 aircraft, which were at the time the world’s 
most advanced fighters. President Carter presented the bill on 28 April 1978 to the 
Senate. It included a proposal for arms sales to Saudi Arabia, Israel and Egypt 
(Simpson, 2008). On 15 of May, the Senate by a vote of 54-44 rejected a resolution 
disapproving the sale, therefore the sale went through (Grimmett, 1981). As the 
Saudis got the sale for the F-15 approved, they started planning for the next phase: 
the AWACS (Levins, 1983). 
 
On March 6 1981, the Reagan administration announced that it would sell an F-15 
enhancement package to Saudi Arabia in order to face the Soviet threat. On July 1 
1981, due to a campaign by the pro-Israel lobby, both houses announced opposition 
to the sale (Laham, 2002).Therefore, Reagan decided to postpone the vote until 
October (Grimmett, 1981). 
 
However, a new dimension was added to the equation. The debate that was in the 
public discourse during the AWACS sales was aggravated by the Israeli invasion of 
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Beirut, there was a change in public opinion, and the special relationship of the US 
with Israel was brought into question (Levins, 1983). This had an effect on lobbying, 
with each camp becoming more aggressive in its approach. 
 
On October 1 1981, as required by the Arms Export Control Act, the Pentagon 
defense security assistance sent document 81-96 for approval by the Senate and the 
House. The initial 3-year cost of the AWACS sales had a total of $8.5 billion (1981h). 
The same document said the Administration regards Saudi Arabia as "one of the 
most stable Arab states." The paper adds that "concern about Saudi stability is more 
a reflection of regional developments and the increasing importance of Saudi Arabia 
and the West rather than any domestic development within the Kingdom" (1981h). 
The document says the Pentagon found no reason for refusal for the arms deal 
which consisted of five AWACS aircrafts for 8.5 billion, however the overall deal with 
the support amounted to $85 billion (Simpson, 2008). 
 
The pro-Israel lobby had successfully mobilized a strong opposition in the House, in 
contrast to the Senate where the opposition was not as strong (Smith, 1996). The 
House rejected the deal by a margin of 301 to 111. Reagan lost any hope in the 
lower house and focused on the Senate. During the month of October, one by one 
the votes started to shift (Sperling, 1981). On October 28,1981 the Senate voted 
favourably for the package and the deal went through (Laham, 2002). 
 
Context  
 
The oil boom endowed the Arab Gulf with immense wealth. This “dubious blessing” 
as described by Charles Yost made the region the center  of attraction of the 
superpowers (Wolfe and Abdul-Rahman, 1980). This was enforced during the 
Kissinger years whose main goal was to isolate the Soviets from reaching the oil 
fields (Lateef, 1974). Jimmy Carter announced in his 1980 State of the Union 
address that any attempt by outside powers (the Soviet Union, at the time) to gain 
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control of the Persian Gulf would be met with military force (Stork, 1980). The 
subsequent administrations adopted the same approach and expressed their interest 
in the maintenance of a stable flow of oil, stable prices, security of oilfields, and in 
increased cooperation between producing and consuming states (Pridham, 
1985),(Safran, 1985). 
 
Another factor that increased the importance of Saudi Arabia was the skyrocketing 
oil prices that were caused by two oil shocks in 1973 and 1979 (Bronson, 2006). The 
US was unprepared to deal with an oil shortage. The 73 oil embargo and the 79 oil 
shock due to the Iranian revolution had severe repercussions on the US. The 
administration viewed any potential shortfall in oil as a threat to national security 
(Levins, 1983). The AWACS sale was framed as the need for Saudi Arabia to have 
an early warning system to protect the oil installations. This argument was discussed 
in the course of the 1st of October hearing (1981i).The report provided to the Senate 
Committee on Foreign Relations in September highlighted the possibility of an attack 
on oil facilities. It stated: “The Saudis feel themselves surrounded by states with ties 
to Moscow. Among the likely threats against which Saudi Arabia must guard, the 
most demanding involves an Iranian air attack on Saudi oil facilities and marine 
shipping terminals in its Eastern Province”(1981h). 
 
Another factor that helped the decision to empower the Saudis was the trend of the 
American government that started with the Reagan administration, which favoured 
funding third parties over direct intervention such as in Vietnam and Korea, in order 
to protect the US interests around the world.  The US was starting  to “diffuse power” 
to other states as a by ‘proxy” mode to fight its enemies (Pierre, 1981).In addition to 
this tendency to empower allies, major events that occurred between 1979 and 1980 
had put the Arab Gulf under major threat which provided another reason for the US 
to help Saudi Arabia enhance its defence capabilities. The events were: the fall of 
the Shah, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, the hostage crisis, and the Iraq-Iran 
war (Laham, 2002).   
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The revolution in Iran gave more importance to Saudi Arabia. Iran during the time of 
the Shah was a major ally to the West. Nixon’s policy in the Arab Gulf consisted of 
encouraging Iran’s primacy in the region (Alvandi, 2012). The rising Iranian threat 
that emanated from the Iranian revolution and the hostage crisis terminated the US 
friendship with Iran. This gave Saudi Arabia a greater strategic value as it became 
the only US ally in the Gulf (Grimmett, 1981).  In addition, the war that broke out 
between Iraq and Iran created a source of threat for the oil fields. Khomeini, who was 
talking about exporting the revolution, was fighting in Iraq, the neighbour to Saudi 
Arabia (Cobban, 1980). 
 
During the Carter era, the US was falling back from any active engagement in Africa, 
while the Soviet Union expanded its influence into Ethiopia, Mozambique, Uganda, 
and in south Yemen. Therefore the argument presented by Kissinger that Israel was 
a buffer against the Soviet Union did not pan out. A respondent, a member of the 
Saudi Royal family, said: “at the time the Soviet Union was up and well and up to no 
good.” The Soviets were increasing their influence and the danger  to the monarchy 
increased (Grimmett, 1981). During the Cold War, the Arab-Gulf, described  by Dr. 
John Duke Anthony as “profoundly anti-communist”(Pridham, 1985), saw a benefit in 
an alliance with the Soviet nemesis, the US. 
 
Therefore the AWACS  were necessary to achieve a “strategic consensus”(Pridham, 
1985). From the US administration's perspective, the Saudi AWACS/F-15 
enhancement sale as well as the  strategic relationship with Israel were essential to 
achieve a ‘strategic consensus’ among  the states in the region,  whose security was 
threatened by  the Soviets(1981h). Saudi Arabia was viewed as a partner in 
containing the Soviet expansion and Reagan saw how his predecessor failed to 
prevent the Soviet expansion in Angola, Ethiopia, and Afghanistan  (Bronson, 2006). 
 
In the seventies, the view of Arabs in the US changed, with Sadat going on his 
historic visit to Jerusalem and the 1978 Camp David accords (Smith, 1996). The 
Saudis were seen as pro-peace as they called for the creation of an independent 
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Palestinian state with pre-67 borders and the right of refugees to return or to obtain 
compensation. This plan was well received by the American administration, and 
there was a belief that granting Saudi Arabia the warplanes they wanted would 
encourage them to help the US in its peace efforts in the region(1981h).  
 
The peace was viewed as serving American interests as it would prevent 
radicalization that could encourage Soviet encroachment in the region, which would 
put them in the vicinity of the oil wells on which the West depended for its daily 
functioning. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan was seen as the first alarming sign of 
this potential scenario, as according to an American official, it provided them with 
“access”(1981h). 
 
However, looking at the peace process prospects, the report presented by the 
Committee on Foreign Relations in the Senate in September 1981 showed doubt on 
this point, as it signalled the possibility that a rift might occur between Saudi Arabia 
and the US, if the US was seen as siding with Israel: “However, the Saudis will 
continue to be wary of aligning themselves with the United States on issues which 
seem to have the United States and Israel on one side and other Arab nations on the 
other. They will hope for and seek U.S. cooperation but go separate ways when they 
believe their relations with the other Arab states make that necessary” (1981h) d. 
 
The report emphasized the importance of Saudi Arabia as a regional player which 
funded the Lebanese and Jordanian Government, the PLO, and the Syrian forces in 
Lebanon. However, their support for the US peace effort was put in question as they 
were seen as not supportive enough of the Camp David accords. 
 
Saudi Arabia was active in pushing for peace, as they were responsible in 1982 for 
the Fez communique that rejected the 3 “no”s of  the Khartoum summit in 1968: “no 
recognition, no negotiation , no reconciliation with Israel”(1981g). They were also 
supportive of the Lebanese government’s effort to negotiate directly with Israel their 
withdrawal from Southern Lebanon (1986). 
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The opposition 
 
In his biography, Prince Bandar says: “The key to understanding the recurring 
obstacles, objections and rejections encountered in attempting to sell advanced 
weapons to Saudi Arabia is the special relation that exists between the United States 
and Israel” (Simpson, 2008). The Jewish community had a record in preventing or 
amending sales to Arab countries (Feldman and ʻal Šēm, 1988). As soon as 
president Reagan announced the sale, the pro-Israeli lobby represented by the 
Conference of Presidents of Major Jewish Organizations issued a statement on April 
23 1981 claiming that the deal would undermine US national security (Laham, 2002). 
 
The opposition was very strong in the House. House members have relatively small 
constituencies; in these limited territories it is easy for strong, organized interest 
groups such as the Jewish groups to use their financial and organizational resources 
to defeat members hostile to Israel. However, in the case of the Senate, 
constituencies are larger and it is therefore harder for pro-Israeli groups to have the 
same effect. It takes much more financial effort to defeat a Senator. The pro-Israel 
lobby has this capability in the states that have major Jewish populations such as 
New York, Florida, Illinois and California (Laham, 2002). 
 
US relations with the Middle East have been complicated by the existence of the 
Israel lobby. Menachem Begin, the Israeli prime minister, enjoyed more support in 
the Congress than the president himself, so any American diplomacy which aimed at 
improving the relationship of the US with the Arab world, even though they had an 
immense strategic importance, was unable to “circumvent the Israel lobby” 
(Rabinovich and Reinharz, 2008). This point was emphasized by Senator James 
Abourezk who said: “The policy planners for Israel have for years seen it in their 
interest to disrupt the relations between the United States and the Arab world. It is 
not in their interest to have a close relationship develop, especially between the 
United States and Saudi Arabia, whose oil reserves gives it a great deal of clout 
throughout the Arab World” (1978).  
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The Israeli opposition to arms sales to Saudi Arabia goes back to the Kennedy era. 
Then, the Kingdom wanted to buy the F104 Starfighters as the Egyptians and the 
Russians were in Yemen, where they had deployed their MIG 21s. However, the 
Kennedy administration, knowing it would not be able to pass it through Congress, 
advised Saudi Arabia to buy from Britain (Simpson, 2008). In 1976, President Ford 
agreed to the sale of advanced Maverick air to ground missiles to Saudi Arabia in 
order to secure lower OPEC prices for oil. However, AIPAC opposed the deal and 
the proposal fell apart (Simpson, 2008). The F-15 deal, which was part of a tripartite 
package, passed with a limited amount of resistance. However, the AWACS deal 
was much harder to pass (Findley, 1989). 
 
The bill that President Reagan proposed faced resistance from both the Senate and 
the House. On June 25, fifty five Senators, representing a majority, opposed the sale 
and sent a letter to the president. This was spearheaded by Tom Dine the executive 
director of AIPAC and Bob Packwood of Oregon, a Republican senator (Findley, 
1989). On the same day Clarence Long, a Democratic U.S. Congressman who 
represented the 2nd congressional district of Maryland, and Norman Lent, a 
Republican representative from New York, presented a House resolution signed by 
224 members, disapproving the sale. AIPAC openly said it would oppose the deal 
(Emerson, 1985, Smith, 1996). Given the fact that House members expressed their 
opposition at an early stage and that the bill had a large number of co-sponsors, 
Reagan gave up on the House and focused on defeating the resolution in the Senate 
in order to pass the bill (Laham, 2002, 1981i). 
 
The opposition had achieved a success by passing the two resolutions in both 
houses of the Congress, and two weeks before the vote John Glenn announced that 
there were 57 Senators against the sale (Webbe, 1981). However, attitudes started 
to change quickly as the president and the pro-Saudi lobby intensified their pressure 
as it was getting closer to the voting date. 
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Arguments 
 
The opposition, AIPAC and its supporters in the Congress presented several 
arguments against the sale. The first one was that the sale of advanced jet AWACS 
meant that the Israelis could no longer have “the freedom of movement” nor the 
“invincibility” they had before (Levins, 1983). This was conveyed by representative 
Brigham during the 1st of  October hearing,  who said that putting these capabilities 
in the hands of the Saudis “worries the Israelis tremendously” as “the AWACs could 
easily deprive Israel of the ability to surprise its enemies, and when Israel faces the 
numerical odds it does, surprise can be essential to security” (1981i). The report 
presented to the committee said though the sale “does not shift the air balance”  it 
makes Israeli “preparedness more costly” in case of any confrontation(1981h). 
 
The second argument was that Saudi Arabia  was an unstable regime that could 
collapse anytime and be replaced by an Islamic regime hostile to the US, modeled 
after the Islamic republic in Iran, as declared by Thomas Dine in his hearing (1981f). 
Dine said that the US thought the Shah had a strong rule, however, he fell. He also 
described Saudi Arabia as an “inherently unstable regime”. Dine presented the 
argument of a possible change in regime at the time when Khomeini’s ideology 
promoted the concept of “exporting the revolution” to other Islamic countries (UPI, 
1981).   
 
During the hearing, opponents of the deal mentioned the comments made by 
president Sadat that the Saudi Royal family  was unstable and the pressure for a 
regime change  was internal as well as regional (1981f).This argument was 
supported by the report given to the Committee on Foreign Relations in the Senate 
that said that the Shia population, estimated to be to be 250000 to 270000, was 
concentrated in the Eastern Province, the home of oil installations, and was 
dissatisfied with the regime (1981h). The opposition claimed that providing Saudi 
Arabia, with its limited personnel to deal with this sophisticated weaponry, would be 
of no use when the threat to its fields was internal (1981b). 
 
Additionally, opponents to the deal questioned the sincerity of Saudi Arabia’s alliance 
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with the US. Senator Patrick Moynihan pointed to how the GCC condemned the 
attack on the Gulf of Sidra, which they described as “medieval piracy”. He even 
presented a communiqué from the GCC to the Soviets in which the GCC  expressed 
their condemnation (1981a). On the other hand, Dine presented King Khalid’s 
statement that the loyalty of Saudi Arabia is not to the Eastern or to the Western 
block but to the Muslim people around the world (1981f). Senator Jespen declared 
that  Saudi  Arabia had financed the Syrian presence in Lebanon, which was at odds 
with American policy (1981g). Questioning the relationship was an argument that 
opponents to the DP World deal also presented. At the time of the AWACS episode, 
Saudi Arabia was an important Cold War ally and at the time of the DP World 
episode the UAE was an important ally in the war on terror. However, in both cases, 
opponents brought up ad hoc incidents and statements to discredit Saudi Arabia and 
the UAE and to put their alliance with the US into question.  
 
The opposition tried to frame the sale not as a litmus test for Saudi friendship but as 
“blackmail” as there were no quid pro quos. Saudi Arabia, unlike Israel, does not 
share bases with the US. The opposition framed the issue as the start of a process. 
Dine asked “How will the Congress respond when the Saudis ask for nuclear 
technology?” His argument reinforced the argument of his opponents that Israel was 
scared of a developing friendship with Arab countries (1981i). 
 
Another argument presented by the opposition was that even if they got the AWACS, 
the Saudis could never defend themselves against the Soviets in the case that they 
decided to raid oil installations. Therefore, in any case, the security of oil installations 
depended on American protection and not on Saudi capabilities.  
 
Bingham said in the 1st of October hearing: “Underneath there is always the 
implication that the Saudis need the new planes as a deterrent against Soviet 
aggression, but again there is no attempt to discuss the reality of the situation: The 
fact that the risk of global conflict operates as an infinitely more powerful deterrent to 
the Soviets than the addition of some capacity to the Royal Saudi Air Force, and the 
fact that there is no way the Saudi forces could be strengthened to the point where 
they could cope with a Soviet attack.” 
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In the House, the deal faced great opposition as members were skeptical of the 
Saudi assurance that the planes would be used solely for defensive purposes. The 
opposition presented a statement by high ranking Saudi officials who stressed that 
Israel  was a greater threat than the Soviets (Zablocki, 1981). Bingham said: “True, 
the Saudis insist the aircraft are not intended to be used against Israel, but in the 
world of the military it is not intentions but capability that counts.” However this 
argument was destroyed  by Reagan, as on  October 28,  hours before the Senate 
vote  he “pulled off the last master stroke” as he announced publicly the limitation of 
the use of the planes (Simpson, 2008).  
The opposition of Israel was so fierce, not only because of the technical 
specifications involved in the weapons but because they were afraid it would tamper 
with the US-Israeli special friendship (Bronson, 2006).  
Opponents to the deal mentioned that the 1978 sale that included a tripartite 
package to Egypt, Israel and Saudi included a promise by Secretary Brown not to 
sell enhanced arms to Saudi (1981i). Opponents of the deal said that the sale  would 
alter Israeli confidence in American reliability (1981i). 
Opponents to the deal downplayed the role that Saudi Arabia could play in the peace 
process and highlighted the fact that Saudi Arabia rejected the Camp David accords 
(Zablocki, 1981). Lee Hamilton and Benjamin Rosenthal mentioned that since the 
sale of the F 15s in 1978, Saudi Arabia had not made any serious effort to push for 
peace with Israel. 
 
AIPAC lost that round to the Saudis, however Bard mentioned that on the issue of 
arms the pro-Israel lobby has a 50% success record because arms deals involve 
American economic interests and usually the opposition they face comes from the 
arms contractors and their employees who have a vested interest in letting the deal 
pass. Therefore it was not totally unusual for AIPAC to lose. Their loss was partly 
due to some flaws in their tactics but it was due in greater part to the constituency 
that the Saudis were able to put together that outweighed AIPAC influence on the 
Congress.  
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AIPAC took an early stand against the AWACS sale. Two days after the 
announcement of the deal, the Conference of Major Jewish Organizations issued a 
memo saying that US interests in the Middle East were at risk (Laham, 2002). AIPAC  
started publishing full page ads in newspapers to raise the anti-AWACS stakes 
(Levins, 1983). At the same time, they employed their mailing list to raise money for 
the anti-AWACS campaign (Levins, 1983) asking for a $1000 donation, for which 
they promised a free subscription to their newsletter and a book signed by the 
AIPAC founder, along with other perks (Levins, 1983). The pro-Israel lobby mobilized 
their grassroots who flooded the media with letters expressing their opposition and 
describing the sale as anti-Semitic (Levins, 1983). 
 
The other self-inflicted hurdle facing the pro-Israel lobby was the fact they were 
waging a confrontation with the President. The head of B’nai B'rith accused the 
administration of waging an anti-Semitic war against the Jewish community (1981e). 
However, these attacks were perceived as cheap attempts to discredit Reagan, who 
was known for his perfect record in supporting Israel (Laham, 2004). Some accused 
the president of abusing his power as he was trying to coerce the Congress to 
support the deal (Emerson, 1981). Laham recalls: “By September 1981 the relation 
between the White House and the pro-Israel lobby deteriorated to such a level that 
the two sides were talking past each other rather than to each other; and both sides, 
rather than attempting to reconcile their differences, were determined to do battle 
with one another” (Laham, 2002).  
 
The fact that Begin, the Israeli prime minister attacked Ronald Regan (Godsell, 
1981a) pushed the latter to retaliate in order to safeguard his prestige as a president. 
Also a strong president will not allow a foreign country to interfere in his own internal 
affairs (1981b). The charges that he did not deliver on his campaign promise to 
protect Israel did not pan out, as by pushing for AWACS  he was delivering on his 
campaign to boost the economy (Laham, 2002). 
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The methods adopted by the pro-Israelis were also used against them. Every time 
Begin appeared on TV to criticize the sale, he gave the Saudis a chance for a media 
appearance, to defend it and to launch to the public the slogan: “Begin or Reagan”.  
President Reagan confronted Begin by saying that Israel cannot  dictate US foreign 
policy and he asked him to stop lobbying the Congress (Simpson, 2008). In his 
October 1, 1981 statement, when he notified the congress Reagan said “It is not the 
business of other nations to make American foreign policy.” (Laham, 2004). 
Also, the fact that the Israeli prime minister was personally involved in lobbying 
senators and talking to media looked like a foreign intervention. In the case of Saudi 
Arabia, it was a Lt Col, a low ranking officer and a registered lobbyist who did the 
lobbying. It was not King Khalid or Crown Prince Fahad who did the lobbying 
(Laham, 2002). 
The arguments that Dine presented were either weak or theoretical. The argument 
that Saudi might shift to the Soviets or that there might be a regime change were 
purely theoretical as there was no indication that either of the two situations might 
occur. On the other hand, the fact that Saudi Arabia condemned the attack on Libya, 
a fellow Arab country, was not strong enough to question the US-Saudi alliance.  
 
Dine also could not substantiate his argument that the scenario that happened in 
Iran—when the Iranians shared the technology of their American planes with the 
Soviets after the revolution—could happen in Saudi. The Chairman asked him if he 
had proof or an indication that this could happen. Dine said that he had no listing but 
that “history” has shown that this could happen. His answer was “look at their 
government”. His defense was hypothetical, based on vague comparisons (1981i). 
 
However, the comparison does not stand as the Shah was isolated from his people 
and he took power by a coup (Cole, 2009). The house of the Sauds, on the other 
hand, is entrenched in the Saudi society and enjoys legitimacy. They also used the 
wealth from oil to enhance the lifestyle of citizens (Abdulla, 2010). The use of 
unsubstantiated arguments weakened the opposition’s overall narrative. Instead of 
focusing on a few valid arguments, they diluted their defences by using several weak 
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arguments. Dine’s discourse presented arguments that were inconsistent. For 
example, talking about Saudi Arabia’s commitment to the US he said: “A true 
partnership is based on commitment. Both Israel and the United States have 
demonstrated their commitment and capacity to defend the region against Soviet 
expansion. Saudi has yet to show a commitment to peace with Israel. Saudi Arabia 
has yet to show a commitment to a two way relationship.” He defined Saudi Arabia’s 
commitment to US by peace with  Israel, and then he mentioned the Soviet 
expansion which is unrelated to the peace with Israel. This paragraph represents 
how inconsistent was the Israeli narrative (1981f). 
 
Also the speech of Dine was judgmental, or even derogatory, of Saudi Arabia when 
he said it is a country with “tribal rivalries” where blood relations, not elected 
representatives, command the ruling hierarchy” and he said, “Do you want to leave 
the airplane in the hand of “dissident tribesman and disloyal soldiers”? He also 
described the sale as “wrong” and the rationale that the Saudis could go to 
competitor nations as “immoral”. 
 
Problems with opposition 
 
At the outset, the pro-Israel coalition was fragile and had a meagre majority of 54 in 
the Senate: it “lacked strong popular underpinning” (Smith, 1996). The pro-Israel 
lobby was weak in the South West, the home of the conservative Republican states 
(Smith, 1996). The loss of Roger Jespen the Republican from Iowa had been a big 
blow to AIPAC as he had been one of the core AWACS opponents. The pressure on 
the Senator was immense to the point that this staunch opponent of AWACS 
changed his vote. He was influenced by farmers, manufacturing equipment makers, 
farm coops, and defence contractors.  (Emerson, 1985). The Saudis hyped on 
economic interest. This factor was used in all ways possible. It was used positively 
with the promise of a gain via employment and negatively by the threat of depriving a 
party of an existing privilege or an income.  
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The Saudis used their business connections to influence legislators. Directly there 
was the influence of arms contractors and their employees, and their subcontractors 
and their employees. This represented grassroots as well as grasstops. The 
employees would represent a constituency to the legislator and the contractors were 
the grasstops as they were an important source for funding campaigns. The Saudis 
were able to influence entities such as farm coops that had no direct stake in the 
deal. Also, the argument was that if the deal went through, jobs would be created in 
the district and money would pour into the district, which would be to the benefit of 
everyone. Therefore, even those who were not directly affected by the deal had an 
interest in pressuring their representatives to support it. Here, the economic benefits 
were a strong argument that helped Saudi Arabia build a coalition of business and 
their employees. 
 
Since Jespen was considered part of the backbone of the anti-AWACS coalition, his 
change of mind had a psychological impact on others who started, one after the 
other, backing off their opposition positions (Simpson, 2008). The biography of 
Prince Bandar describes Jespen as a cornerstone of the opposition. He was the 
most vocal about it and he was rallying people against the deal. When, under the 
influence of pressure of his constituency, he changed his position, this gave the 
signal to others that the opposition to the deal was a losing cause; therefore 
legislators started one by one changing their positions. 
 
The other problem the pro-Israel lobby had was that they could not counter the 
pressure that came from the President as well from the pro-Saudi coalition. The deal 
was simply too big for any Senator who could get a chunk of it to refuse. The arms 
companies had spread their subcontractors to cover all the states (Smith, 1996).The 
pro-Israeli lobby could not balance the economic gain involved from the deal. At the 
outset the lobby had to face the president who, as explained below, had great 
popular support, especially for his foreign policy. To add to that, the Saudis were 
able to orchestrate a constituency to support the deal by using their business 
connections and highlighting the economic benefits which left no chance to the pro-
Israel lobby for a success. 
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Every senator had the option of upsetting AIPAC or upsetting multiple other interest 
groups in his state. According to Emerson, even the florists had a stake in the deal 
as, when it passed, people would have more money to spend on flowers. This 
narrative even gained the florists, who put pressure on their elected officials to 
support the deal (Emerson, 1985).In the course of my interviews one respondent, 
who works as a communication specialist for an Arab Gulf country, said that when 
the deal is too big and success is not certain, AIPAC backs off. They do not push 
forward their opposition in order not to waste their capital with politicians; however 
they usually trade their retreat for concessions on other issues. This is what 
happened with the 1978 sale. However, in the case of the AWACS, given the 
implications of the sale, they fought adamantly. 
 
Another problem for AIPAC was the surprise factor. They did not expect the Saudis 
to be so well prepared, to have gathered and coordinated so much support 
domestically. A respondent who was involved in the 1978 sale recalls: “We were 
faced with opposition, at that time AIPAC who were not expecting us to be that 
organized, so all their reaction was off key. Simply, they were 2-3 steps behind us, 
when they tried to ambush us we had answers. So, as I told you it was well thought 
out and we learned a lot from their methods in applying these issues in Congress 
and Senate.” This “off key” reaction is visible in the hearing before the Senate Armed 
Services committee. Opponents of the deal could not present valid arguments to 
counter the arguments of witnesses from the military who supported the deal and 
who had the technical knowledge and presented scientific explanations in their 
defences. 
 
For example, when he was at the forefront of the opposition, Jespen tried to ambush 
General Jones, who had said the technology provided to the Saudis was off-the-shelf 
technology and that the communication could be jammed in order to defend the 
proposition that, once the Saudis had their own aircraft, the US would no longer be 
able to control their usage, therefore those aircraft would give the Saudis the ability 
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to attack Israel and go against the will of the US. In order to prove his proposition, 
Jespen brought a Senate Appropriation Committee document from the year 1976 
saying that the AWACS radar is the hardest to jam. General Jones responded that it 
was still true. Jespen was confused as he thought he had scored a point against his 
opponent, and asked: “Pardon?..but.. in line 4 of the slide.you say the 
communication link could be easily jammed.” General Jones answered: “That’s not 
the radar that’s the radio.” (1981g).1 
 
 
The role of Arab Americans 
 
The F15 and the AWACS coincided with the rise of the Arab American organizations 
that emerged following the 1967 war and the ABSCAM (Findley, 1989, Shain, 1996). 
 
The help of Arab American Senator James Abourezk contributed to a great extent to 
securing President Carter’s support of the F15 deal. A respondent who was involved 
in the 1978 sale recalled: “Of course the NAAA (National Arab American 
Association), the ADC (Arab American Anti-Discrimination committee) was coming 
alongside Senator Abourezk, (the Arab American senator from South Dakota). He 
founded it (ADC), at that time he was still Senator, it's funny he played a crucial role 
in getting the deal through. At that time, the US was negotiating with Panama on the 
withdrawal of American forces from the Panama Canal. The US wanted to do that 
and reach an agreement with the Panamanian government. The Congress opposed 
it, and the one who opposed it vehemently for his own reasons was Senator 
Abourezk. He was from South Dakota; he wanted the government to give him 
something for the South Dakotan farmers in order to get his vote for the Panama 
deal. He was adamant. So President Carter called Prince Bandar at the time and told 
him: "This fellow Arab of yours is giving us a hard time. He said if I don’t get the deal 
on Panama not only will I lose face but I might not be able to get the deal on the 
F15s". So Prince Bandar talked to James Abourezk and persuaded him to vote for 
Panama, and it went through.” Prince Bandar’s mediation led Abourezk to change 
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his position on the Panama deal and in return for this favour Carter backed the F 15 
deal. However, the attitude of Abourezk did not reflect the attitude of all elected 
officials from Arab ancestry. Toby Moffett, an Arab-American representative from 
Connecticut, who was known to be against the oil  companies and to be aligned with 
trade unions, stood against the sale in 1978 and 1981.  
 
Part of the mandate of the foreign agents contracted was to reach out to Arab 
American organizations. The contract awarded to Crawford, a foreign lobbyist in 
1981, states: “The corporation shall be responsible for broadening the participation 
of the Kingdom with Arab American organizations whose goals and ideals are 
generally consistent with those of the government of Saudi Arabia, such as the 
National Association of Arab Americans” (1981d). 
The Saudis, who encouraged the NAAA, realized that an indigenous American 
organization would have more credibility in sending studies and research to the 
Congress then a report prepared by a foreign agent. The report prepared by the 
Library of Congress on the AWACS included as sources of information AIPAC, the 
Middle East Research Center, and NAAA (Vajs, 1981). 
 
David Sadd the executive director of the NAAA helped Prince Bandar to organize the 
support of US industries that had an interest in Saudi Arabia to lobby for the sale 
(Simpson, 2008). The NAAA, like AIPAC, coordinated the lobbying activities of more 
than an half a dozen Arab American groups (Levins, 1983). The important feature of 
the NAAA was that it represented a domestic American organization. In the hearing, 
Sadd said that his organization represented American citizens of Arab ancestry. The 
NAAA stressed the same themes as the Saudis: the fact that the refusal would 
“undermine” Reagan’s “credibility” in the region, the fact that these weapons would 
be used to protect installations and hence would contribute to the secure flow of oil 
necessary to the West’s daily functioning, the Saudi‘s “responsible role” in the 
region, and described it as “a force of moderation” that would generate job creation 
from the sale. 
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At the end of his speech he attacked Israel by saying: “Why then, is Israel opposed 
to the sale? Israel has grown so dependent on its relationship with the United States 
and so accustomed to having this military domination in the Arab world assured by 
the United States that it has come to view a close American relationship with any 
Arab nation as being automatically a threat to its own interest. Israel’s real intention 
in attempting to block the air defence package is to drive a wedge between the 
United States and its closest Arab friend.” He terminated his speech with the very 
strong Begin or Reagan argument by saying: “The American people would like to 
know whether the congress will support President Reagan or Prime Minister Begin in 
determining what is in America’s best interests and what American foreign policy 
should be to achieve those interests” (1981f) . 
 
Limitations of the role of NAAA 
 
In the course of  the hearing, NAAA director Mr. Sadd started his speech by saying : 
“As American citizens of Arab ancestry, NAAA members across the country are 
particularly concerned that the broad outline of foreign policy conducted by the 
United States best serves America’s national interest” (1981f).Though Arab 
organizations were involved and they appeared in the hearing as a domestic faction 
to counter the views of AIPAC, the broader Arab-American constituency was not so 
involved.  
  
This was the reason why the coalition that rose from the AWACS was short lived and 
the so called “pro-Arab” lobby did not prevail. The support from Arab American 
organizations had no constituency of Arab Americans behind it. When I was 
interviewing one head of an Arab-American organization, he said: “we had no dog in 
the fight”, to signal the fact that Arab Americans as a community had no stake in the 
sale, though the NAAA was involved as an organization and with it Sadd coordinated 
the work of half a dozen other organizations (Simpson, 2008). However, the Arab 
American community as a constituency was not involved. Emerson quotes Fred 
Dutton, the main consultant for the Saudis, downplaying the role of domestic 
lobbying and saying: “You don’t see Arab lobby groups going up and down the 
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corridors of Congress. Why? Because we can’t rely on a nationwide constituency, 
nor can they provoke a flood of telegrams” (Emerson, 1985).  
 
Though there was a constituency, the constituency was around jobs rather than an 
ethnic one. Their lobbyist would go to a Senator and tell him how many jobs the deal 
would create and the unions would pressure the Senator and tell him to support the 
deal, but they could not replicate the American Jews who had emotional ties with 
Israel, who identified with Israel, and who, as individuals would call their 
representatives or send telegrams to their local newspapers. The support for the 
Saudis did not extend beyond the deal, whereas the opposition that American Jews 
expressed was part of their overall position on Middle East issues and part of their 
support for Israel. 
 
At the time, most Arab Americans came from Lebanon and were not so concerned 
whether Saudi Arabia renewed its arms arsenal or not (Laham, 2002). This element 
was highlighted by works written by pro-Israeli authors,  who said that these 
organizations represented an artificial constituency, as the average Arab American, 
who most likely was a Christian from the Levant, had no ties with Saudi Arabia and 
did not care whether the package passed or not (Levins, 1983).  
 
In addition to the fact that the issue of Saudi armaments had low salience to the Arab 
American constituency, the NAAA did not seek to engage them by raising the 
salience of the issue. When asked why the NAAA did not mobilize Arab-Americans, 
the respondent who was involved with NAAA at the time said that they did not have 
to do it as they viewed the support from the President and the American business 
community as more important. Even the NAAA did not see in the AWACS an 
opportunity to build a constituency or an issue to rally the community around it. 
Rallying a fragmented community around an issue that had low salience to its 
members was seen as a long shot, as opposed to rallying the business community, 
which was easy to identify and had direct interest in the deal. 
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Saudi approach to lobbying 
 
Comprehensive approach 
 
The Saudis had a multilayered approach. According to my interview with a 
respondent who was involved in the 1978 sale, and according to Prince Bandar’s 
biography, the Saudis’ reversed the methods that the Israelis used against them. 
They asked the President to exert pressure on the Congress at the same time that 
they used the business coalition to pressure members. They did inside-the-beltway 
politics by approaching the senators directly and explaining to them the benefits of 
the sale, using the media to make the idea acceptable to their constituency, and 
basing every move on previous research. The Group for International Study and 
Evaluation was set up as a subsidiary of the Insurance company of North America, 
whose main objective was to gather intelligence and pass it to the Saudi government 
(Levins, 1983). They initially kept a low profile and let the president take the lead, 
then when they saw the dissent in the Congress, they started aggressive lobbying 
(Simpson, 2008). The pace of lobbying started to increase six weeks before the deal 
(Emerson, 1981).  
 
The coalition 
 
The pro-Arab lobby had support from oil based corporations including Fluor, Bechtel, 
the Computer Science Corporation, Mobil and all Houston based giants of  the oil 
industry, who joined the campaign to support the sale (Simpson, 2008). Bechtel was 
involved in intense lobbying for the deal as it had many projects in Saudi Arabia, 
which was going through a boom with 100 billion USD in oil revenues, and everyone 
was interested in tapping into the new market. The president of Boeing and the 
Chairman of United Technologies sent more than 6500 telegrams to subsidiaries, 
vendors, contractors, suppliers, and distributors to support the sale (Emerson, 1985). 
Together these two companies were responsible for generating 70% of the 
grassroots support for the deal (Emerson, 1985).  
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As well as the companies directly involved in the deal, the business coalition had a 
snow ball effect. Companies interested in starting business relations with Saudi 
leaned towards support for the deal. In addition to the contractors and their 
subcontractors,  companies and unions in districts where the arms were to be 
produced supported the deal, as it would boost the district economy and would 
indirectly boost their business (Emerson, 1985).The business coalition secured the 
grass tops for the deal. Prince Bandar, by highlighting the economic effect to the 
business community, rendered the issue domestic. 
 
 The Saudi team used economic incentives in all possible ways. They used them 
positively with the promise of a gain or employment and negatively by depriving a 
party of an existing privilege or income. In his biography, Prince Bandar mentions he 
got the support of Rockefeller, a Jewish banker, by using negative incentives. He 
closed the account he had with his bank and did not reopen it until Rockefeller spoke 
to New York senators to support the deal. As stated by a member of the Royal family 
in an interview, the Saudis marshalled all their assets and capabilities in order to get 
support for the sale. 
 
On the day of the vote on  the AWACS,  23 of America’s top executives from IBM, 
TWA, Procter and Gamble, and American Airlines sent what became known as the 
“Riyadh Telex” saying that failure to pass the deal would impair US interests in the 
Middle East (Levins, 1983). However, the role of oil companies and business 
interests is seen as exaggerated by Dr. Kemp from Carnegie’s Endowment for 
International Peace. He said, “It was more Prince Bandar himself who convinced 
more people of the wisdom-if that is what you want to call it-of supporting (the sale 
of) AWACS than oil (executives) who always seem embarrassed at the concept of 
lobbying and are never good at it” (Feldman and ʻal Šēm, 1988). The lobby that 
Prince Bandar formed was multilayered. It worked with American organizations that 
had an interest in the Middle East, and it also worked with newly founded Arab 
American organizations (Levins, 1983). 
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Actually the F15 deal and the AWACS deals gave an impetus for the formation of 
Arab American organizations. In one interview with an activist in an Arab American 
organization, the respondent recalled that the support that Saudi Arabia was willing 
to provide encouraged political entrepreneurs to start Arab American organizations 
with a focus on Middle East affairs 
 
 
Grassroots 
 
Though many factors played in favor of the Saudis, such as having an aggressive 
approach, securing the support of the president, the cold war, the constituency that 
they were able to gather and to mobilize was crucial in wining that round against 
AIPAC. According to Prince Bandar’s biographer, at the beginning they kept a low 
profile and waited to see whether the President could secure the deal by himself; 
however, when they saw that the President was facing hurdles and that his support 
was not enough to let the deal go through, they quickly used their business 
connections, engaged the unions, and orchestrated a grassroots base (Simpson, 
2008). 
 
Here the view of Smith prevails that there are two kinds of grassroots. There is long 
term permanent grassroots, such as the base for the lobby for retirees or the base 
for the pro-Israel lobby. This base is spontaneously mobilized whenever an issue of 
concern to them is raised. On the other hand, there are temporary grassroots that 
are usually “inseminated” by a lobbyist who raises the interest of a faction of an 
American society when an event occurs. In this case, Prince Bandar and his team 
inseminated an economic constituency that was interested in the benefits that would 
come from the sale. Paradoxically, in the DP World case, the lobbyist of Eller &Co 
was able to generate a constituency to oppose the takeover. 
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Prince Bandar understood the techniques employed by AIPAC.  He knew that AIPAC 
had a constituency that could exert pressure on the Congress and wanted to counter 
this pressure. Fred Dutton prepared a brief for him on the AFL-CIO. He knew that 
spending by Saudi Arabia meant jobs, therefore he took the case to the unions at 
McDonnell Douglas, who took it to their subcontractors (Simpson, 2008). They just 
substituted the Jewish votes with the votes of the workers who would benefit from 
the sale (Simpson, 2008). According to Prince Bandar’s biographer the constituency 
preference and pressure were more important in persuading the Congress than the 
strategic value of Saudi Arabia.  
 
In his biography, Prince Bandar says that he was influenced by Tip O’Neill, the 
speaker of the House, who said “All politics are local politics, it doesn’t matter what 
you take, the bottom line is its local politics” (Simpson, 2008). The economic 
interests involved and the grassroots were a main factor in support from the 
Congress. It had in Prince Bandar’s opinion more weight than the strategic interest of 
the US.   
 
He knew he could not take the issue on a strategic level only; he had to present it as 
a domestic issue or as an issue with relevance to the average American, therefore 
the ethnic constituency was replaced with an economic one. However, this was a 
temporary constituency as it was related to the sale and not to any link to Saudi 
Arabia. Additionally, the President presented the argument of the strategic value of 
Saudi Arabia in the struggle against communism in order to get public endorsement 
of the deal. 
 
Direct contact with the Congress 
 
In addition to outside lobbying performed by pressure groups, the inside lobbying 
was very important and the messaging was consistent. The Kingdom took 
Representatives and Senators on trips to Saudi Arabia. They met with senior 
officials, especially with Prince Fahd, who later on became the King of Saudi Arabia. 
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One respondent, a member of the Royal family who used to be involved in the deal 
recalls: “Having them come to the Kingdom and talk to leadership, played an 
important role in convincing them”. The Saudi lobbyists would go to a Senator, ask 
him for a few minutes and tell him that the deal would employ several thousands of 
his constituency. This argument was the main narrative behind getting support from 
the Senate (Simpson, 2008).  
 
Hiring foreign agents 
 
Though foreign agents cannot win a losing case, when there is a good case, their 
expertise and connections can make winning a sure outcome. In the case of DP 
World, they were not able to save the deal. However, in the AWACS deal they were 
able to secure meetings with media and members of the congress and they helped 
structure a coherent narrative and to frame the issue. The 1978 sale did not require 
the effort that the 1981 sale required. In the 1978 sale, foreign agent records show 
they had only one registered lobbyist, Frederick Dutton who retained three people 
with him. His role was to provide legal services and counseling as well as analysis 
and research. He was assigned to help in negotiating as well as drafting documents 
regarding contract business relationships (1977). However, in the 1981 sale, the 
registered principal was J Crowford Cook. He was hired by the Saudi Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs and his duties included, besides trade and liaison with US 
government, outreach to the Arab American community as well as an educational 
role.  
 
Comparing the two registration forms, one can see a maturity in the role of foreign 
lobbyists. During the first phase, their lobbyist was an adjunct lawyer advising on 
contracts. In the second phase, the lobbying was integrated; it encompassed public 
relations, strategy, research and media, hence the lobbyist played a bigger role. His 
role included conducting an education program to inform the general public on the 
importance of energy and the problems it faced with the needs to conserve energy, 
while emphasizing the role of Saudi Arabia in conservation plans (1981d), (1977).  
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The Saudis did not want to be looked upon as purely the producers of raw oil, they 
wanted to portray themselves as a main player in energy policies around the world, 
and as a responsible player concerned with conserving energy for the future. 
Although Saudi Arabia is the last country to worry about a shortage in energy, it 
wanted to portray itself as a true partner to the West in its quest for energy. 
 
Spending on lobbying increased from 1978 to 1981. In 1977 the amount paid was 
100 USD per hour, in addition to a 100 USD of expenses. The figure that was 
reported in the foreign registration act for the 1981 contract that included public 
relations and education was 470000 USD. 
 
On the issue of AWACS, the Saudis also joined forces with other Arab countries. 
Other Arab countries’ lobbyists were also lobbying for the arms sale for Saudi 
Arabia. Therefore, in addition to its own hired agents, Saudi Arabia benefited from 
other Arab countries’ agents—Saudi Arabia,  Iraq, Algeria, Libya and the UAE had 
enlisted 25 foreign agents altogether (Levins, 1983). The lobbyists also played the 
role of liaison as they organized meetings for members of the Saudi family with 
senators, similar to the visits that Begin and Dayan paid to senators (Levins, 1983). 
The different accounts show that Saudi Arabia hired a team of ex-statesmen to give 
them access to the Congress and American administration (Simpson, 2008).  
 
 
Narrative 
 
The other aspect of the education program included a plan to teach the American 
public about the history of Islam and of Saudi Arabia. This was an important element 
as, following the 1973 embargo, Saudi Arabia was portrayed as greedily 
blackmailing the US with oil. This image was intensified with the ABSCAM scandal, 
where federal agents disguised as mysterious Sheikh Abdul Karim tried to bribe 
152 
 
congress people. This led to the stereotyping of Arabs in general and Saudis in 
particular (Shaheen, 1997). The program also informed the general public on the 
advantages that the US would reap from Saudi investments. The economic 
advantage was the main theme that Bandar used when aligning a coalition to 
support the deal. 
 
The peace angle was also used. The American public was open to the Arabs; the 
Nasser era where he kept threatening Israel was gone. With Sadat’s overture to 
Israel and his signing of the peace agreement he projected a “peaceful Arab face to 
Americans” (Smith, 1996) (298).Saudi Arabia had offered a peace plan to the 
administration and used this angle in their communications with the American public. 
One of the objectives of the communication plan was to promote the need to the 
American public to have a long lasting peace in the Middle East. Though all these 
points seem unrelated to a military sale, they helped to set the mood among the 
public to accept the fact that the US was to sell state of the art military technology to 
Saudi Arabia. 
 
Media 
 
The Saudi lobby had cultivated good relations with top journalists and publishers in 
the mainstream media, which helped the Saudis voice their opinion to the public 
(Levins, 1983). Crawford used media in order to effectively deliver on his plan. The 
mandate of the firm included research to find conduits for effective implementation of 
the program. The Saudis even used advertisements to promote their positions. Their 
supporters in the business community also advertised: Mobil put out an ad saying 
that 200 American businesses would get 35 billion in business from Saudi Arabia 
(Emerson, 1985), (Levins 83) . 
 
Mentored by Dutton, who was a special assistant to Kennedy and was appointed as 
secretary of state for congressional relations in the State department, Prince Bandar 
would provide a lunch for the press in a Kalorama Park town house, “lacing the 
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conversation with well-timed and tasty news”. Prince Bandar would invite the cream 
of the press and give them some inside information on the deal (Simpson, 2008). 
This kept the arms sale in the public discourse. The AWACS sale became a 
dominant theme in the US media (Al-Zuhayyan, 2012). Prince Bandar was able to 
raise the visibility of the issue, which made it more difficult for the Israelis to lobby 
against it. The AWACS became the center of the Middle East debate, as opposed to 
the Arab-Israeli conflict. However, this new debate not only included foreign policy, it 
also involved domestic policy as it highlighted the benefits of the deal for the US 
economy (Emerson, 1985). 
 
Support from the White House 
 
Both presidents had strong motives to support the sale. Carter was focused on 
energy, a theme that translated later into the Carter Doctrine (Stork, 1980). This 
concept was adopted by subsequent administrations. Carter, who brokered the 
peace following the 1973 war, was eager to pursue peace efforts and he saw in 
Saudi Arabia a potential partner for his endeavor (Rabinovich and Reinharz, 2008). 
He sent letters to every senator claiming, that vetoing the sale would be a 
devastating blow to  Sadat’s efforts for peace (Bard, 1991). 
 
On the other hand, in addition to the importance of the safety and secure flow of oil 
emphasised by his predecessor, Reagan emphasized containment of the Soviet 
threat. In addition to the economic interest that was a strong argument in the districts 
where the contractors and their subcontractors were based, the containment of the 
Soviet threat was an appealing argument to the overall American population.This 
created an incentive for Reagan to back the deal as well as to promote the argument 
to the public. 
 
Both presidents received concessions in return for supporting the deal. Reagan, who 
was an advocate of supply side economics  with his “Reaganomics” policy, wanted 
to keep the price of oil low in order to encourage production (2013b). The Saudis 
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accepted keeping oil at a low of $32 a barrel until the end of 1982 (Dorsey, 1981), 
while Carter got a concession  from Abourezk on the Panama treaty. 
 
The military was in favor of selling AWACS,  which provided a rationale for 
Americans to build airbases for the  US in case of a crisis (Smith, 1996). One 
respondent, who was involved with NAAA at the time, said that the military saw an 
extension of their influence in the sale as it  was to be followed up by technical 
support and training which gave them a wider acess to the region. They also 
supported it as a large order of planes would accelerate their production, which 
would facilitate their re-equipment (Bard, 1991). The stance that the Pentagon tends 
to take on US sales is that they endorse sales that increase their readiness  and they 
oppose sales that diminish their stocks or delay their re-equipment (Feldman and ʻal 
Šēm, 1988). 
Both presidents provided assurances that the warplanes would not be used against 
Israel. Carter said to the Senate that the F 15s would not be used against Israel but 
would be for defensive purposes and would not be complemented by  offensive 
equipment (Emerson, 1985). Reagan topped his lobbying campaign by sending a 
report that detailed the limitations of the sale and that provided assurances the 
planes would be solely used for defensive purposes on the day of the vote. He 
outmaneuvered his opponents as he was able to gain wavering senators and did not 
leave time for the pro-Israel lobby to answer the report (Laham, 2002). This was an 
act that Prince Bandar in his biography described as a “master stroke” (Simpson, 
2008). 
 
Reagan’s approach 
 
From April to September, President Reagan took a defensive stand by simply 
answering any arguments or letters he received, whether from his supporters, the 
pro-Israel lobby or the Congress. However, as the opposition mounted six weeks 
before the voting on the sale, he decided to take a more aggressive aproach 
(Laham, 2002). Given that the US was at the height of the Cold War, patriotism was 
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strong in the US and the president had high leverage with members of the Congress, 
who tend to be more supportive of the president when there is a perceived potential 
threat (Lindsay, 2003). President Reagan had the war on communism as a narrative 
for the Congress as well as the American public (Bronson, 2006). This was a 
weapon that he also used against opponents of the deal, when he described them as 
putting Israel’s interests before their own national interest (Simpson, 2008). The 
element that allowed Reagan to have such an aggressive approach and not face a 
backlash was the fact that he had high popular approval for his foreign policy (Holsti, 
2009). Reagan was successful in persuading Senators for several reasons. Reagan 
was a strong president at the beginning of his term, and he had strong approval 
ratings as he was seen as forceful on national security.  This emboldened him to use 
coercive measure with Senators who did not tow the line, such as depriving  a state 
of a provision without fear of public backlash. This tactic was not open to President 
Bush  in the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina because he had very low public approval 
and was vulnerable to scrutiny.  In addition to the pressure that Reagan exerted on  
the Senate he had support from the Saudis, who as explained before, were able to 
generate a constituency in support of the deal. Bush had no similar support. Though 
Bush tried to pressure the Congress to let the deal go through, the Emiratis were not 
able to generate a constituency in support of the deal to back him up.  Additionally, 
Reagan was able to put pressure on the Senate, as the Republicans had taken 
control by winning twelve seats and defeating nine Democrat incumbents. As Smith 
argues in his book The Power Game, Reagan was very good at showing the image 
of the winner. He showed firmness and strength facing the opposition, but gave 
concessions whenever he needed to. 
To encourage the Senate to reject the Packwood resolution, Reagan started by 
lobbying the committees that had a say on the issue and that could influence the 
Senate: the committees on Foreign Relations and on Armed Services (Laham, 
2004). On the Foreign Relations Committee two senators, SI Hayakawa and Larry 
Pressler of South Dakota, were among those who opposed the deal; later on, they 
changed their mind and joined the proponents of the deal. 
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The opposition went from attacking Reagan’s position on the AWACS  deal to 
attacking his foreign policies in general. Congressman Benjamin Rosenthal 
described the president’s interventions in El Salvador and Libya as “ill-advised”“ and 
“disconnected episodes”. From this overall attack on his policies he went on to say 
that the Reagan adminstration could not reconcile the pillar of the Middle East policy 
that revolved around commitment to Israel and the strategic flow of oil (1981i). On  
the 14th of September  1981, Reagan invited twenty-seven senators to the White 
House to persuade them on the arms deal. In that month another bipartisan petition 
came against the sale signed by fifty six senators (Emerson, 1985).  
 
Reagan used all methods to get the approval of Congress: he “resorted to cajoling, 
persuading even threatening “(Simpson, 2008) . One respondent who was in the 
military at the time, said that Reagan used the “carrot and stick approach” with the 
Senate: he gave positive as well as negative incentives to persuade Senators to vote 
for the AWACS. In the same way he would promise senators budgetary 
concessions, such as promising a representative a new post office in his district, he 
would deprive those who opposed him of existing privileges in their states (Bard, 
1991). Prince  Bandar was quoted as saying:“We aren’t fighting this battle, the 
president is” (Emerson, 1985). 
 
As for those he could not persuade, he tried to make them lose credibility in order to 
alienate them. On September 11 1981, Reagan tried to persuade Packwood, who 
introduced the anti-AWACS resolution in the Senate, but Packwood did not change 
his mind. On the contrary, Packwood raised funds for GOP Senate candidates, 
saying that Jewish contributors were unhappy with the AWACS. When Reagan saw 
that he was unconvincible, he leaked the accounts of his meeting with him, which put 
the latter in an embarrassing position in front of his supporters. Reagan also played 
on the partisanship theme, as on October 7 he gathered 43 Senators from the 
Republican party and stressed the need for party loyalty (Simpson, 2008).Reagan 
even addressed the American public and televised his defense by explaining why the 
deal was important to US national interests (Levins, 1983). He also used support 
from Nixon and Carter, and from  sixteen  prominent  former foreign and national 
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security officials (Laham, 2002). These high calibre officials helped him frame the 
issue to the general public as a foreign and national security issue of great 
importance to American national interests.  
 
Since he knew that opposition from the Congress was motivated by pressure from 
the pro-Israel lobby, Reagan decided to face the pro-Israel lobby directly. He inititally 
started by sending a letter to B’nai B’rith clarifying the content of the package and 
assuring his adminstration’s commitment to Israel (Laham, 2002). At the same time 
he offered the Israelis and their supporters enough assurances that the warplanes 
would not be used against Israel. Reagan’s pitch was that the security of Israel 
would not be affected as Saudi Arabia would not attack Israel. He also assured  the 
pro-Israel lobby that the upgraded warplanes would not be based in Tabuk which is 
located in the proximity of Israel (Bronson, 2006). Similarly, he showed firmness 
facing the Saudis. Though he needed to keep oil  prices low for the success of his 
“Reaganomics”, and though he recognised the economic boost that would come 
from the cash injected into the US economy, he still dictated the terms of the sale.  
 
Although Reagan catered to the Saudis’ demands, he did not want to be seen as 
manipulated by them and being totally “blackmailed” by oil, as the media was 
suggesting  (1981c). Reagan sent a letter to the Senate majority leader explaining 
the terms of the sale. On the 21 of October, he published the letter in the New York 
Times. The letter stated: “Should the Saudis adopt the policies which are disruptive 
to the prospects of stability of the region and detrimental to US interests, I will not 
hesitate to exercise my right to cancel the sales agreement or withdraw the support 
essential to the continued operations of any AWACS  that may have been delivered 
to Saudi Arabia” (Grimmett, 1981). 
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Conclusion 
 
Value of success 
 
Prince Bandar says in his biography, “A thorough understanding of the workings of 
the American political system, and an immensely effective and well organized lobby 
in the form of American Israeli Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC) provides Israel with 
considerable influence over US foreign policy in the Middle East” (Simpson, 2008). 
The AWACS sale proved that the pro-Israeli lobby was not invincible (Laham, 2002) 
and that Arabs can have an influence inside the US if they prepare properly. 
 
As discussed before, the issue of the airplanes had aspects larger then the 
technicalities of the military balance; it defined the special relationship between the 
US and Saudi Arabia at the same time as it defined the relationship between the US 
and Israel (Tillman, 1982). It was a test for the strengh of the two alliances. This 
aspect was mentioned in the various works handling the issue of AWACS as well as 
the hearings.The sale period was characterised by a period of tension between the 
US and Israel (Rubin, 1981). The arms sale was an acknowledgment of  the 
strategic importance of Saudi Arabia to the region. This strategic importance was 
downplayed during the Nixon/Kissinger era that saw the protection of the oil fields 
from any potential Soviet invasion as best achieved by fortifying Israel, which would 
stand as a surrogate fortress for the US (Lateef, 1974). The AWACS sale came to 
shift this perceived responsibility from Israel to Saudi Arabia. 
 
Factors for success 
 
One respondent, a member of the Saudi Royal Family, summarizes the factors 
behind the success of the Saudis in securing the sales. He said: “I can talk about 
F15s, we had a clear strategy, we marshaled our resources to the fullest extent. Not 
just money people, media companies, everything, publications etc...” They had a 
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strategy and planned well. According to Levins, the plan for AWACS started the day 
they got the F-15 deal approved, which was three years prior to the deal. This is 
considered a departure from the reactive way Arab governments usually conduct 
their relations with the US.  
 
In addition to being proactive and aggressive, they were well organized and used 
every resource they could. However, the most important element of their lobbying 
was their ability to generate a constituency that, along with the support of a strong 
President, was able to pressure the Congress into approving the sale. Additionally to 
these two elements, they had other factors that played in their favour: the Soviet 
threat and a relatively positive image. As stated before, the Sadat peace accord had 
a positive impact on the image of the Arabs and the sale coincided with the Israeli 
invasion that helped in tipping opinion against Israel (Levins, 1983). 
 
They had all the elements needed to have comprehensive lobbying: the grassroots, 
the funding, the issues of concern, the coalition, the media, the necessary 
information, the direct lobbying. And it was all put together and coordinated in one 
overall strategy (Shlozman and Tierney 1986). Most importantly, they made informed 
decisions based on in-depth research. They had a study group, the Group for 
International Study and Evaluation, which was set up as a subsidiary of the 
Insurance company of North America  whose main objective was to gather 
intelligence and pass it to the Saudi government (Levins, 1983). But the two most 
important factors were the constituency that the Saudis were able to create and the 
support of a strong president (Reagan) who had high public approval on foreign 
policy matters (Holsti, 2009).   
 
Limitations of the success 
 
Everyone expected the Arab lobby to flourish, especially at the beginning of the 
1980s with the Israeli invasion of Beirut when public opinion started to tip against 
Israel. However, after the AWACS sale, the Arab lobby started fading away. Success 
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was temporary and ended rather than began with the AWACS episode. The lobby 
was not institutionalized. Prince Bandar, as described by his biographer, was a “lone 
ranger”(Simpson, 2008) (59). Though the lobbying for AWACS was comprehensive, 
it stopped with the closing of the sale. The basis of the coalition could not stand 
beyond the deal. The Saudi lobby rose to power quickly and faded away quickly after 
the sale (Levins, 1983). A top congressional aide said “The Arabs just  suddenly 
appeared in Washington in 78, it was quick, boom!” (Levins, 1983). 
 
Though there was a strategy for AWACS, there was no strategy underneath it for 
foreign policy. The coalition was not sustainable for subsequent issues, and there 
was no underlying general issue to hold the coalition together, in contrast to the 
Israel lobby that had the maintenance of the state of Israel as an overarching issue. 
This stance prevailed even when the AWACS episode was closed. 
 
On the contrary, AIPAC learned from their deficiencies and from the weakness of the 
Saudi success and they rose after the AWACS sale like a “phoenix” as described in 
Bandar’s biography. AIPAC learned from their defeat and adapted to the new 
Washington politics: the spread of power in Congress, the potency of grassroots 
lobbying, the need to be bipartisan, the need to give financial support to friends and 
defeat enemies and then to advertise the results (Smith, 1996). The AWACS  deal 
was an impetus for the transformation of AIPAC from a lobby to a “super lobby”  as it 
increased its activities, funding, and reach (Smith, 1996).  The change in fortune of 
the Israel lobby was due not only to increased AIPAC activity, but also to the fact that 
the lobbying game changed, with inside lobbying needing support from outside 
lobbying. Lobbies could no longer rely on high priced sophisticated lawyers/lobbyists; 
they had to generate grassroots to influence their representatives (Smith, 1996)1.  
 
At the time the pro-Israel lobby gained muscle, the pro-Arab lobby or pro-Saudi lobby 
did not see continuity, because it was based on an artificial constituency that 
revolved mainly around the AWACS transaction (Bard, 1991). The Arabs had no 
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long term cohesive constituency: the coalition was not institutionalized with a long 
term infrastructure. With the sealing of the deal, the coalition broke up. 
 
In the course of an interview one respondent, who used to be an American diplomat 
in Saudi, said: “There has been a pattern of narrow band of communication.  The 
supreme example is Prince Bandar bin Sultan.  He had such a close relationship 
with the White House. If something happened, he could get the White House to fix it.  
But that does not work anymore.  You have to communicate with the mass -- with the 
whole country.  There is no one-stop shop anymore.” 
 
Once the deal finished, instead of focusing on the Arab American organizations and 
on creating a sustainable grassroots base by engaging the Arab American 
community, they decreased the funding for NAAA. One respondent, who used to be 
involved with NAAA, said that with the decrease of foreign money, the domestic 
money that was linked to Saudi interests also dried up, which signalled the start of 
financial problems for the organization. The success of the AWACS should have 
been the beginning of the lobby and not the end of it. Though the fact that Saudi 
Arabia acquired fighter jets was not of great importance to the Arab-American 
community who, as stated before did not come from the Gulf, the success of the 
AWACS could have been a good anchor to rally the Arab American community  and 
to create  pride in being of Arab ancestry. The Saudi disengagement from Arab-
American organizations coincided with AIPAC reinforcing its engagement with 
grassroots. So, whereas AIPAC worked on increasing their grassroots base and 
captivating this base by social services and institutionalizing the relations, and 
coupled grassroots with financial contributions, Saudi Arabia started  slowly 
disengaging from the Arab American organizations who had the potential to create a 
permanent base for Saudi Arabia. 
 
AIPAC used its power to defeat Charles H Percy from Illinois and Charles JR 
Mathias, both of whom supported the AWACS deal. AIPAC made it no secret that it 
was responsible for their defeat in the elections  (Findley, 1985). In this action AIPAC 
162 
 
intimidated any other Senator into not taking any anti-Israel positions (Laham, 2002). 
On the other hand, the Saudis or the Arab American organizations did not or could 
not support their friends to make sure they won the elections.  
 
Though hiring lobbyists is sometimes fruitful, and lobbyists were hired both during 
the 1978 F 15 and the 1981 AWACS sale, it does not come without scrutiny. Their 
success attracted attention to foreign sources of funding and this was exposed in the 
media (Roberts, 1978). The Israeli side relied on ordinary Americans expressing 
their view in foreign policy, whereas Arabs were viewed as relying on professional, 
sophisticated, highly paid agents with no grassroots support (Goott and Rosen, 
1983). 
 
Though the pro-Israel lobby was not successful in preventing the sales in 1978 and 
1981 to Saudi Arabia, it caused the administration to drain its political capital on the 
issue and was able to prevent it from approving subsequent sales (Feldman and ʻal 
Šēm, 1988). In the mid-eighties Saudi Arabia asked for an add-on, but Reagan, who 
wanted to mend his relations with an important political faction, informed the 
Kingdom that he had spent his political capital on the issue and therefore the 
Kingdom had to seek arms from somewhere else. 
 
The role of both Carter and Reagan was crucial. The F15 and the AWACS deals 
would not have gone through if it were not for presidential support. AIPAC stated: 
“Paradoxically, the F 15 and AWACS battles revealed the value of a large grassroots 
constituency and the weakness of relying heavily on agents paid by foreign 
governments” (Goott and Rosen, 1983). 
 
In the course of this chapter I have analysed the different factors that led to the 
success of the Saudi lobbying, arguing that the ability of the Saudis to garner a 
constituency to push for the deal and their ability to present the deal as in line with 
the US national interest was crucial. However, I also analysed some of the 
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drawbacks of this success and why it was fragile and short lived and did not lead to a 
subsequent success in 1986 when the Saudis needed an upgrade for their fleet. In 
the following chapter, I will analyse the case of failure and the main factors that led to 
it, mainly the lack of a comprehensive strategy, the negative image and the absence 
of a grassroots base to support the UAE.  
1 Though the sale was a gain to Saudi Arabia, it was not a total loss for AIPAC. They 
got compensation from the government for not answering their wishes. In return for 
the 1978 deal, they got 15 F15s and 75 F 16s to Israel (Bard, 1991). During the 
Reagan time it included 600 million free credits to Israel and dropping the bomb rack 
from the Saudi order  
1 1974 with the Watergate scandal in the US the party structure received a major hit. 
No longer was power concentrated with a few party “barons” and more congressmen 
began to deviate from their party and depend more on their constituencies. This was 
accompanied by a rise in the power of interest groups and hence the power of 
grassroots. 
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Chapter 5: The Dubai Port World case study 
 
Value of the case study 
 
The main aim of this chapter is to show the importance of grassroots and of public 
opinion. The reason why the DP World acquisition, an issue that usually involves 
only technical people and that was going smoothly, got stopped was due to the 
popular opposition. 
 
The chapter shows that hiring lobbyists does not result in success when the issue or 
the group for which they lobby has a bad image, as a lobbyist cannot ask the 
legislator to vote for an unpopular bill. It also shows how legislators first and foremost 
tend to respond to the preferences of their constituencies, therefore at many times 
strategic considerations are downplayed by local preferences.  
 
Sequence of Events  
 
In October 2005, the London-based Peninsular & Oriental (P&O) Steam Navigation 
Company agreed to be purchased by DP World, a Dubai-based ports company 
owned by the United Arab Emirates (UAE) (2006k). Before finalizing the acquisition, 
on October 17, 2005, a team of lawyers from DP World and P&O informally 
approached the Committee of Foreign Investment in the US (CFIUS) to discuss the 
initial stages of the transaction. The Committee was established within the Treasury 
Department by executive order in 1975 to evaluate the impact of foreign investment 
in the United States (Jackson, 2006). This informal contact was established in order 
to identify any issues that might emerge before the actual formal process began. In 
this case, Treasury staff identified port security as the primary issue, and 
immediately directed the companies to the Department of Homeland Security. On 
the 31st of October, the Homeland Security and Department of Justice officials met 
with DP World and Peninsular & Oriental executives to informally discuss any issues 
that might arise prior to the official filing of the transaction (2006o). 
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On November 2nd, Treasury staff requested an intelligence assessment from the 
Department of National Intelligence. The department sent its assessment to the 
Treasury on December 5th, which circulated it to the staff members of CFIUS 
(2006o, 2006b). Based on this assessment, on December 6th the CFIUS staff met 
with company officials to request additional information. On that day, DP World and 
Peninsular and Oriental held a pre-filing briefing for all CFIUS agencies. In the 
meantime, while undergoing all these consultations, DP World made the acquisition 
public by announcing it in a press release on the 2nd of November (Shah, 2005). 
 
On that same day, Treasury circulated the filing to all CFIUS member agencies for 
review. The documents were also sent to 17 agencies at the Department of Defense 
for review and comment. The review conducted by the Department of Defense was 
described by witnesses from the Department of Defense as “in depth and 
comprehensive”(2006g). Usually, acquisitions by foreign companies that might 
trigger a national security threat undergo a 45 day review; the review did not reveal 
any national security threats that required the 45 days investigation (2006g). 
 
DP World filed the official notification on December 15th, 2005; and CFIUS 
commenced a 30-day review, as required by statute. The notification took place after 
2 months of informal hearings and 45 days after the CFIUS requested intelligence 
assessment of the companies. During the course of that review, DP World 
responded to all of the CFIUS’ requests and their questions (2006m). As part of this 
process, the Department of Homeland Security negotiated an assurance letter that 
addressed the security concerns that had been raised during the review. The letter 
was circulated to the committee on January 6th, and CFIUS concluded its review on 
January 17th (2006o). 
 
Everything was going smoothly until a Miami company, Eller &Co, hired a semi-
retired lobbyist in a “last minute bid” to block the deal (Overby, 2006). Eller &Co. had 
a legal feud with Peninsular and Oriental with whom it had a joint venture in the 
Miami operations. The lawsuit was held in UK courts and in the US. The dispute in 
the Miami court started 3 years before the acquisition (2006m).  
 
166 
 
According to the company’s lawyer, Eller &Co had to go to “its court of last resort, 
Congress”. They hired the semi-retired lobbyist Joe Maldoon as they could not afford 
“a team of big name lobbyists”. Maldoon took the month of January when the 
Congress was out of session to do his research. In February, he started going to 
Capitol Hill. “He had just a laptop, a cell phone, and a binder full of information” 
(Overby, 2006). 
 
Maldoon was a sole practitioner; however, he knew how Washington works. He 
started with the members of the Banking Committee (Overby, 2006). According to an 
interview with a lobbying specialist, Maldoon had worked with the Republican Party 
before. He went first to John Warner who was not interested; afterwards he targeted 
Kelly Hutchinson. Both were Republicans. He finally landed on Chuck Schumer, a 
Democrat. Schumer was interested and the whole controversy started when he and 
a business reporter from the Associated Press gave Maldoon attention (Overby, 
2006). 
 
On February 10, DP World outbid the Singaporean company PSA International, with 
a final bid of 6.8 billion USD and the acquisition of P&O became final. The P&O 
operations included the rights to operate in six major U.S. ports, including terminals 
in the New York/New Jersey area, Philadelphia and New Orleans {, 2006 
 #135}. On the 13th of Feb, Schumer took everyone by surprise when he gathered 
journalists on the New York harbor and held a press conference to protest the deal 
publicly. The press conference received what the WRMEA (Washington Report on 
the Middle East) described as a bonanza of publicity when he announced that the 
sale was “a grave security risk” (curtiss, 2006). 
 
The “political storm” as described during a hearing by Bilkey, the COO of DP World, 
started with the Democrats then quickly gained the interest of ranks of Republicans. 
On February 21st, Republicans joined Democrats in demanding the president block 
the deal, while George W Bush stated that he would veto any similar bill (Stanley 
Reed, 2006). On the 23rd of February, representatives from the departments and 
agencies present on the Committee of Foreign Investment in the US (CFIUS) 
presented a briefing to the Congress on the national security implications of the 
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acquisition. Three days after the briefing, on the 26th of February, DP World 
voluntarily asked for a 45 days review.  
 
However, neither testimonials by the agencies nor DP World’s gesture was enough 
to calm the political and public protest over the deal. The day following the DP world 
request for a 45 day review, Schumer introduced a bill under the title “Foreign 
Investment Security Improvement Act of 2006”. The bill required investigation under 
the Defense Production Act of 1950 of the Acquisition by Dubai Port World of 
Peninsular and Oriental Steam Navigation Company (2006h). The bill (S. 2333) by 
Schumer would ask the president to put on hold any existing decision by CFIUS and 
to conduct a 45 day investigation. However, DP World had already asked voluntarily 
for the 45 days review. The same bill was introduced the following day by Peter King 
in the House of Representatives (2006i). 
 
 On  Feb 28th 2006, Schumer sent a letter asking the Homeland Security 
Department  why the demands of the coastguard had been ignored (Schumer, 
2006b). On the 28th of February, another senator, Dorgan, from North Dakota, 
introduced a bill (2006a) to prohibit the merger acquisition or takeover of Peninsular 
and Oriental Steam Navigation Company by Dubai Ports World.  
 
On the 2nd of March, Edward Bilkey the Chief Operating Officer of Dubai Ports 
World testified, accompanied by George Dalton, the General Counsel of the 
company, along with Robert Scavone, the Executive Vice President of P&O Ports 
North America in a hearing before the Committee of Armed Services in the House. 
On March 8th, 2006, the House Appropriations Committee  nullified  the decision of 
CFIUS regarding the DP World transaction  by attaching an amendment (H. 
Amdt.702) to a supplemental appropriations bill for defense activities in Afghanistan 
and Iraq and emergency relief for the victims of Hurricane Katrina (H.R. 4939). The 
amendment blocked any fund that could be used to allow “the acquisition of leases, 
contracts, rights, or other obligations of P&O Ports by Dubai Ports World." The 
amendment prohibited DP World or any other entity controlled by it from acquiring  
any lease or rights or contracts in the US. The measure was passed by a huge 
majority of 62 to 2 in the committee (Jackson, 2006).The following day DP World 
announced the sale of its US operation to US-based AIG Global investment 
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(Graham, 2006). On March 15th, 2006, a measure to remove the ban failed by a 
vote of 377 to 38 whereas the following day the measure to block the deal passed 
the full house by a margin of 348 to 71 (Jackson, 2006). 
 
The opposition 
 
Unlike the AWACS episode, where the opposition represented by the pro-Israel 
lobby was identified before pitching for the deal, the opposition in the case of DP 
World was unexpected. In this case, the UAE was “taken by surprise” as the 
acquisition did not infringe on any other lobby interest. “They were simply taken by 
surprise,” as one respondent who works for a lobbying watchdog said. The 
opposition was a coalition between a business who had no way of  achieving its 
goals via regular channels and hence looked at politicizing the issue and a politician 
who wanted to raise his public profile and score points with his opponents (curtiss, 
2006). The opposition was a coalition of unexpected interests and it took a snowball 
effect as it had a reception among the public and more and more politicians wanted 
to show that they  were adamant on safeguarding national security. On the other 
hand, UAE was unprepared and had a negative image associated with terrorism, 
therefore it was vulnerable to the most unsubstantiated accusations. 
 
Eller & Company, which  started the opposition, was described by Israel Klein, the 
spokesperson for Senator Schumer, as the "canary in the mineshaft for many people 
on the Hill and in the media." (2006l).  Like a canary that the miners send down a 
mine to detect the dangerous zones, Eller &Co signaled the danger that the deal 
represented to the media and the Congress. 
  
 
Basis for the dispute 
 
For three years prior to the transaction, Eller &Co had a dispute with P&O with whom 
it had a joint venture in Florida. It claimed that the company was trying to increase its 
control over Continental Stevedoring & Terminals Inc. a portion of the port operations 
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which is a division of Eller &Co in South Florida (HITT, 2006b). However, when the 
news about the takeover came to light, it became the core of a lawsuit that the Eller 
&Co subsidiary filed on Feb. 17th (HITT, 2006b). 
The comparison between the filing in the UK court and the filing in the US court 
shows a great deal of discrepancy. In the UK, the lawsuit was filed on a purely 
business basis. The objection raised in front of the higher court that was responsible 
for approving the deal was that Eller &Co had some unsolved financial issues with 
P&O. Eller knew about the acquisition on Jan 18th, they bought stocks in P&O and, 
once the sale was concluded, they tried to stop it on the basis that they were owners 
of shares in P&O. However, the British court ruled their objection as “irrelevant” as 
they were present in all of the relevant sale sessions (2006n).  
 
On the other hand, the objection in the US took a totally different turn. The lawsuit 
included quotes from various federal commissions that investigated Sept. 11th, 
2001, which signaled that the hijackers traveled through the UAE on their way to the 
US. As a result, the lawsuit said that Eller and Co. did not want "to become 
involuntarily a business partner with the government of Dubai." Eller knew that the 
American public post-September 11th was very sensitive to issues of security and it 
knew that the UAE could be easy prey for a terrorism accusation.  The case in the 
Florida court was that Eller did not want to become an involuntary partner to Dubai, a 
city that is associated with terrorism.  
 
Tactics 
 
According to my interview with a lobbying specialist, given that Eller &Co knew they 
had no solid basis to stop the takeover, they resorted to “unscrupulous” methods by 
generating hype on the general fear of terrorism. Eller &Co. looked for “hot buttons in 
public opinion” in order to generate a grassroots movement against the deal. Some 
grassroots bases are spontaneous, such as the rifle group or retirees, so that, 
whenever any issue is raised regarding gun control or benefits to retired people, 
there is a grassroots base that automatically reacts when issues related to them 
arise. However, lobbyists sometimes “inseminate” this grassroots base by looking at 
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“hot buttons” in public opinion and raising the visibility of the issue at stake and 
framing it in a way to generate a reaction from the public (Smith, 1996). This is the 
way to create a grassroots movement for an issue that does not have a natural base. 
There is no interest group against direct investments by Arab Gulf states or by the 
UAE. However, by flagging the issue of security, Eller &Co generated a grassroots 
base to oppose the deal. 
 
This guaranteed a reaction from the public: Maldoon was able to create a grassroots 
base by using Schumer as a conduit to disseminate the message and raise the 
visibility of the issue. His message was that ports are key to US national security and 
they cannot be left in the hands of a country that is promoting terrorism. His action 
had a snowball effect, as when the issue became public, the American public as well 
as the Congress opposed the deal. Following that, accusations against DP World, 
Dubai and the UAE started to flow. 
 
Arguments 
 
In order analyze the different arguments presented by the opposition I used the 
discourse in the different hearings in Congress. The arguments presented were as 
follows: 
 
The analysis of the discourse of the different opponents of the deal presenting the 45 
days review argument shows that the Congress is not really familiar with the review 
and what it entails. The opponents stuck to the form of the review though in reality all 
the necessary due diligence that is usually conducted in a 45 days review was 
undertaken prior to the official filing. The process was described by Senator Reed as 
a “faceless and amorphous operation” as very few people really know what it entails 
(2006 h). The analysis shows that the people on the Hill were raising the issue just 
because it had the appearance of a breach of a procedure to safeguard national 
security after the 45 days review, though in fact it was not a threat to national 
security, as extensive investigation was undertaken prior to giving the approval. 
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 The 45 days review was the first argument that opponents of the deal raised, as DP 
World did not undertake the 45 day review that companies owned and controlled by 
foreign governments usually undertake; it went for the 30 day investigation that 
privately owned companies go through whenever they are making an acquisition in 
the US. The CFIUS was accused of not doing the background check it should 
normally do whenever it is facing a foreign acquisition and that it simply rubber 
stamped the deal (Holzer, 2006a). 
 
In the hearing of the 27th of February, that included a briefing by CFIUS to discuss 
the national security implications of acquisition, Schumer questioned Stewart Baker, 
the Assistant Secretary, Policy, Department of Homeland Security, who was 
testifying in favor of the deal at the hearing: “So, in other words, it would be fair to 
say that you relied only on internal governmental people in the agencies and did not 
ask anybody from the outside about these concerns, Mr. Baker. I think that would be 
fair. Senator Schumer. Is that typical?” 
 Mr. Baker; “That would be typical.” 
 Senator Schumer: “I think that is really wrong. Will you not be able to do it in the 45-
day review for Dubai Ports World?” He then adds that if the 45 day review  had been 
conducted “these checks would have been done” (2006f). These questions show 
how Schumer wanted to frame CFIUS and DP World. Schumer asked about the 45 
days assuming that if a 45 day review was conducted it would have involved 
additional security checks without specifying what security checks were missing and 
what “people from outside” could have added to these security checks. 
 
Schumer introduced a bill under the title “Foreign Investment Security Improvement 
Act of 2006”. The bill required investigation under the Defense Production Act of 
1950 of the Acquisition by Dubai Port World of Peninsular and Oriental Steam 
Navigation Company (2006h). The bill (S. 2333) by Schumer would ask the president 
to put any existing decision by CFIUS on hold and to conduct a 45 day investigation. 
However, DP World had already asked voluntarily for the 45 days review. The bill 
asked for additional measures to be taken such as the provision by the Department 
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of Homeland Security  of intelligence and security information to the Congress, to be 
studied while taking into consideration the Exon Florio provision that governs foreign 
acquisitions (Jackson, 2006). The bill also required the Secretary of Homeland 
Security to provide CFIUS with intelligence and other information collected by the 
Department, and it required CFIUS to report its findings to Congress. 
  
The investigation would encompass foreign ports that Dubai Ports operated, 
backgrounds checks of officers at DP World, and a security evaluation of the impact 
of the acquisition on the ports’ security as well as national security. The report would 
contain the determination of the president and a briefing to specified members of the 
Congress. Following this investigation, if the president determined not to block the 
transaction, it could be blocked by Congress if it passed the joint resolution within 3 
days of receiving the report (Jackson, 2006). Basically the bill’s language was 
negative. One senator said: “I am pleased that the Administration has finally agreed 
to conduct a review of this matter. However, I am disappointed that it took a massive 
public outcry, congressional pressure and a request from the Dubai Ports World 
company itself for the administration to agree to conduct what unquestionably should 
have been done in the first place” (2006g). The discourse shows that the Congress 
distorted the facts, as the security checks were done, though not through the formal 
45 days review, and all the security concerns were answered. However, Congress 
people were sticking literally to the requirements as this allowed them to show their 
vigor in safeguarding national security. 
 
Clay Lowery, Assistant Secretary, International Affairs, Department of Treasury, who 
serves on the Committee on Foreign Investment in the U.S, said that the 45 day 
investigation is usually requested to address security concerns that were identified 
but not resolved during the initial 30 days period. Upon the completion of the 45 day 
investigation, the Secretary of the Treasury sends his recommendation to the 
President who has 15 days to take action. He explained that the transaction was “not 
rushed through the review” but was approved after 3 months of investigation  
(2006m).   
 
National security, especially following September 11th, became a salient topic for 
every American. Therefore it was very easy to have what Senator Reed described as 
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groupthink on the issue of the 45 days review. He said: “Like so many of my 
colleagues, I have been trying to understand this process and understand this 
particular decision. And I must say, my impression is that this is a rather amorphous 
and faceless operation. I mean, it is hard to tell who made the decision; hard to tell 
what was the definition of national security, was it consistent across every 
department that looked at this? And I think we have a lot of work to do. Again, I have 
immense respect for the gentlemen here today and particularly Secretary Kimmitt, 
but the impression I have is that perhaps it is not national security that pervades this 
decision-making, but it is the notion of getting these deals done as expeditiously as 
possible, which means, effectively, do not invoke the 45-day investigative phase, 
because that raises it to a very high public level, involving Congress. And perhaps I 
am wrong, but those types of groupthink to me might account for a situation today, 
we are looking back all of us, stunned, saying how could this happen? This seems 
so simplistic that at least you would want to ventilate this deal.” (2006g). The 
statement of Senator Reed summarizes the furor that took over the Congress and in 
which the CFIUS was framed as incompetent and DP World as non-compliant with 
the US Law.  
 
Since the deal was vetted by the responsible bodies and judged not to create any 
threat, it was given the green light without the 45 days review (2006g). However, the 
DP world willingly asked for the 45 day investigation on the 26th of February as 
stated by Lowery and by Bilkey in the course of the hearing, but even this gesture 
did not calm the politicians. In the course of the hearing, the filing was described as 
“too little and too late” (2006m). 
 
 
Another misperception is that this deal was conducted in secret. Although the Exon-
Florio statute requires the CFIUS to safeguard business-confidential information 
while the transaction is pending, companies tend to announce these transactions 
publicly. On the 29th of November, 17 days before the formal filing, DP World 
announced the deal by carrying out a press release (Candappa, 2005). However, the 
news was circulated even prior to that date: the Independent  newspaper reported on 
the 31st of October 2005 that Dubai Port World was launching a takeover of P&O 
(Shah, 2005). Though the deal was mentioned according to the White House 162 
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times between 2005 and 2006 (office, 2006), in February the Congress was appalled 
that they were not informed and  claimed that the deal was kept secret. 
 
However, as stated before, the uproar about the deal being secret goes back to two 
factors: one of them is that the Bush administration and DP World were taken by 
surprise as they did not expect this reaction; the other factor is due to the lack of 
knowledge of the CFIUS workings as explained by Kimmitt, the Undersecretary of 
the of Treasury, in a written letter presented at the hearing of the 23rd of  February. 
CFIUS conducts its investigations in a confidential way in order not to embarrass any 
foreign entity in case their transaction gets denied. Communication with state and 
local officials regarding such transactions remains on a need to know basis (2006b).  
 
The 2005 report of the Government Accountability Office signaled that CFIUS 
members were concerned that the stigma of an investigation could discourage 
foreigners from investing in the U.S, especially if the investigation was not resolved 
by the end of the 45 days and by then the president had to make a decision and 
submit a report to the Congress. This is why the process was “shrouded in secrecy”. 
It was not secrecy but, "It's a privacy issue," according to David Heyman of the 
Center for Strategic and International Studies. Confidentiality was needed to 
encourage foreign investment and preserve international relations (Holzer, 2006b). 
 
Schumer stated in his press conference held on the 13th of February that the deal: 
“was quietly cleared by a government panel without public scrutiny. The Committee 
on Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS) cleared the deal, without a 
public report or evaluation,” (Schumer, 2006a). The discourse of Schumer 
represented an action that initiated a series of events. It raised the salience of the 
issue and framed it in a way to affect public opinion. Following Schumer’s action, the 
issue became very difficult to control. As described by one respondent, who works 
for a lobbying watchdog, the issue was no longer a transaction to be vetted by the 
concerned body; it became the UAE versus the American public. In contrast to the 
AWACS case where a faction of the American public supported the deal, 
representing businesses and workers that would benefit from the deal, here they had 
no one to counter the opposition. The acquisition was not going to create new jobs, 
on the contrary, usually take overs result in loss of jobs, as the acquiring company 
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fires some of its existing employees and replaces them with its own employees. On 
the other hand the AWACS had a strong ally in the President. Though Bush was for 
the deal he was not as aggressive as Reagan in defending it to the public and was 
not as aggressive as Reagan in attacking those who opposed it. Schumer used the 
strongest words in his discourse, to vilify the UAE, whether while talking to the press 
or in his testimony at the Congress. In the 2nd  of March hearing, he said that the 
CFIUS had left the most vital assets open “to infiltration and attack” (2006g).  
 
In the beginning of the, hearing his concern was that the 45 day review was not 
initiated by the CFIUS and that the approval of the transaction was given without 
such an investigation. However, after DP World re-filed on the 26 of February, 
Schumer’s argument changed from why CFIUS did not conduct a 45 day review to 
why the Committee or the Congress was not informed when the 45 day review was 
initiated.  
 
Given that the review argument was answered he started focusing on the second 
argument, which was the secrecy and the transparency of the process (2006g). 
When analyzing how the discourse of Schumer evolved, one can see that every time 
DP World or the government gave him assurances to answer his concerns he would 
move to another argument and raise other issues. It was apparent that these 
arguments had no intrinsic value to him; they were just tools to incriminate DP World 
and the Bush government. 
 
The secrecy issue and the fact they were not informed was a concern among 
Congress members. Senator Clinton said: “Now, one of the concerns that we have in 
the New York/New Jersey area-Senator Menendez and I have been working, along 
with my colleague Senator Schumer, Congressman King, Congressman Fossella; it's 
a completely bipartisan, bicameral concern-is that-there is no requirement that the 
Federal Government consult with, or take into account, the views of State and local 
officials. Do you think that we should look at providing some kind of requirement, 
especially when we get to the area that we're most concerned about, a government-
owned entity, a potential effect on national security, that there ought to be 
consultation with State and local officials?”(2006b).                                                                                                                                         
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Though it had been in place since the 1970s, the whole process of CFIUS and its 
confidentiality was put in question when it involved DP World. To explain further her 
concerns Clinton said, “We live in a post September 11 world. Sometimes that's 
used as a declarative statement, and sometimes it's used as a political attack. But 
the fact is, we do live in a post-September 11 world, and I think it's important that, 
whatever the interpretations of the statute was in the past, that there is now a 
necessity for a heightened scrutiny. I don't think this has to do with the nationality of 
the company so much as the track record that Senator Levin and others have laid 
out, and the fact that it is a foreign government-controlled and -owned entity. Senator 
Menendez and I will be introducing legislation to prohibit government-owned entities 
from controlling, owning, and managing our ports. We don't let them do it to our 
airports. There's a very different standard. Yet, the potential for danger and damage 
to our country is as high, or higher…” (2006a). Clinton’s expression of “post 
September 11 world” re-contextualizes the whole situation. One respondent, a 
journalist who covered the deal, said that the deal came a few years after September 
11th when the American people were questioning US relations with the Gulf and 
were very sensitive to national security issues. Therefore, though the deal was 
mentioned in the press several times (office, 2006) they still felt that they were not 
fully informed. He added that since DP World was in such a delicate position they 
should have made a larger effort to disclose the deal in order to seem “above board”. 
He added that sometimes companies just issue a press release thinking they have 
informed the public but in reality the information does not get to the general public. 
Therefore these companies, especially those in the “delicate” situation of DP World, 
should make more effort in disclosing their activities. 
 
From analyzing the discourse of Clinton we see that September 11th is mentioned 
frequently  as a summary of the base condition governing the DP World deal 
(Scollon, 2008).  The base condition revealed in Clinton’s statement is that Arabs, 
the Gulf and the UAE are more prone to scrutiny because of September 11th. 
Therefore, the transaction that in normal conditions and as per the CFIUS 
requirements should have been dealt with confidentially, in this specific case should 
have been disclosed to a larger extent to the American public and the Congress. 
This expression overshadowed all the other arguments at the same time as it 
explained the driver behind them. When analyzing the discourse flow throughout the 
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different hearings one can see that the arguments were presented only to veil a 
major concern, which was the distrust in the UAE as an Arab country created by the 
tragic September 11th event. Given that such an argument on a stand-alone basis 
could not be bluntly presented as it reveals discrimination, different arguments were 
used such as secrecy of the deal and 45 day review to discredit the approval 
process. 
 
In addition to secrecy, the Congress had a concern that they were informed too late. 
Their take on the administration was that it did not communicate with them directly; 
instead they knew about the deal like everyone else from the news. Carl Levin said, 
“The White House Press Secretary recently said that, ’In hindsight, perhaps 
Congress should have been notified sooner.’ We weren't notified at all, unless 
watching CNN and reading the morning paper constitute notification. More to the 
point, Congress should have been consulted, and not merely notified.” (Kersh, 
2000). Jon Corzine, the Senator from New Jersey, told NBC: “We were told that the 
president didn’t know about the sale until after it was approved. For many 
Americans, regardless of party, this lack of disciplined review is unacceptable,” 
(2006k). 
 
 
The arguments presented by opponents of the deal were security related. Though 
the security concerns that were flagged when DP World approached CFIUS were 
answered, these concerns were highlighted by legislators who opposed the deal as 
well as by the media. CNN  stated  in the subtitle of the article announcing the 
hearing in which executives from DP World would testify, “Coast Guard initially 
raised issue of 'intelligence gaps' in review “ (Ted Barrett, 2006b). The media 
reported statements by legislators opposing the deal such as, "’There are many 
intelligence gaps concerning the potential for DP World or P&O assets to support 
terrorist operations that precludes an overall threat assessment of the potential 
merger,’ the Coast Guard report on the potential deal stated ”(2006p).  “Intelligence 
gaps” concerning “the potential” for DP World to “support terrorist operations”—is 
vague language at the same time as it conveys a sense of danger. NBC News stated 
in its headline that the Department of Homeland Security first objected to the ports 
deal. The opening paragraph had statements such as, “It is the lone protest among 
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members of the government committee that eventually approved the deal without 
dissent. ”(2006k). 
 
In another subtitle, “the company declines to comment,” the first paragraph states: 
“The company earlier had struck a more conciliatory stance, saying it would do 
whatever Bush asked to salvage the agreement.”(2006k). This, and similar reporting 
enforce the idea of “secrecy”; they give the impression that DP World had a sort of a 
secret agreement with the Bush administration. A representative from Minnesota 
(Congressman Jim Ramstad) pointed to the Coast Guards’ intelligence assessment 
of Dubai Ports World and its owners in the United Arab Emirates on December 13th 
2005. Ramstad relayed the report’s “warning”: "There are many intelligence gaps 
concerning the potential for DP World assets to support terrorist operations that 
preclude the completion of a thorough threat assessment of the merger." The 
intelligence assessment also stated: "The breadth of the intelligence gaps also infer 
potential unknown threats against the large number of potential 
vulnerabilities."(2006e) 
 
U.S. senator Susan M. Collins (R-ME) held a meeting of the Senate Homeland 
Security and Governmental Affairs Committee to be briefed on the Dubai port deal. 
During the meeting, Senator Collins made the following statement: “ Because on the 
face of it, these unclassified questions and the use of the word ’intelligence gaps‘ 
that preclude an overall threat assessment of the potential merger and that it 
involves potential unknown threats against a large number of potential vulnerabilities, 
that language is very troubling to me. And I commend the Coast Guard for raising 
the tough questions. I think that's your job. But we do need to get to those issues.” 
(2006p). 
 
However, this meeting and the memo issued took the press by storm. Following this 
meeting, the panel released the memo of the coast guards that included the 
expression “intelligence gaps” and suggested "a large number of potential 
vulnerabilities" that could be raised by the deal. The memo, coupled with Senator 
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Collins’ comment that she found the Coast Guard report "very troubling,” had a 
strong echo in the press which escalated the opposition to the deal (HITT, 2006c).  
Though the Coast Guard commented on the release of the memo by saying :“This 
transaction, when taking into account strong security assurances by DP World, does 
not compromise U.S. security,” and that the document released did not "reflect the 
full, classified analysis" and  was "taken out of context " the damage was already 
done (Ted Barrett, 2006b). The media intensified the fear that was initiated by 
Schumer. As reporting flowed highlighting the coast guards’ concerns, the American 
public was bombarded with titles such as “Dubai deal had coast guard at sea-
pol”(Kenneth R.  , 2006), “After hearing, GOP chairwoman calls review process 'truly 
flawed': US Coast Guard warned on Dubai ports deal” (Ted Barrett, 2006a). One 
article had the following abstract: “The US Coast Guard warned before Dubai Ports 
World was given clearance to take over five US port terminals that “intelligence 
gaps” about the company made it impossible to assess whether the deal posed any 
threats to national security, according to a document released by the Senate on 
Monday.” (Kirchgaessner, 2006).The use of strong words such as “intelligence gaps” 
intensified the public opposition to the deal. When analyzing the different media 
reporting, none explained how the approval was acquired and what screening DP 
World went through. On the other hand as background almost every report 
mentioned that two of the September 11 hijackers were Emiratis. This fact was put 
next to expressions such as “intelligence gaps”, a combination guaranteed to 
generate opposition to the deal. 
 
Accusations about the UAE and Dubai 
 
In addition to the deal itself and the security of the port, Dubai and the UAE were 
framed as unreliable partners to do business with. They were accused of links to 
terrorism or at least of being soft on terrorism. They were accused of breaching US 
law and of applying double standards when it came to trade. The bill that Senator 
Dorgan introduced  to prohibit the acquisition (2006a), stated the following in its 
opening:   
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(1) It is essential for the security of the United States that United States maritime 
ports be protected against terrorist attacks. Then it adds; 
(7) Two of the hijackers involved in the events of September 11, 2001, were from the 
United Arab Emirates. 
(8) According to the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United 
States (the 9-11 Commission), the banking system of the United Arab Emirates was 
used to help finance the attacks of September 11, 2001. 
(9) The United Arab Emirates has also been a way station for the trafficking of 
nuclear components to state sponsors of terrorism, including Iran and North Korea. 
 
Initially the bill says that the deal was approved without undertaking the 45 days 
investigation, and then it mentions the Exon-Florio provision and the fact that the 
President can block any deal that threatens national security. It goes on to say that 
DP World requested the 45 days review, “In response to strong public and 
congressional opposition to the impending acquisition” but in the following item, it 
states: “In view of evidence already on record, it is clear that the proposed 
acquisition of P&O Ports by Dubai Ports World poses a serious threat to the national 
security of the United States.” 
 
The language of the bill clearly frames the UAE as a country that is soft on terrorism. 
The deal was doomed to be blocked no matter what assurances DP World gave to 
the US government. The second section states that: “The President shall exercise 
the authority under section 721 of the Defense Production Act of 1950 (50 U.S.C. 
App. 2170) to prohibit the merger, acquisition, or takeover of P&O Ports by Dubai 
Ports World.” The language of the bills introduced is patronizing and marginalizes 
the authority of the President. 
 
Since Arabs have a negative image and have a stigma that is engraved in the mind 
of the Americans since September 11th, it was very easy to keep bombarding DP 
World with accusations. In the hearing held in front of the Committee of Banking, 
Housing and Urban Affairs  to check whether the deal was secure enough to go 
through or not (2006g), Senator Elisabeth Dole stated that the trade issue got 
politicized. 
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In his opening statement, Richard Shelby said that, though the UAE was an 
important ally in the war on terrorism, it was a country in the Persian Gulf, an area 
that had strong support for Al Qaeda and a region from which the funding of terrorist 
activities flowed, and it was the location where the smuggling of dangerous nuclear 
weapons operated (2006g). His statement summarized the attitude of the Congress 
towards the deal that did not focus on the track record of DP World or on the 
assurances it could give, but on the fact it was an Arab-Gulf company. The area that 
produced the September 11th hijackers was not to be trusted; therefore anything or 
any deal that came from this area was subject to suspicion. 
 
In the same hearing Senator Jim Bunning from Kentucky said: “The UAE is an 
important trading partner. In fact, we have a large trade surplus with them, one of the 
few countries that we do. The UAE is also a partner in the war on terror. They have 
provided critical assistance to our military forces, including port facilities for the Navy. 
They are actively participating in our efforts to bring democracy and freedom to the 
Middle East, both in Iraq and Afghanistan. They even donated $100 million to help 
those affected by Hurricane Katrina. But there are troubling questions that we need 
to resolve. For example, the UAE was one of the three countries to recognize the 
Taliban in Afghanistan prior to September 11. There are reports of censorship by 
their government, and the parent company of Dubai Ports World may participate in 
the Arab boycott of Israel. How do we know if the UAE's friendship with the United 
States is sincere or if it is just good for business?” Here the UAE alliance with the US 
was put to question. As mentioned before, the DP World case came at a time when 
the American public was questioning the US relationship with the Arab Gulf. The 
deal, with the publicity that Schumer created around it, was the catalyst event for 
policy makers and the public to re-launch these questions in the public discourse. 
 
The different members stated that Dubai was being used by Pakistani scientist A Q 
Khan as the clandestine trans-shipment point for nuclear material to Libya and Iran 
(2006b) and they accused its government of “acquiescence”, of “ informed 
involvement”, and  of “one of the greatest systematic cases of negligence that the 
world has ever seen” facing the grave security risk that nuclear trafficking represents 
(2006m). 
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Issues that were not related to security and that had existed for a long time, such as 
the boycott of Israel—a resolution of the Arab League, of which the UAE was a 
member, were also put on the table. The UAE was also accused of double 
standards. This was because the laws in the UAE did not allow foreigners to have 
full ownership of business unless they were based in a free zone, however the UAE 
seeks to own businesses in other countries. Turner, in the hearing in front of the 
Senate Armed Services committee said: “Except for companies located in one of the 
limited free zones, at least 51 percent of a business establishment must be owned 
by the UAE national. These are matters which I think should be of economic concern 
to us in terms of the fair play that our government goes out of its way to provide for 
others” (2006m). 
 
In the opening statement of the hearing of the Armed Services Committee, Duncan 
Hunter, the chairman of the committee, accused the government of Dubai of being 
negligent and of creating “an environment of deniability” that allowed illegal nuclear 
weapons to be smuggled though the Emirates. He described Dubai as a hub for 
Nazis to transship illegal material to rogue states. He said: “That is the nature of 
Dubai. It is a bazaar for terrorist nations to receive prohibited components from 
sources from the free world and from the non-free world.” Even when acknowledging 
the UAE effort with the US on the war against terror, negative issues were 
mentioned in parallel. Issues such as the Pakistani scientist or the fact that two of the 
hijackers were Emiratis were mentioned throughout the hearing. The quote from the 
9/11 report stating that the UAE was “both” a counterterrorism ally and a counter-
terrorism problem was cited at several instances during the hearings (2006b). 
 
Dubai was accused of being unreliable and of doing whatever it took to get money. 
Duncan Hunter, the Chairman of the hearing of the Committee of Armed Services 
said: “Let me stop you on that. If you had-let's say you had the British ownership of 
this particular port, and you had people who had been strong allies of the United 
States and were people whom you felt you could trust, isn't that different from having 
an ownership which reflects basically the desire to do whatever it takes to acquire 
money, which I think is a good description of Dubai's foreign policy? Their foreign 
policy is, they will sell Winchesters to the good guys or the bad guys. They are not 
too interested who it is as long as they get to be the bazaar and they get to have the 
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money. So are you sure you can say, from a security standpoint, that the ownership 
is irrelevant?” The analysis of the accusations shows that many of them were 
hypothetical. In their discourse Clinton and King used words such as “would” and 
“may”, as in DP World when operating in the US “would be able” to provide visas or 
relocate hundreds of people and “some of those” might be Al Qaeda sympathizers 
(2006b).These hypothetical accusations show the lack of trust in the UAE as a 
government and as a people. 
 
The American public, the media and DP World 
 
Professor Gary Oren from Harvard University said “One should never underestimate 
the disinterest, the apathy, the lack of information the Americans have towards 
international affairs .., the consequence of this ignorance is the elites become more 
important and the public becomes more sensitive to threatening or dramatic events.” 
(Feldman and ʻal Šēm, 1988). On world affairs issues the American public has little 
information and is subject to elite manipulation (Holsti, 2009) (Aldrich et al., 1989). 
 
In this case Schumer was able to manipulate the masses and to hype on their fear of 
terrorism by signaling that two of the hijackers were Emiratis. He was able to create 
a grassroots base to oppose the deal. On the other side of the equation there was no 
base to support the deal. The Arab American community did not actively defend the 
deal, though some Arab American leaders (2006c) addressed the media and 
defended the deal. However, they did not represent a faction of American people to 
face off the opposition. This is in contrast to the AWACS where the prime politician, 
the President, hyped on the popular fear of communism in order to create a 
grassroots base in support of the deal. In addition to the President, contractors and 
employees who would benefit from the deal defended the AWACS sale. In the DP 
World case, no new jobs were to be created as a result of the acquisition; on the 
contrary acquisitions usually lead to a loss of jobs, an issue that DP World clarified 
during the hearing would not happen if the takeover took place (2006m).  
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The language used by the politicians created a fearful mood among the American 
public. On  28th of Feb 2006, Schumer sent a letter asking the Homeland Security 
department  why the demands of the coastguard were ignored (Schumer, 2006b). 
The text of the letter had statements such as, “If this isn’t a smoking gun, it shows 
that there might be one undetected by the CFIUS committee. We need to know why 
Homeland Security objected and then backed off their objection given this 
devastating report. This memo in no uncertain terms, shows that the CFIUS 
evaluation of the DP takeover may have been dangerously incomplete.” His use of 
dramatic words such as “devastating” and “dangerously” shows the effect Schumer 
wanted to give to his demands. This letter was sent in a press release that was 
circulated to the media. 
 
Schumer stated: “On the issues of national security, the American people expect that 
the federal government to take every conceivable step to protect our homeland yet 
unfortunately, when it came to the approval of the Dubai World deal national security 
concerns seem to have been given short shrift given the revelation yesterday that 
the coast guard had concerns about intelligence gaps. This is particularly 
disconcerting in light of the fact that Secretary Chertoff was unaware of either the 
deal or of these concerns until well after his department approved the transaction.” 
(Schumer, 2006b). The discourse presented in the document gives the reader the 
impression of a grave danger, whereas the whole matter was that the coast guards 
had some concerns that the DP World had answered.  
 
Though the US government had already vetted the security of the deal, and though 
officials such as Michael Chertoff, Homeland Security Secretary, went on ABC News 
to state that DP World provided the necessary assurance, Schumer had a great 
reception among the Congress, the press and the general public (curtiss, 2006). The 
statements of Schumer and his actions took the Congress by storm as he was 
playing a very popular tune: security. Schumer initiated a wave in the Congress 
where each official wanted to show that he or she was the most caring and 
protective over the US national security.  
 
Initially, Senator Schumer launched the issue into the public discourse when he held 
a press conference and issued a press release titled: “Multi-billion dollar company 
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that operates NYC port to be taken over by United Arab Emirates government-
owned firm.” (Schumer, 2006a) .This was an attractive issue to the press and to the 
American public and it got him a “bonanza of publicity” (curtiss, 2006). After Schumer 
launched the issue in the media, the story witnessed a snowball effect and the media 
carried Schumer’s accusations uncritically. For example, CNN stated: Critics have 
said the deal raises concerns because DP World is owned by the United Arab 
Emirates, a nation that has had questionable ties to terrorists in the past (Ted 
Barrett, 2006b).  
 
Even articles that defended the deal and that demonstrated it did not impair security, 
such as the article by the distinguished think tank, the Council on Foreign Relations, 
mentioned that the main objection of critics was that the hijackers were Emiratis 
(Kaplan, 2006). Every time the deal was mentioned it revived painful memories for 
the average American. Therefore, every time the deal was mentioned whether in a 
positive or a negative way, it ignited public resentment towards the UAE and DP 
World. This falls in line with what John Zaller calls a one-sided message from the 
media, which would indeed affect public opinion (Zaller, 1992). 
 
The Miami Herald, the hometown of Eller &CO, which started the whole controversy, 
published the headline: Dubai Deal on Ports Draws Fire. The deal was described as 
“jeopardizing national security”. The article stated: ''Six of our largest commercial 
ports are being handed over to a country that is seeking to be Iran's free trade 
partner and has been linked to the funding and planning of 9/11,'' Foley said. ”If our 
ports are the most vulnerable targets for terrorism and if we are at war, as the 
president says, we should be overly critical of handing over the management of our 
ports to any foreign countries, post 9/11. Instead, this was done in the dead of 
night.'” (2006d). The Wall Street Journal described Dubai as the “Chameleon of the 
Persian Gulf” in its 23 of February article “In Ports Furor, a Clash Over Dubai Where 
Bush Sees an Ally, Foes in Congress See Links to Terrorism New Wealth From an 
Oil Boom.” (BILL SPINDLE, 2006). 
 
The reporting carried information in an anti-Arab way but also suggested a distrust of 
the Bush administration. This is in contrast with the AWACS  deal  where the media 
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was used as a channel to reach out to the American public. Though some of the 
reporting was negative, the general tone was in favor of the President. The reporting 
stated the following: “Lawmakers raised alarms about the potential security risks of 
giving an Arab-owned company access to U.S. port facilities.” (HITT, 2006b).The 
opening paragraph of the article in the Baltimore Sun stated: “No wonder so many 
people across political lines went ballistic when they heard that a company owned by 
an Arab state, from which two 9/11 hijackers had come, was taking over operations 
at six U.S. ports. They had little reason to trust the White House when it said 
everything was fine.” (RUBIN, 2006).  
 
This was how the acquisition was portrayed in the press in the states that housed the 
ports to be acquired. It was with this language that local representatives and the 
American people read the news. One representative during a hearing quoted the 
New York Times saying : “Now, I want to read to you a reference one of you made to 
A.Q. Khan, and I want to read to you from a New York Times article, which I think 
summarizes a point on this question, that "the Emirates was also the main 
transshipment point for A.Q. Khan, the Pakistani nuclear engineer who ran the 
world's largest nuclear proliferation ring from warehouses near the port, met Iranian 
officials there, and shipped centrifuge equipment, which can be used to enrich 
uranium, from there to Libya," referring here to the port in Dubai (2006b).  
 
When the media highlighted these issues and the UAE was framed as being soft on 
terrorism and the deal was framed as a threat to national security, no elected official 
would dare to back it and to risk a loss in popularity. Though in the AWACS case 
opponents had security concerns as they were not sure of the future direction of the 
Saudi government and they were not sure of the stability of the regime, however the 
base condition represented by the cold war played in favor of the Saudis, unlike in 
the DP World case where September 11th created an environment that was hostile 
to the UAE. Additionally, there was one main difference in the two cases: one is 
exporting arms technology to a foreign country, while the other case was about a 
foreign country with which the average American did not identify coming to run 
critical facilities in mainland America. AWACS opponents mentioned national 
security but they could never say that these warplanes could attack America; their 
concern was that these planes could attack Israel. On the other hand the DP World 
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opponents claimed that these facilities could be used as a platform for another 
terrorist attack on mainland America and that this represented a totally different level 
of concern to the average American. The security concern in the case of DP World 
was much stronger than in the case of the AWACS, therefore counter-lobbying was 
difficult. It is very difficult to convince an elected official to take a position negatively 
viewed by his constituency. The security of Israel does not have the same salience 
as the security of mainland America, especially given that, a few years before, 
mainland America had been attacked by Arab individuals. One interviewee said that 
at that time DP World was facing public opinion. Therefore no matter how skilled and 
connected that lobbyist was, he would not have been able to present a plausible 
argument to back up the deal as the public was against it. Both Assistant Secretary 
Baker for the Department of Homeland Security in the hearing in front of the 
Committee of Banking, Housing and Urban affairs in the House (2006g) and 
Chairman Warner in the briefing to the Committee of Armed Services in the Senate 
(2006b) said that if you read the news you would think that the US government was 
selling the ports and outsourcing security to a foreign company, which was not true.  
 
In the briefing in front of the Committee of Armed Services (2006b), Senator Clinton 
said that according to the Associated Press, the transaction was approved “without 
many of the conditions” that are usually placed on similar investments. Congress 
people were conveying the message that a “balance has not been properly struck” 
between the open investment policy and the national security of the US.  Senator 
Reed said: “Certainly, that is what I am hearing from my constituents throughout 
Rhode Island, and I think my colleagues are hearing the same thing throughout the 
country” (2006g). 
 
Mr. Jones, the Representative from North Carolina in the hearing held on the 2nd of 
March in front of the Committee of Armed Services in the House said: “In 2 days I 
had 127 phone calls. That is not a lot out of my district of people, but, again, it is 127 
phone calls from people who took time to call and only 6 were in favor of this 
arrangement. I had people who professed to be Republican, I am a Republican, and 
they are just outside themselves irate.” He added: “I apologize. Mr. Bilkey And again, 
I don't fault you, I don't fault your company or the people that you represent, but I will 
tell you that this is an issue that maybe has galvanized the American people to 
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understand that we are selling America out, and it is time to stop.” Therefore it was 
difficult for any elected official not to toe the line and object to the deal because 
he/she would be leaving room for opponents to attack him/her as being soft on 
national security issues.  
 
Though some did come to the defense of the UAE stating the UAE’s record in 
supporting the US counterterrorism effort, none had adequate support in the 
Congress nor from the Bush administration to face the negative campaign that was 
launched against the deal and no one dared to defend it aggressively. 
 
The response of the UAE 
 
In the hearing in which executives from DP World testified (2006m), the bias against 
Dubai and the UAE was very clear from the opening statement. In the opening 
statement, Dubai was framed as being a bazaar for terrorism and its government as 
negligent. Ike Skeleton, a representative from Missouri, said: “We must be able to 
reassure the American people in every case that we will not allow the fox to guard 
the chicken house.”  
 
The UAE kept a low profile. One respondent, who is the head of an Arab American 
organization, said that at the time of the crisis he was constantly in the media 
conducting interviews defending the deal while the UAE officials kept a low profile. 
They were advised by their consultant to keep a low profile and to let the president 
“fix things”. It was after the controversy reached its height and after the respondent 
himself asked them to send an official to clarify the UAE position to the media that 
they sent Sheikha Lubna Al Qassimi. The two interviews that I was able to find that 
came from UAE officials and that were the most representative of the UAE 
responses and attitudes are an interview with Mohammed Sharaf, the CEO of DP 
World, and an interview with Lubna Al Qassimi, both of them with Wolf Blitzer of 
CNN.  In the interview with CNN, Sheikha Lubna Al Qasimi took a defensive, rather 
passive, stand trying to tone down, show cooperation, and avoid any possible 
confrontations with her host.  
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In another interview with the CEO of DP World, Mohammed Sharaf Blitzer started by 
saying that 67% were against the deal. He repeated statements by officials that 
discredited the company and Dubai and asked Sharaf to defend them. He presented 
rhetorical propositions such as what if Dubai was “clandestinely supporting 
terrorists?” Such suggestions served more to frame Dubai than to defend the deal. 
He even indirectly showed skepticism about their willingness to cooperate with US 
authorities as he asked him the same question twice: Blitzer: “So you'd be willing to 
cooperate with the U.S. Government...” 
.Sharaf: “Definitely.” 
 Blitzer: ... “Whatever they want, you'd be willing to say, DP World, from your 
perspective as a businessman, you'd be willing to cooperate?”  
The way he conducted the interview showed cynicism and sarcasm. In the course of 
the interview, Blitzer asked: “The White House press secretary, Scott McClellan, 
says that you've made some concessions; you've made some agreements to bolster 
security. He says, "One thing that is key is that this company agrees to additional 
security measures that they will take beyond what some others do in transactions 
like this." 
 Sharaf: “Yes we do.” 
 Blitzer: “Do you know what he's referring to?” 
 Sharaf: “Yes, yes...” 
 Blitzer: “What is he referring to?” 
 Sharaf: “What we have said is basically that within the 45 days we will not interfere 
in the running of the terminals in the U.S....” In this exchange, the host was trying to 
make his interviewee feel uncomfortable by asking him whether he knew what the 
requirements were and then he asked him to recite them. Also Sharaf tried to evade 
any confrontation and avoid any criticism of the US when Blitzer asked him whether 
he felt the opposition was a result of an anti-Arab discrimination. Sharaf replied it 
was the result of misunderstanding (blitzar, 2006). Studying the discourse of UAE 
officials, the language and expressions used, the information revealed, and the 
arguments presented and their sequence, can show why at the time the UAE was 
not able to defend its position before the American public, which at the time was 
against the deal. 
 
In the hearing the person representing DP World was the Chief Operating Officer 
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Ted Bilkey, who himself is an American citizen. The Emiratis stayed in the 
background. The themes generated from the interviews revealed that the Arab Gulf 
do not like to plead their case. They prefer to stay in the background and to get 
people to talk on their behalf and “to do things for them”.  
 
In his response, Bilkey focused on the track record of the UAE in supporting the US, 
namely in its counterterrorism effort. He mentioned also a recommendation sent by 
the head of an Israeli company Zim to Senator Clinton praising DP World as a 
reliable partner. This also ties up with the themes generated from the interviews that 
the Arab Gulf worked their issues quietly through the Israelis by getting their support 
or by sidelining their opposition on deals. Bilkey said: “Our Company has long-
standing business relationships with all the major shipping companies, including 
Israeli companies, among our diverse international clients; and actually Zim Lines is 
one of our larger clients and a highly valued one.” 
 
Though here the issue was not defense but a commercial issue, the Israelis were 
involved for mediation. This confirms the theme generated from the grounded 
method stating that they like to hire pro-Israeli lobbyists or deal with pro-Israeli 
people, thinking that these individuals have better access and a better influence than 
an Arab-American. So in the response of Bilkey, the Israeli company was mentioned 
and the various Arab American companies or companies that had relations with 
Dubai were not mentioned. Although she was against the deal, Senator Debbie 
Stabenow mentioned that Michigan and Detroit had many positive relationships, 
“business relations, city to city relationships, with Dubai.” She added “And it’s been 
positive”. However none of these relationships were mentioned by Bilkey, none were 
activated to pressure representatives or to talk favorably on behalf of DP World. On 
the contrary, the two elected officials representing a large Arab-American 
constituency, Debbie Stabenow and Carl Levin, stood adamantly against the deal. 
Though in the case of the AWACS, Tobby Moffett, a Connecticut senator of Arab, 
origin stood against the deal, however the NAAA supported the deal. In the 
testimony David Sadd presented the organization as representing Americans of Arab 
ancestry. There was no one in the hearing representing “people of Arab ancestry” to 
support the deal. 
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On the other hand, the direct business relationship that Dubai had with Secretary 
Snow was used against them. DP International, an affiliate of DP World, bought, in 
February 2005, container freight facilities previously owned by the American CSX 
Company, the company that Secretary Snow headed before becoming Secretary of 
the Treasury. In this case, Secretary Snow was accused of a conflict of interest since 
he had business interests with the company at stake (2006m). 
 
Bilkey mentioned that they had approached the committee in “good faith” and that he 
was confident that the review would reveal that they posed no threat to the US. His 
response included first a listing of DP World’s record of cooperating with the US 
government. He said in the beginning of his statement that he wanted “to dispel 
myths and establish facts.” However, his speech did not include any new 
information. He mentioned that DP World would not buy the port but merely obtain 
the lease and that the security would be under the control of the US government and 
that the deal was not sealed “secretly in the dead of night or without review”.  
 
However, all these points were already clarified in the previous briefing; the only 
point he added was that DP World was not in a capacity to enforce a boycott on 
Israel and that they followed the rules of the countries in which they operated. His 
statement did not represent a comprehensive narrative; it was merely a reply to 
some of the accusations.  
 
 Later on, following his questions to Bilkey, the chairman mentioned the nuclear 
triggers in 2003 that were transferred to a Pakistani businessman via Dubai. He also 
mentioned that in 1996 the German government named six firms in Dubai acting as 
a front for companies for Iranian efforts to import arms and nuclear technology. The 
chairman went on listing other instances where Dubai was used as a location for 
illegal operations. Facing these strong accusations his reply was, “I do not know” or 
“I am not sure I was in Dubai at the time”. Bilkey’s replies were evasive, lacked 
assertiveness, and did not provide the necessary assurances.  
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Given this weak defense, the Chairman concluded: “It appears from the hearing that 
the sole stockholder of this company is the Emir of Dubai…I guess the point that I 
am making is he is in charge of the government which shapes Dubai and it appears 
that Dubai specializes in masking transfers…” He added: “If you want to mask the 
seller and mask the buyer you take things through Dubai.” Even from the exchange 
between Bilkey and the Congress people, one feels the discomfort of Bilkey, for 
example when asked about the CEO of DP World. Skelton the Representative from 
Missouri, asked Bilkey “Where does he live?” Bilkey’s first reaction was “Excuse me”. 
Bilkey felt perplexed facing this rhetorical question, since the CEO of a company 
whose headquarters is in Dubai will naturally live in Dubai.  
 
Another point worth mentioning is the fact that they were not well prepared. For 
example the nuclear trafficking conducted by scientist Khan was mentioned in the 
briefing held on the 23rd of February, one week before Bilkey was asked the same 
question. If they were well prepared they should have reviewed all the concerns that 
might arise and found plausible arguments to defend their position. Evasive answers 
only validated the arguments of the opponents. The grounded theory method 
generated a theme that they are disorganized and lack a strategic approach. These 
themes were confirmed in the DP World case where all the response and the actions 
of the UAE were off key. On the other hand, the AWACS case shows completely the 
opposite: the Saudis were well prepared; they made informed decisions, and had a 
strategic approach. 
 
Then Bilkey was asked questions that were impossible to answer. Both Kline, the 
Representative from Minnesota, and Skelton asked how DP World could guarantee 
that some of the workers of DP World do not have “sympathy” with radicals. Skelton 
said: “How do you know that people working for DP World at the management level 
and the operational level do not pose a security threat?” and “What type of 
background checks or other investigations have been conducted regarding potential 
security threat for the corporate people who work for the corporation?” (2006m). 
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Bilkey was asked questions that indirectly denigrated the company. Skelton asked 
Bilkey to what countries the managers at DP World belong. He also asked vague 
questions to perplex his interlocutor, such as: “Would you tell us how does the 
government of Dubai own the corporation?”  
Bilkey: “I am not sure I understand the question.” 
 
The team of lobbyists that DP World hired that was described as a “heavy-hitting line 
up”, could not properly counter the effect that the semi-retired lobbyist that Eller&Co 
hired created (HITT, 2006b). At the time of the crisis, DP World hired Alston & Bird, 
the lobbying firm headed by Bob Dole (2006g). Even the fact they hired highly paid 
lobbyists was treated with skepticism. During the course of the hearing Mr. Weldon, 
the Representative from Pennsylvania asked Bilkey: “Why did you hire lobbying 
firms?” He added “I assume you hired them for a reason”. This was the spoken 
message but the unspoken message was that if you know you are totally legitimate 
and you know the deal is totally clean why do you need to hire a lobbyist? Weldon 
added that if they had a strong case and if they were not in breach of any law or any 
requirement why did they need these high priced lobbying firms? The facts should 
convince the Congress, not these lobbyists. The names involved were a firm 
Downey and McGraffin, a gentlemen by the name of Jonathan Winer who had been 
an aide to Kerry for ten years, Kathryn Marks who had been policy director to 
Senator John Edwards, and Carol Browner who used to be director of the 
Environmental Protection Agency under President Clinton. The public affairs firm of 
former Secretary of State Albright was also mentioned. These names were 
mentioned with scrutiny.  
 
Mr. Weldon told the DP World executive: “Everything was going well up until the 
process became public. Why would you have to hire those firms in the past?” He 
also said: “You obviously employed a council in this city and public affairs firms and 
lobbyists and I assume you hired them for a reason…” Dalton, the General Consul of 
DP World, answered: “Yes sir, as you call it we found it necessary to turn to certain 
firms. I understand that has been reported fairly in the press because we felt our 
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company followed all the US processes and in fact relied upon those processes in 
lifting our condition precedent as well as the other regulatory filing that we had done 
in a number of locations throughout. We relied on that process and we found 
ourselves in a difficult situation.” Weldon said to the COO: “Why would you hire all 
these high priced firms if there are no security concerns …if there is no way to 
grease the skids? The answer of Bilkey was: “We need a liaison … we don’t know 
the process...” 
 
The president and DP World 
 
Though Bush defended the deal and threatened to veto any resolution to block the 
deal, his support was not enough to make the deal go through. The difference lay in 
the fact that at the time of the AWACS Reagan was a much stronger president then 
Bush at the time of DP World. The AWACS case occurred at the beginning of 
Reagan’s term. Reagan had scored a major victory in his election as he was able to 
win over an incumbent president. Additionally, he had large support from his party in 
the Congress. Republicans had taken 12 seats from the Democrats (Grossbeck et 
al.). In contrast, the DP World deal happened when Bush was midway  through his 
second term and his popularity was going in decline. In November 2006, following 
the midterm elections, the Democrats ended up taking control of both Houses of the 
Congress.  
 
The DP World incident happened shortly after Katrina, when the executive branch 
and the President showed incompetence and their rating plunged to a record low. A 
poll undertaken jointly by ABC and The Washington Post showed that a majority of 
54% disapproved Bush’s response while an even larger majority of 57% said that 
officials should be held responsible for the problems caused by the hurricane (Morin, 
2005).  
 
This is why the statements of Bush were neither frequent enough nor strong enough 
to face the Congress and the American public. The press reports gave an indication 
of the Congress’ attitude towards Bush. The Washington Post reported: “The House 
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and Senate GOP leaders bluntly told President Bush that Congress would kill the 
U.S. portions of the company's $6.8 billion acquisition of London-based Peninsular 
and Oriental Steam Navigation Co. (P&O), which has operations at six major U.S. 
ports, including New York and Baltimore” (Graham, 2006). The use of the word 
“blunt” shows the aggressive attitude the Congress was showing towards Bush. 
The response of the President came as a press release issued on the 25 February 
2006 under the title: “Fact Sheet: DP World: Myth Vs. Fact”. The press release was 
merely a clarification of certain misconceptions such as the deal was kept in secret 
or that foreign companies should not operate a US terminal, or the fact that the 
operator will be in charge of security, or that the review was not comprehensive… 
But in defense of the UAE, the document mentioned quotes by two generals who 
praised the country. The press release was not strong enough in defending the UAE 
against the accusations of the Congress, whereas Reagan’s tone in the case of the 
AWACS was much stronger in defending the deal and attacking its opponents 
(Laham, 2002). 
 
Conclusion 
 
In conclusion the three most important lessons learned from the DP World case 
study is that:  first, foreign agents are not very effective when facing a public 
opposition; second, grassroots are key to successful lobbying, especially when the 
issue has high salience among the public; third, it is very difficult to lobby when the 
group or the issue has a negative image. Therefore a sound strategy would be to 
create a positive image for the group or overall issue before starting to lobby on 
small tactical issues. 
 
DP World did not employ the right tactics to manage the crisis and to lobby for the 
deal. Firstly, they kept a low profile and did not present strong arguments. They also 
adopted a defensive attitude instead of being offensive and attacking Eller who used 
“unscrupulous” methods and played on the feelings of American citizens to block the 
deal. However, having said that, even if they had adopted better tactics at the time 
and were more proactive with the media and went to every outlet and pleaded their 
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case and even if they had been able to discredit Eller, the deal would not necessarily 
have gone through. This is simply because lobbying is a continuous long term effort 
that resides in building an image in the mind of the public and long term relations 
with legislators and this could not have been done in a very short period as a 
response to an incident. 
 
 Successful lobbying requires a long term proactive approach and this was not there. 
The team of lobbyists was hired to do damage control. This confirms the theme 
generated from grounded theory stating that Arab Gulf States have no proactive 
approach; they only rush to repair damage when it arises. One respondent, a 
communication specialist who had GCC governments as clients, compared them to 
someone trying to use his fingers to close holes; when one hole is closed another 
hole opens. They adopt this approach that does not stop the leakage, instead of 
doing an overall restructuring of the wall and bringing a team to cover the entire 
surface and fix it properly. Her description applies to the DP World case. They had 
this decaying wall caused by the negative image of Arabs and Muslims associated 
with September 11th, so when the public outcry came they rushed to close the holes 
on the spot, and no matter how many fingers they hired they could not stop the 
leakage. However, if from the start the wall had been well maintained such a leakage 
would not have happened. Therefore, even if better tactics had been used at the 
time, that does not necessarily mean the deal would have gone through because 
there is no underlying comprehensive narrative, no underlying lobbying to frame the 
UAE positively in the mind of the American people and in the mind of their 
legislators.  
 
The AWACS case had many advantages that were lacking in the DP World case, the 
tactics employed for lobbying were better, and the general environment was better 
as it was the height of the cold war, and the president had a stronger position and 
the subject of lobbying was less sensitive as it involved selling arms to a foreign 
country, whereas in the DP World case it was a foreign country coming to mainland 
America and managing one of its sensitive facilities. However, despite all the 
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differences that put the AWACS at an advantage and put DP World at a 
disadvantage, the lack of consistency and the lack of continuous lobbying in both 
cases ultimately led to a failure. In the case of the AWACS, though the Saudis won 
the first round their subsequent lobbying failed.  
 
In the hearing held on the 2nd of March in front of the Committee of Banking, 
Housing and Urban Affairs in the Senate (2006g) Kimmitt, the Undersecretary of the 
Treasury who was defending the deal, told Shelby the Senator from Alabama that he 
understood his dissatisfaction, however Shelby answered that it was not his 
dissatisfaction, it was the dissatisfaction of the people in the coffee shop in Montana 
“or Oregon or wherever you want to go. It’s of great concern”. The essence of 
Shelby‘s statement was that when the issue went public and given that Schumer as 
well as the media and other politicians tainted the UAE with terrorism, the issue 
became very difficult to control. Bilkey in his hearing mentioned that he hoped that 
this “unnecessary political storm” would pass and then everyone would be able to 
focus on business. The fact is politics and business were intertwined and Eller 
started the process by pursuing an “unorthodox legal strategy” where  “national-
security concerns” were blended with details of a “very technical business dispute” 
(HITT, 2006a). The lawsuit that had been in place for three years (2006m) in the 
Florida and UK courts took a very different shape once the UAE came to the scene. 
Eller&Co found a scapegoat that could be stamped with the terrorism stigma. In the 
hearing, Senator Bill Nelson mentioned that press reports and information from 
embassies showed that similar acquisitions by DP World in other parts of the world 
had generated much less public interest. However, as mentioned in the hearing, the 
US lives in a post September 11th world. One Congressperson mentioned that had 
Britain been hit the way they had been hit they would have looked at things 
differently (2006b). 
 
Mr. Weldon said, “They have been helpful and I publicly acknowledge that this deal 
has put us in an extremely difficult if not impossible situation. As I said earlier we are 
damned either way this goes. If we stop the deal we are damned because the 
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Emiratis will think we have done this to embarrass them, if the deal goes through 
then we will be blamed for not having done our homework. So either way we lose.” 
(2006m). His statement sums up the dilemma that faced the Congress people. 
Though they knew that the UAE was an important ally with a strategic value, they 
needed to cater to their constituents’ preferences. They could not appear to support 
a deal that might jeopardize national security. This tie in to what Shelby said: it is not 
the Congress’ opinion, it is the general public’s opinion on the deal that pushed the 
Congress to take such a position. The same applies to the AWACS case. It is 
popular support that led Congress to take the position it took in support of the deal. 
The analysis of Prince Bandar’s biography, as well as the other works that highlight 
the deal, shows how businesses and unions that had a stake in the deal pressured 
their elected officials to push for the deal. This is how the Saudis were able to defeat 
AIPAC.  
 
Democrats had been blamed for being soft on security issues as opposed to 
President Bush whose marketing tool and main tagline were the security of the US. 
Schumer, who is a Democrat, saw in this transaction an opportunity to bash the 
president and his administration. Thomas Friedman expressed that Bush who 
emphasized security and accused his opponents of being soft on terrorism found 
himself the victim of his own rhetoric (OXLEY, 2006). 
 
Both the administration and DP World were “surprised” by the intensity of public 
interest. One congressperson said: “The only surprise is that the administration is 
surprised by the intense reaction of the American people.” (2006b). They were not 
prepared for such a reaction from the American people and their representatives in 
the Congress. The element of surprise was visible in the answers of Bilkey as he 
appeared unprepared to answer the accusations. This tie up to the theme emerging 
from the interviews, that they did not have a long term strategy. They responded to 
things as they occurred and they did not have a long term consistent narrative and 
this was obvious from the testimony of DP World executives.  
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The testimony was more of answers to questions but they did not make a full 
comprehensive story that could convince the average American and his 
representative that they should back this deal. The testimony did not present a larger 
picture, such as the importance of having the UAE as an ally in the Middle East, and 
the progress made because of the UAE in the war on terror. The answers of Bilkey 
failed to offer opponents a comprehensive and cohesive narrative in defense of DP 
World, Dubai and the UAE. He mentioned facts such as that DP World had the US 
military as a client or that they were the first to implement a Customs-Trade 
Partnership Against Terrorism (C-TPAT). He did not bring up the bigger picture on 
the economic front such as showing the positive effects of Arab-Gulf and Emirati 
investment on the national economy. In answering the questions regarding the 
nuclear smuggling, Bilkey’s responses were sketchy and evasive, whereas it was 
known from previous briefings and from reports in the media that such issues would 
emerge. Also there were many arguments they did not use. They could have 
discredited their opponents by discrediting the source of the information, Eller &Co. 
According to one respondent who works for a lobbying watchdog, before the DP 
World issue, Eller & Co. tried to block a Japanese company from working in its ports. 
They used security as an argument. In addition to this maneuvering the respondent 
added that the company as well as its CEO had some shady dealings in the past. 
They could have looked into this area and tried to discredit the source. When 
discrediting the source they could have killed the credibility of the argument.  
 
The Emiratis were not aggressive enough in their approach. Though this might not 
have totally affected the American people’s security concerns, however when 
discrediting the source and showing how Eller had a history of distorting facts and 
playing on people’s emotions, this could have led the American people to question 
these claims. All that was mentioned in the hearing was that P&O had a feud with 
Eller &Co that it had been going on for the last three years. Given the dodgy history 
of Eller &Co, Eller &Co should have been the point on which they started their 
defense. 
 
Also described by one interviewer was that, once a crisis breaks, Arab Gulf States 
run and hire people to solve their issue and this is not productive. Here this was 
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proven as the DP World hired a large team of high priced lobbyists; however, this act 
was used against them in the hearing. Weldon said: “What I see here are leaders of 
both parties instead of coming to the Congress and letting the Congress come in and 
understand, which is what I would have done when I had this deal, knowing it was 
going to become controversial based on substance or not, after the fact all of these 
players including a former president are getting involved to push a deal through that 
the American people including my constituents are going bonkers over and that 
bothers me.” The fact that they used these high caliber people to plead their case put 
them under even more under suspicion. Lawmakers are suspicious when a client 
uses lobbyists excessively (Smith, 1996). 
 
This ties up with the themes emerging from the interviews that Gulf Arabsdo not 
speak for themselves, they let others speak for them. And I have shown that they 
had very little appearance on the TV; we could only retrieve two interviews, one by 
Sharaf the CEO of DP World and one by Sheikha Lubna Al Qassimi.   
 
Actually, this episode proves that hiring high priced lobbyists can sometimes be 
ineffective. Even sarcastically the Chairman asked Bilkey what Chairman Bin 
Sulayem thought after consulting with President Clinton, who probably got paid a 
handsome amount for his advice when Senator Clinton, his wife, criticized the deal. 
The Chairman: “Your chairman, did he make any remark in the wake of Senator 
Clinton criticizing the deal?” 
 Bilkey answered, “I have no knowledge of that, sir.” The question left Bilkey 
perplexed as he answered that he did not know. Even the personal connections they 
had made with high caliber people in the government were used against them. For 
example, the business connection they had with Secretary Snow was put into 
question and was framed as a conflict of interest (2006m). 
 
One year after the port deal, during a hearing, the Congressman Garrett said that 
perception is reality and explained why the deal failed. He said: “What the American 
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public had with this Dubai deal is that things did not look right. They might have been 
right, but there was the appearance of something less than perfect circumstances 
emerging from that transaction.” (2007b)  
 
The UAE was framed as being an unreliable partner. Given the recent history of the 
US and the tragic event of September 11th it was very difficult to change this 
perception by using a few lobbyists, and the administration whose forte was to focus 
on security issues could not back it forcefully and seemed to be soft on security 
issues. As one interviewer, who works for a lobbying watchdog, said the support for 
the deal was not strong enough. Though the President spoke and said he would veto 
any resolution to block the deal, his support was weak compared to Reagan’s who 
was completely focused on reaching out to the American public and the Congress 
and going on TV to defend the deal at every occasion. Bush, on the other hand was 
not so vocal about his support. He did not show the perseverance and the 
aggression that Reagan showed in defending the AWACS deal. 
 
In the course of this chapter I analyzed how DP World was taken by surprise and 
how hiring expensive lobbyists gives no result when the issue has no public support. 
The DP World is a classic case of a lack of a long term strategy where lobbying is 
undertaken only when issues arise, as opposed to a consistent and comprehensive 
long term effort  to build a positive image  and to reach out to the American public 
and government. In the conclusion, I will highlight the problems and the prospects 
that were presented in the case studies and I will reconcile the themes that emerged 
from the grounded theory with the theoretical framework to come up with 
propositions that are unique to this study. At the end, after laying down the findings 
of the study and their implications I will present further research needed to 
complement the study as well as an outlook to the future of Arab Gulf lobbying. 
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Conclusion: Problems and prospects of an Arab-Gulf 
lobby 
 
The question that most of my American interviewees asked me was: “How come 
Arab Gulf states have not thought of establishing a lobby like the Armenians, the 
Greeks etc.…?” As inferred from the two case studies and the themes that emerged 
from the different interviews, there is no entity that can be called an “Arab lobby “ but 
merely sporadic effort to lobby on different issues by different states at different 
points in time. Arab Americans do not advocate Arab Gulf issues. Arab Gulf states 
do their lobbying individually and hire foreign agents on an issue basis. Their 
lobbying has been successful on narrow issues, mainly involving American interests 
such as arm deals. However, on macro issues such as war and peace they have not 
been successful, whereas, according to Mitchell Bard, the Israel lobby has recorded 
a 100% success rate (Bard, 1991). There is nothing called an “Arab lobby” that 
focuses on the overall relationship of the US with the Arab Gulf.  
I will start this chapter by highlighting the problems that face the establishment of an 
Arab lobby then I move to the theoretical part and examine the propositions that can 
be inferred from the research then I will feature the implications of the findings of the 
research. Following that I extrapolate to have a future outlook on Arab Gulf lobbying, 
given the changes in geopolitical parameters and changes in the Arab American 
scene. I end this chapter by highlighting the limitation of this research and laying 
down the research that should be follow and complement my work.  
 
Problems 
 
There are many challenges that face the establishment of an effective Arab Gulf 
lobby. This is why an Arab lobby has not been formed naturally and grown the way 
other lobbies have naturally formed and flourished over time. The structure of the 
Arab-American community, characterized by a multitude of factions, represents one 
part of the problem: other challenges come from inter-Arab Gulf rivalries as well as 
priorities, from the relations of the Arab Gulf with the Arab-American community, and 
in the way the Arab Gulf conducts its politics. 
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Though the problems come from different sources they have one common element, 
which is disunity. The Arab Gulf, though homogenous, is disunited. Arab-Americans 
are also disunited and have different approaches towards American policy in the 
region.  
 
Inter-Arab Rivalries 
On the Arab side, who will initiate a lobby? If you look at Israel, Armenia or Greece, 
each lobby is focused on one single country. Conversely in the Arab case, there are 
twenty-two countries in the Arab League, each with a different agenda and different 
priorities in its relations with the US. Even with the GCC countries, which represent a 
more homogenous group, an Arab Gulf lobby has still not been initiated.  
 
The main reason is that Arab Gulf countries conduct their foreign policy 
independently on a bilateral basis. Though they face the same threats and are 
homogenous in character, their stances regarding different events vary and are 
sometimes contradictory. For example, in response to the rise of the Muslim 
brotherhood to power in Egypt, Qatar was very encouraging—they even proposed 
giving the government a grant (2012d) –while the UAE and Saudi Arabia distanced 
themselves. The UAE even had tensions with Egypt, as it accused the latter 
government of implanting brotherhood cells in  Dubai (Duraid Al Baik, 2013). 
 
The Arab Gulf inter relationship is characterized by rivalries that are partly fueled by 
border disputes that exist between the different states (Henderson, 2003). These 
border disputes have led in some cases to military confrontation, such as the war led 
by Saudi Arabia against Al Khalifa of Bahrain and Al Sabah of Kuwait and the 
capture of Buraimi from Oman and Abu Dhabi (Alkim, 1994). 
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 Another problem emerges from what Gregory Cause calls the “transnational 
identities,” where some tribes extend across state borders. These leave the margin 
for ambitious leaders to interfere in their neighbor’s affairs (Gause, 2010). This is 
why each ruling family fears its neighbors will try to increase their control over its 
state and deals with them with skepticism. This skepticism and mistrust of neighbors 
has led each state to focus increasingly on enforcing its sovereignty (Partrick, 2011). 
This is perhaps why, after over thirty years since its inception, the GCC still has not 
resulted in any strong form of unity among the different states.  
 
This mistrustful attitude has created what Gause describes as a “security complex” 
where the different states spend most of their effort and resources in monitoring 
each other instead of monitoring others. This explanation by Gause falls in line with a 
comment by one respondent, a former American statesman: “Why isn’t the GCC as 
strong as NATO?” This is because, though a formal cooperation exists, integration 
between the systems is non-existent. The different members are more worried about 
each other than they are worried about an external threat. 
The same respondent mentioned the anti-ballistic missiles that the US has tried to 
convince the GCC to adopt for 30 years. Until now it has not been implemented 
because no country trusts its neighbors with its military secrets. This is why the field 
of foreign policy, which is central to national security, cannot be handled on a 
collective basis. The different countries formulate their foreign policy independently 
of their neighbors, while putting regime security as a top priority (Hinnebusch and 
Ehteshami, 2002). Also the relationship is complex as it is characterized by one large 
country with a large population surrounded by small states each having a population 
of one million people. Traditionally Saudi Arabia is considered the leader in the GCC 
as most initiatives come from Saudi Arabia and it is the state that sets the 
perspective for the other states on security (Alkim, 1994). However, this situation is 
changing as the smaller countries are trying to increase their prominence on the 
map. What had helped the emergence of the smaller states is that after September 
11,the US started developing relationships with the smaller countries (Henderson, 
2003).  
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Qatar is flexing its muscle by trying to play the role of the Arab mediator; it is trying to 
take the role that Saudi Arabia has played (Kamrava, 2011).The UAE is trying to 
raise its profile through philanthropic contributions and through raising the profile of 
the UAE and Dubai as a regional hub (2007c). Also many Gulf countries have 
launched foreign policy initiatives that have the appearance of being a collective 
effort by the Gulf, such as the peace initiative of King Abdullah in 2002 (2002) or the 
Fez communiqué (Ellis, 1981). However, these remain country specific initiatives and 
are not signs of a joint foreign policy. 
 
In addition to the issue of sovereignty there is the issue of prestige; each country 
wants to have the image of the pioneer. One respondent, a head of an Arab 
American organization, said: “The problem is everyone wants to be the chief, no-one 
wants to be the Indian.” This is visible domestically as individual countries compete 
to erect landmark projects that dwarf their neighbors’ monuments (Langton, 2013). 
Though an institution that has equal distance from different parties and that does not 
fall under the control of one specific ruling family such as the Gulf Cooperation 
Council (GCC) should overcome the complexities of prestige and sovereignty, the 
GCC was not able to achieve this role. This is because the GCC does not have 
authority.  Also the GCC does not have the executive power to undertake such a 
project as it remains a loose coalition between neighbors, when it is supposed to be 
a platform to integrate the different countries by incorporating different institutions. 
However, many of its projects, such as the single currency project, face the obstacle 
of the rivalries. This project, which has a pure economic aspect, did not materialize 
because of a dispute about whether the central bank should be in Riyadh or in Abu 
Dhabi (Pantin, 2009). 
 
The GCC has no effective role in foreign policy though it gives collective statements 
and expresses collaborative positions. Many times member states have acted in 
ways that contradict the position of the GCC. For example the GCC has announced 
it is against a US attack on Iran, however Wikileaks revealed that King Abdulla 
requested an attack by the US in order to contain Iran’s nuclear ambition (Tisdall, 
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2010). On the other hand, the UAE ambassador has publicly announced that the 
UAE supports such an attack (Lake, 2010). 
Given this mistrust and given that they rely on the US for their security; this has 
created a state of competition in foreign policy. Each country wants to have a special 
relationship, and a superior relationship with the US to its counterparts. The general 
mood is to excel in the relationship with the US and not to cooperate with 
counterparts in order to improve the relationship for everyone and to have a better 
bargaining power with the world superpower  (Shayji, 2013). 
 
 
The relations of Arab Gulf states with the US 
 
Another part of the problem facing the establishment of an Arab Gulf lobby lies the 
relation of the Arab Gulf states with the US. The problem in this relation lies in three 
areas: they don’t see the need for a lobby, they adopt a narrow short term simplistic 
approach with the US and they suffer from a negative image. 
As shown in Chapter 4 the Arab Gulf does not properly understand the need for a 
lobby to maintain and enhance their relation with the US. This is due to two factors. 
First, as discussed in the introduction, lobbying as a concept is alien to the Arab 
culture. As shown in Chapter 4 and in the AWACS case study chapter, Arabs rely on 
their strategic value to the US. One respondent, a former statesman, said: “You have 
to ask them whether they want a lobby”.  
The Arab Gulf monarchies have depended on the US for protection from potential 
threats. In the sixties it was the Pan Arab wave, in the seventies it was the Soviet 
threat and then the Iranian threat that was embodied by Khomeini and his concept of 
exporting the revolution (UPI, 1981). Then came Saddam Hussein’s expansionist 
ambitions. Facing all these threats, the US has been a supporter of the Arab Gulf 
states, whether by supplying arms or directly intervening as in the case of the Gulf 
War.They see that they have enough leverage through the strategic importance that 
emanates from the fact that the Gulf resides on the world’s largest proven reserves 
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of oil, and on the fact that the US has bases in the Gulf. One American respondent, a 
former chief of staff of a prominent Senator, said: “Because as long as the world runs 
on petroleum the world economy is dependent on the price of oil, it is in our (US) 
interest to make sure there is a free flow of oil and that is why the US cares.” 
Although the Arab Gulf has been an ally to the US since the inception of the nation 
states, the Gulf has shown that it can use this strategic advantage to create pressure 
on the US .The Arab oil embargo of 1973 represents a prime example (Major Bard 
O'Neill, 1977). 
 
In addition to the strategic importance of the Arab Gulf states as providers of oil, they 
gained another strategic advantage when they became the US’ allies in the war on 
terror. Post September 11, the US started strengthening its ties to the smaller Gulf 
States in order to bring them to its camp in the war on terror (Henderson, 2003). By 
virtue of providing those two strategic benefits to the US, the Arab Gulf states do not 
see a need to mobilize domestic politics to guarantee the support of the US.  
 
Another reason why Arab Gulf states do not see the urgent need for a lobby is that 
they do not feel the existence of an imminent threat. The different Gulf States’ ruling 
families enjoy legitimacy from the people (Abdulla, 2010) and even if they join a war 
they do not risk being swept away. This is unlike Israel that, as a government and as 
a people, constantly feels that it faces an existential threat. It is heterogeneous, with 
an environment that consists of surrounding Muslim and Arab countries, it has a 
large minority of its population that shares an identity with its enemy (Cohen, 2009), 
and large numbers of Palestinian refugees who are still emotionally attached to land 
that is now part of the state of Israel (Kissinger, 2001). Israel feels it needs US 
protection for the maintenance of the state. 
 
Because they do not see the need for a lobby they have not invested in research to 
understand the dynamics of American politics nor in cementing a narrative in the 
mind of the average American nor have they nurtured a grassroots base that can 
push for they issues in a systematic and consistent manner on the contrary they 
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adopt a narrow approach whereas they focus on the executive power and on the 
president and use foreign lobbyists to open doors with lawmakers as issues arise.  
 
Therefore there is no organization in the Gulf similar to the Jafee center in Israel 
whose whole purpose is to trace the impact of America’s domestic forces on Mideast 
policy (Terry, 2005). The center also has an educational purpose, which is to 
educate the American public on the importance of the support of America to Israel 
(Feldman and ʻal Šēm, 1988).There is also no center similar to the Israel project 
whose mandate is to gauge the public opinion in the US and to give the Israel 
government as well as the pro-Israel lobby advise so that everyone works in tandem. 
Arab Gulf rulers mainly rely on individual advisors when dealing with American 
politics. However, few  advisors no matter how well informed they are, cannot 
replace a full-fledged research center that continuously measures and accesses the 
different aspects of American politics.  
 
The lack of informed decision and lack of understanding of the dynamics of 
American politics were very visible in the DP World episode where most of the 
responses of the UAE were off key. The Emiratis were, as described by one of the 
respondents who is a lobbying specialist, “totally taken by surprise” when Schumer 
held a press conference and denounced the deal.  
Another problem facing the creation of the lobby is their short term approach in their 
relations with the US. The creation of a lobby is a long-term process that requires 
strategic planning in order to engage the American government and general public. 
One respondent, who was involved in public relations programs for Gulf Arab States, 
said they want everything there and then. Everything has to be immediate; they have 
no long term perspective. 
 
 Another respondent described Arab Gulf states as being reactive and not proactive 
in their approach, they wait till events take place and they decide on what action to 
take. This was visible in the DP World episode. As shown in Chapter 5, the UAE had 
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no underlying narrative to present to the American public and Congress to defend 
itself. When the crisis occurred they tried to control the damage, however, they had  
not worked beforehand on nurturing a comprehensive narrative in the minds of the 
American public and government in order for those defending the transaction, 
whether they were representative of DP World or members of the government, to 
relate to it. 
 
 As discussed in previous chapters, lobbying databases show that the lobbyists are 
chosen based on the issues they face. Their focus, even from their choice of 
lobbyist, is based on issues on which most of them have not been hired for the long 
term. Lobbyists are hired on an issue basis and not to build an overarching narrative 
for the Arab Gulf. Though at the time of the AWACS Crawford was commissioned to 
launch a campaign to promote a positive image of Arabs and Islam, this effort was 
confined to the AWACS episode and was not part of a long term strategy to engage 
the American public at large. This was visible in the DP World episode as they did 
not have an overall narrative to relate to when making their case. Their defenses 
merely consisted of responses to the accusations they faced. 
 
As a result of their short term perspective and their lack of strategic approach they 
do not use all their assets to advance their political goals. The Gulf has decided to 
keep politics separate from business. Though the Arab Gulf is an important investor 
in the US, Arab Gulf corporations do not have PACs, despite the fact that the law 
allows foreign owned companies to establish PACs as long as the contributors are 
American citizens (2013a). The AWACS case represents an exception where the 
Kingdom marshaled all its assets to engage the US; they used business connections 
to generate grass tops that could influence policy makers. This was a case where 
the economic interests were subject to political interests. However, these actions 
were not institutionalized through the creation of PACs.  
Given their short term approach and given they have no grassroots to advocate their 
issues, the Arab Gulf uses lobbyists to open doors, however activities of foreign 
agents fall under the Foreign Agent Registration Act (FARA), which gives them very 
little room to maneuver. The lobbyist usually works on specific issues where the 
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foreign government needs help, namely with Congress, such as an agreement that 
needs a push to get ratified, or on human right issues, among others (Gelak, 
2008).However unlike ethnic lobbies that represent American constituencies foreign 
lobbyists do not have the power to steer foreign policy in one direction or another 
 
Moreover, the Congress views foreign lobbyists with “suspicion” (Smith, 1996) as 
opposed to domestic lobbies that represent American citizens’ aspirations. Hiring 
lobbyists is sometimes fruitful as they help put together a strategy and have 
connections with legislators and the media. In the AWACS case, lobbyists played an 
important role in the success of the deal. However, their contribution was the source 
of scrutiny. Their success attracted attention to foreign sources of funding and this 
was exposed in the media (Roberts, 1978). Whereas the Israeli side relied on 
ordinary Americans expressing their views in foreign policy, Arabs were regarded as 
relying on professional, sophisticated, highly paid agents with no grassroots support  
(Goott and Rosen, 1983). 
 
Additionally, the DP World episode shows how relying on foreign agents made them 
subject to scrutiny. As shown in Chapter 6, during the hearing DP World executives 
were questioned as to why they used highly paid lobbyists if their case was totally 
legal and clear. 
 
This is the reason why different Arab Gulf states have lobbied successfully on 
narrow issues that face no opposition and do not involve public interest. But when 
narrow business issues become of high salience to the average American, which 
happened with DP World’s acquisition of operations in US ports due to its purported 
security implications, highly paid lobbyists became ineffective.  
 
The instances of success of Arab Gulf lobbying on major issues such as the AWACS 
episode were not due to the use of foreign lobbyists, but to other factors, including 
pressure from the President and the economic interest involved, as the deal meant 
jobs in the various districts. The role of the lobbyist is to formulate the right narrative 
in order to orchestrate a base in support of the issue at stake.  
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In the case of AWACS, foreign lobbyists generated a transient base so as to offset 
the  “spontaneous” long term base that belongs to the Israel lobby  (Smith, 1996). As 
explained above and in Chapter 5, Prince Bandar was said to offset Jewish votes 
with workers’ votes. Foreign lobbyists, by putting a strategy and reaching out to the 
different businesses involved, were able to generate a domestic base that had an 
economic interest in the deal.  
Unlike the foreign lobbyists hired by Arab Gulf states, who work on an issue basis 
and who try to generate a constituency in support of the issue they are handling such 
as in the case of AWACS, ethnic lobbies such as the pro-Israel, Armenian, and 
Greek lobbies have a sustainable base and work on the basis of a relationship 
between the country of origin and the US regardless of the issues at stake.  
 
In addition to the fact they have no grassroots support they have failed to 
communicate with the American public at large and to build a comprehensive 
positive narrative in the American psyche. One interviewee who has spent 12 years 
in the Gulf and has cemented important relations with high ranking officials in the 
Arab Gulf, told me that the friends he has made in the Gulf would give him an 
expensive watch but would not give him sponsorship for a research center  because 
they do not see the need for it. They do not disseminate information about the region 
to the US government and people as opposed to the Israelis who are constantly 
raising the profile of Israel to the different layers of Americans, in order for them to 
feel familiarity with Israel. They make sure in each walk of life the average American 
knows about Israel and identifies with it. The Israeli government makes sure that 
even farming magazines in the US carry features about agriculture in Israel  
(Friedman, 1995).   
This attitude is summarized by the quote mentioned previously by one of the 
interviewees who is a former American diplomat in the Gulf, who said: “The ministry 
of information is a ministry of non-information. They try to stop information instead of 
disseminating it. All they are interested in is protecting the reputation of the royal 
family. So they try to stop you from writing an article about a guy who tries to run 
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over another guy in the desert. It isn’t about money, but what you get depends on 
what effort you put into it.”  
 
One respondent, a former American diplomat to an Arab Gulf country, said they have 
a narrow band of communication. He said that the ultimate example is Prince Bandar 
who focused on relations with the White House and asked “the president to fix things 
if anything went wrong.” He added that “this does not work anymore”. This is due to 
two facts. One  is that, following the Watergate scandal, the political party structure 
was weakened and the party barons that dominated decision making in the 
Congress lost their power to the advantage of the individual legislators who no 
longer vote based their votes on partisanship but were more influenced by their 
constituency preferences (Smith, 1996). Therefore to push an issue one should 
reach out to the public at large.  
The two case studies, as well as the themes emerging from interviews, show that the 
different Arab Gulf states mainly focus on the relationship with the White House and 
the administration. In both cases, DP World and AWACS, the Arab Gulf depended 
on the President.  As shown in Chapter 5 Prince Bandar was quoted as saying that 
the president was putting up a fight on the behalf of the Saudis. In the DP World 
case one interviewee, the head of an Arab American organization, said that the 
Emiratis were advised to keep low a profile and to let the president fix the issue with 
the Congress. In the case of the AWACS, Saudi Arabia relied on President Reagan 
to garner support for the deal, though they also had a strategy and did lobbying on 
their own. The President was a main pillar in the success of the deal. In the case of 
DP World their reliance on the president did not materialize in a successful outcome. 
In addition to the fact that the support from the president is not sufficient to pass an 
issue, the president has no longer has the power to rally people under the premise of 
national interest as was the case with the AWACS. This is due to the  fact  that 
national interest is no longer a well-defined concept in the mind of the average 
American. During the cold war, the national interest consisted in containing the 
Soviet threat; with the collapse of the Berlin wall the notion of national interest 
became fluid. Even fighting terrorism as promoted by Bush  did not represent an 
overarching definition of national interest similar to the containment of communism 
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(Paul and Paul, 2009). Therefore the President could link an issue such the AWACS 
to the containment of the Soviet threat and rally members of the Congress as well as 
the American public around him. However, this is not possible anymore. This was 
visible in the case of DP World as the argument presented by Bush that the UAE is 
an ally to the US in the war on terror was not effective.  
 
The other main problem is that they suffer from a negative image .The negative 
image has a double effect:  on one front, efforts to reach out to the US badly 
received by the average American on the other hand it hinders the Gulf  appetite to 
reach out to the US. 
. 
The negative image of Arabs goes back before September 11 and the stigma of 
financing Bin Laden; it dates to the time Saudi Arabia financed the PLO who were 
involved in terrorist operations such as hijacking airplanes (Smith, 1996). Even 
recently, Qatar was also under scrutiny for supporting the brotherhood in Egypt, 
Hamas or rebels in Mali (Abrams, 2013). Thus, the Arab Gulf states are intimidated 
by the fact that they will face scrutiny if they conduct any activity that might seem to 
be interfering with American politics. They also do not spend on anything that might 
have a political implication. 
 
One respondent said they are very selective in the issues they support. This stems 
from accusations that the Arab Gulf finances terrorism (Kaplan, 2003). Even the 
most benign efforts have been subject to scrutiny, such as when the Zayed Center 
was accused of anti-Semitism. This led to the closure of the center  as well as the 
late Sheik Zayed having to withdraw a donation he made to the Harvard School 
Divinity School to create a chair for Islamic studies (Jaffit, 2005) (2003). Another 
incident is the opposition that faced the campus expansion of the Saudi Academy in 
Virginia.  The opponents said that the teachings were Anti-American, though most 
communities in the US have their own schools (2009). According to one respondent 
who is an American scholar, the local residents look on it as a school for terrorists. 
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Such accusations deterred Arab Gulf states from engaging in the US, especially in 
activities or projects that might have any political implications. 
 
Given this pre-established negative image, any public relations activity might be 
used against Arab Gulf states. The lobbying they might undertake could be subject 
to scrutiny as was the case with the DP World. Their bad image has put the Arab 
Gulf states in a reactive mood that focuses on keeping a low profile and 
concentrating on damage control rather than promoting a positive image. This was 
shown during the DP World episode, as the UAE mostly adopted a defensive 
position and tried as much as possible to avoid confrontation 
 
The negative image has created a Catch 22 situation: It poses a barrier to entry 
(Paul and Paul, 2009). It is very difficult to lobby for an issue when the issue or the 
group carries a negative stigma (Baumgartner et al., 2009a). DP World 
demonstrated the prevalence of the negative image of Arabs and their association 
with terrorism. And if they are not active on the communication front they will not be 
able to change this prevailing image. 
The themes that emerged from my interviews show that the Arab Gulf states are 
reluctant to undertake an aggressive full-fledged lobbying campaign as they do not 
want to be seen as using what is commonly described in the media as “oil money” to 
buy American policy. Anti-Arab Gulf propaganda, where Arabs are described as 
using oil money to blackmail the US government or to buy illegal perks, is prominent. 
A typical headline is “Saudi-Led Oil Lobby Group Financed 2012 Dark Money Attack 
Ads” (Fang, 2012). This article mentions the contribution by the American Petroleum 
Institution to industry friendly politicians. However, the author used this provocative 
headline as one of the members of this institute is a subsidiary of Aramco. Another 
example is the movie Fahrenheit 9/11 by Michael Moore, which questioned the 
relationship between the house of Saud and the Bush family (2004). Even during the 
hearing of DP World, the company’s executive was questioned for using foreign 
lobbyists. The implied message from the hearing was that the UAE, a Gulf country, is 
using money to get illegal perks from the US government.  
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This fear of extra scrutiny has rendered the Arab Gulf more passive in their outreach 
to the US. One respondent I interviewed, the head of an Arab-American 
organization, said that the Arab League asked him to conduct a study for a public 
relations plan to promote a positive image of Arabs in the US. Shortly after, 
September 11th happened; however, instead of putting the plan into action they 
shelved it as they feared a counter-reaction from the American public.  Until now the 
plan has not been implemented. The respondent said that the contrary should have 
happened. September 11th should have been a reason to galvanize Arabs to work 
on their image in the US. The AWACS marked a departure from this passive 
approach. 
 
The attitude of the Arab Gulf contrasts with the general attitude in the US, where 
groups tend to intensify their lobbying when they feel there is a bias against them. A 
study that was conducted by Baumgartner, Berry, Hojnacki, Kimball, and Leech in 
2000 and spanned four years and  ninety-eight cases said that lobbies are most 
active when general policy is against them (Baumgartner et al., 2009a). During this 
period, although conservative citizen groups were very vocal in the public arena, 
they were limited in their activity when it came to policy making.  Baumgartner et al. 
explain that when you have friends in the government you do not need to lobby 
much, however when the policy is against you, you need to defend yourself. Some 
groups such as the poor do not lobby, though general policy is not in their favor, 
because they lack the means (Tichenor and Harris, 2005). However, this is not the 
case with the Arab Gulf.  
 
Another example that supports this theory is the creation of the Arab-American Anti-
Discrimination Committee (ADC).The ADC was founded by Senator Jim Abourezk 
following the ABSCAM scandal, when the Arab community felt they needed to create 
an organization to defend themselves from stereotypes. 
 
In addition to fearing public opinion that is tilted against them, they do not want to 
give excuses to the American administration to interfere in their own internal affairs. 
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Though the US is an important ally to the Arab Gulf States, they try to make sure to 
keep it at arm’s length.  Two respondents, one a former high ranking American 
military officer and a former Arab Gulf diplomat mentioned the following adage: “If 
your house is made of glass you don’t throw stones at others”.  The Arab Gulf states 
have always tried to keep a balance between preserving their alliance with the 
Americans while at the same time limiting US interference in their internal affairs. 
 
This effort to keep the US at arm’s length started with the resistance that Saudi 
Arabia showed towards the American administration’ s various requests to establish 
military bases prior to the first Gulf war (1981i). The Arab Gulf viewed Bush’s 
pressure on the different states to introduce democratic changes as an “imposed 
democracy” and as interference in domestic affairs (Habtoor, 2006). Additionally, the 
recent criticism the American administration addressed towards Arab Gulf states 
(2011b) has increased Arab Gulf states’ urge to limit American interference in their 
internal affairs. 
 
 Therefore they try not to “lobby” as they do not want American administrations to 
think that this gives them carte blanche to dabble in internal Arab Gulf state affairs. 
However, this is not the way American politics works; the reciprocity does not apply 
in this respect. One respondent, an American scholar, said: “You have one 
superpower and facing it six small states”. Not engaging the American public and 
government in order not to entice the US to interfere in Arab Gulf states represents a 
simplistic way of looking at American politics. 
 
 
 The motives behind American interference in the Gulf depend on several factors 
other than reciprocity. For example, facing the turbulence in Bahrain, the US, which 
wants to be seen as supporting democracy, criticized the government. The fact that 
Bahrain does not have a lobby to influence American politics did not lead the US 
government to isolate itself from developments in Bahrain. On the other hand, the 
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Israelis use their lobby to stop the US administration from imposing restrictions on 
them with respect to the Palestinians. The settlement issue is a prime example. 
President Obama tried to impose a freeze on the settlements in Israel. To prevent 
this interference Israel mobilized its lobby, which put pressure on the Congress and 
hence on Obama, and the issue of the freeze on settlements was abandoned (Greal, 
2010). 
 
In addition to the stigma Arabs have, the way Arab Gulf states conduct their relations 
with the US make it very hard to convince the average American that they are the 
US’ trusted allies. Kissinger described Arab Gulf states’ relations with the US as 
“opaque” (Kissinger, 2001). This ties in with the fact that Saudi Arabia as well as the 
different Arab Gulf states will try as much as possible to dissociate themselves from 
American policy. This is why, on a primary policy level, they take positions that might 
contradict American decisions, while on the secondary practical level, which involves 
military, trade, and technical partnerships, they try, as much as possible, to 
cooperate.  They keep the policy association low key while they develop the 
secondary association, because they do not want to look for inside and other Arab 
critics as clients for the United States (Safran, 1985). For example, while opposing 
the US war on Iraq, American troops used bases in the Arab Gulf (Otterman, 2003) 
While Qatar opposed the strike on Lebanon in 2006, it reportedly helped the US 
deliver bombs to Israel (Umrani, 2006).   
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                   
They will only openly endorse the US when there is an Arab concurrence on an 
issue (Safran, 1985). Even in the case of Afghanistan, where the Soviet invasion 
was an eminent threat, they did not want to seem to be joining the US; they wanted 
to look as if they were adopting a parallel course (Safran, 1985).The fact that these 
policy positions are not always in line with US policy, though on the practical level 
they actually are, make it difficult for the average American to view Arab Gulf states 
as strategic allies to the US 
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The relationship between the Arab Gulf and Arab Americans 
 
In addition to their lack of perception of the need for a lobby to cement their 
relationship with the US, the Arab Gulf leadership does not have a good 
understanding of American politics and of the role of grassroots. One respondent, a 
former American ambassador to an Arab Gulf country, said: “There is a problem with 
the model of American politics in the minds of Gulf rulers.  They think that American 
politics works the way their politics works.  But we are not run by a family; we are 
enmeshed in a set of institutions.” 
The problem, according to interviews, lies in the mentality of Arab Gulf rulers who do 
not understand the value of a grassroots base, nor do they understand institution 
building or the power of information. The case studies, as well as the themes that 
emerged from grounded theory, show that the Arab Gulf does not understand the 
value of having a long term base of American citizens to push for their issues as they 
arise. They fund generously whenever they have an issue at stake, but they do not 
invest in a long term constituency. 
 
Ironically, the AWACS episode highlighted the importance of grassroots to AIPAC 
(Smith, 1996). Initially the coalition that Prince Bandar put together created a 
constituency to support the AWACS sale, though as shown in Chapter 5 this 
constituency was transient and only relevant to the arm deal. In his biography Prince 
Bandar was said to offset the Jewish votes for labor votes (Simpson, 2008). In the 
case of the AWACS, the economic constituency, the domestic constituency for jobs 
that the Saudis were able to gather, supported the president’s position and led to the 
success of the deal. In the case of DP World, it was the constituency that Eller &Co 
lobbyist was able to gather by raising the salience of the acquisition and by using 
fear appeals that pushed for blocking the deal, with there being no counter-
constituency to support the deal. In the course of the hearing, Senator Shelby said 
that it was not him who was dissatisfied with the deal but the people in the coffee 
shop in Montana “or Oregon or wherever you want to go. It’s of great concern”.  
Despite the support of the president in both cases, the domestic base was crucial in 
winning or losing. AWACS passed while DP World failed. In analyzing and 
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comparing the two cases, I demonstrated the importance of a constituency in 
pushing for issues. However, in the two cases, the constituencies were not 
permanent ones that could make the base for a lobby; they were created in response 
to the issue at hand.  
 
During the AWACS episode, Saudi Arabia supported Arab American organizations, 
namely the NAAA; however the support was confined to the AWACS deal. The 
AWACS episode shows that the Saudis started disengaging from Arab American 
organizations at the same time as AIPAC started reinforcing its engagement with 
grassroots. AIPAC worked on increasing their grassroots base and capturing this 
base by social services and institutionalizing relations, coupling grassroots with 
financial contributions, while the Saudis starting slowly disengaging from the Arab 
American organizations that had the potential to create a permanent base for them.  
 
The AWACS episode taught AIPAC the value of grassroots. Prior to the AWACS, 
AIPAC had relied on the Jewish population concentrated in major states: New York, 
Michigan, Pennsylvania, California, Massachusetts, and Illinois. Their weakness in 
the Senate came from the Southwest, among conservative Republicans. To spread 
their base and reinforce it, they started focusing on social services: community 
relations councils, day schools, country clubs. This falls in line with Olson’s theory 
that people are mobilized when they get an individual benefit from their engagement. 
 
 The pro-Israel lobby coupled this social engagement with financial engagement as 
they started creating PACs or 527 organizations that fund US candidates in 
elections. They were bi-partisan. Dine had learned from the AWACS episode as he 
saw the deficiency in the AWACS coalition that was temporary and was not 
institutionalized .By creating these PACs, he enforced a long term grassroots base 
that was independent of the individual issues that may arise. AIPAC’s objective 
became to activate the grassroots. They ran political workshops and got local 
leaders to increase their contact with senators and congressmen (Smith, 1996) .  
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The Arab Gulf has not invested in nurturing an Arab American constituency to push 
for their issues for two reasons one being they don’t understand the role of 
grassroots the second being is that they do not see successful organizations that are 
worth investing in. They do not see an organization that has a large captive audience 
of Arab Americans. 
 
As a result, the Arab Gulf does not have a domestic base to plead for its cause, 
unlike  other countries or regions such as Israel, Greece, Armenia or South America 
that have ethnic lobbies advocating strong American relations with their kinsmen. 
The power of these ethnic groups or lobbies, what Mathias calls the ‘secret weapon,’ 
does not reside in their tactics or money. Rather, it is their dedication, and the 
emotional ties that link them to their country of origin. What drives the members of an 
ethnic group is a ‘passionate commitment’ (Mathias, 1980). The two case studies, as 
well as the themes generated from the various interviews, show that Arabs have not 
invested in grassroots. Thus, while Arab-Gulf lobbying does not lack resources, it 
lacks a domestic base, an Arab American community that is united and committed to 
Arab issues. 
 
 
One main initiator for  a strong lobby is for the country of origin to have an interest in 
their kinsmen in the US .This is why, though the Irish are a large community in the 
US, they did not constitute a strong lobby on Irish independence (Feldman and ʻal 
Šēm, 1988). One reason why there is no Arab American lobby is because Arab 
governments are not interested in Arab Americans lobbying for them. They rely on 
foreign agents and they do the lobbying separately. Each country lobbies for its own 
narrow national interests, which are mainly to procure arms or to seal a business 
deal. 
Arab Gulf governments have not invested in engaging Arab Americans. Though they  
give generously whenever any catastrophe hits the US(2013c), they channel very 
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little money to target Arab American organizations or groups. In contrast, Israel 
invests large sums to connect with Jewish Americans. One American respondent, a 
former statesman said: “You have to rekindle the love of their former lives. Look what 
AIPAC does: they send American kids to go spend summer in Kibbutz, create a link 
with their old lives. The Arab community has twenty times the money of the Jewish 
community. How much oil do they have in Israel? Let me ask you this question? How 
do you get grassroots support, by having the tallest tower in Dubai?” What the 
interviewee meant is that the Arab Gulf has the means and should invest in the Arab 
communities in the US in order to create grassroots support.  
 
One respondent, the head of a prominent Arab American organization, said that 
“unfortunately” they get very little donations from Arab Gulf countries. He added: “We 
get some money from Gulf countries but it is limited, the whole budget is $1.4 or $1.5 
million which is very small. If you go across town here there is a place called the 
ADL, Abraham Foxeman, ADL has a fifty million dollar budget compared to our 1.5 
million dollar budget. AIPAC has 75 million dollar budget compared to our 1.5 million 
dollar budget.” 
 
One head of an Arab American organization said that Arab-owned businesses could 
contribute to Arab American organizations, but they do not. He tried to approach 
some but he did not get any response. Another respondent, a former American 
diplomat to the Arab Gulf, said that the Arab Gulf does not invest in building a 
constituency in the US. He said: “You get what you pay for.  If you don’t pay anything 
you don t get anything.”  
 
The fact that Arab Gulf states do not see a success story in Arab American 
organizations has further suppressed their appetite to fund them. As Walker noted, 
governments are usually the most conservative patrons. They rarely invest in start-
ups, they would rather give maintenance funds. And so far, they did not see an 
effective structure that is worth investing in. 
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Even when they want to establish non-political lobbies to promote trade and 
investments between the US and the Arab Gulf, they prefer to do it directly rather 
than going through Arab American organizations .This was visible in the DP World 
.Facing the crisis the government of Dubai did not seek help from Arab American 
groups despite that fact that two members of the congress that stood adamantly 
against the deal Were Senator Carl Levin from Michigan and Debbie Stabenow from 
Detroit. Those two members have a large Arab American constituency .DP World did 
not try to go through ACCESS in order to generate grassroots support which can 
influence those two opponents, on the contrary they preferred to rely on high priced 
lobbyists . 
 
The relationship between Arab Gulf states and Arab American organizations is 
characterized by inconsistency and a lack of trust. When asked what they think 
about Arab American organizations, respondents representing Arab states showed 
skepticism in the ability of Arab Americans to get organized or to exert influence on 
American policy, though they were described by one Arab Gulf diplomat as “friendly 
organizations.” At the same time, however, he belittled their effectiveness. Also the 
Arab Gulf states do not see the Arab organizations as united, they see them as 
groups fighting among each other and criticizing each other. One interviewee an 
Arab Gulf statesman said: “Who are the Arab Americans? They are like a drug, we 
do not see them. On the other hand there is no real representative of the Arab 
Americans who does represent the community.”  What he meant by this comment is 
that they see the heads of these organizations, but they do not see the community at 
work. They do not see the community as a force. This was also visible in the 
AWACS episode. Though Prince Bandar engaged the NAAA, the organization did 
not have a grassroots base that it could be mobilized in support of the deal. 
 
In addition to the lack of trust in the capabilities of the organizations they do not trust 
the people. One respondent said: “The Gulf governments don’t trust the Palestinians, 
the Lebanese, the Iraqis...” Another respondent, a former American diplomat to the 
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Arab Gulf, said: “If you are an Arab American, when you try to get to an Arab country 
they look at you with suspicion. You are not welcome. The Arabs generally prefer 
someone with no connection in the Middle East to someone with roots there.” Also 
the fact that positions that Arab American organizations took were not always 
aligned with Gulf interests discourages the Gulf States from supporting Arab 
American groups (BARRINGER, 1990). The first Gulf War exemplified this situation, 
as some Arab American groups opposed the war. This led to the total drying up of 
funds coming from the Gulf (Shain, 1996).  
 
On the other hand, when interviewing young, active Arab Americans, they mentioned 
that the Gulf cannot be relied on and that a strong lobby or a strong community 
cannot be built if it depends on resources from outside, especially when the 
resources are tied to issues on which Arab Americans might agree or disagree. One 
head of a young Arab American organization said the reason why some of the old 
organizations failed is because they relied so much on support from the Gulf and 
“bowed” to the Gulf instead of nurturing a domestic base. Gulf support has been 
conditional and inconstant as it was linked to political goals that are not always 
compatible with Arab American aspirations. They will finance them when they want 
something like the AWACS, but will give little money when they work on issues of 
interest to Arab Americans.  
 
Various Arab American respondents said that the Gulf helps them only when they 
need their assistance on an immediate and narrow issue, they do not help Arab 
Americans to become strong in the American scene. However, this will eventually 
take away credibility from these Arab Americans or these organizations as they will 
be labeled as foreign agents. One respondent said that they do not understand that 
by promoting Arab Americans into positions of power, even if those do not work 
specifically in the Arab Gulf states’  direct interests, they will be strengthening their 
position within the American system.  
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One of the founders of NAAA said that at the time of AWACS, money, foreign and 
domestic, was flowing to the organization. However, once the AWACS episode was 
closed and NAAA started focusing on an issue of importance to Arab Americans, 
which is Palestine, the foreign money dried up and with it the domestic money. This 
is unlike Israel, which  has helped the Jewish-American constituency become a 
strong community inside the US (Friedman, 1995).The focus of the pro-Israel lobby 
is more on the relationship between the US and Israel and is not focused on narrow 
issues.  
 
Another dimension to the problem is that Arab Americans do not identify with the 
Arab Gulf. A former American diplomat I interviewed said: “So, if you talk about 
Emiratis, they do not emigrate. So people who emigrate are people from the Levant.  
Lebanese, Syrians, people from Iraq, or Egypt.  People from the Maghreb are 
beginning to emigrate, but not Saudis, not Kuwaitis, not Omanis. Here is the 
problem. Where is the money?” Those immigrants do not come from the Arab Gulf.  
A big group of them who come from the Levant and are Christians do not relate to 
the Arab Gulf (Feldman and ʻal Šēm, 1988) and do not identify or have affinity with 
Saudi Arabia or the UAE or Qatar, unlike a big portion of Jewish-Americans, who 
despite coming from different parts of the world identify with Israel. Though the new 
wave of immigration has brought more Muslims, as more immigrants come from 
Morocco and Yemen (Nagel and Staeheli, 2005), even they do not have emotional 
links to Saudi Arabia or the Emirates. 
 
In addition to the issue of identity there is divergence of interests. Although , 
according to one respondent who is the head of an Arab American organization, 
Arab Americans act with a sense of “Arabness” and pride in their heritage, their 
interests do not coincide with each Gulf country’s narrow national interests. They are 
interested in an overall American policy towards the Middle East but they are not 
interested in whether the UAE or the KSA get fighter jets sales approved. 
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According to Feldman, to have an ethnic lobby the diaspora should identify not only 
with its country of origin but also with the government in the country of residence 
(Feldman). This is why, though the Iranian Americans are influential in the US, they 
do not lobby for Iran as they do not identify with the regime (Paul and Paul, 2009).  
 
The Arab spring is another source for Arab Americans to distance themselves from 
Arab Gulf governments. A respondent said that some Arab Americans look with 
discontent towards the Gulf when they see the wave of democratization across the 
whole Arab world except for the Arab Gulf that is resisting democratic changes. The 
Arab Spring has actually generated lobbying against some Gulf state governments: 
Bahraini activists lobbied the US government for the cancellation of a 53 million 
dollar arms deal to the Bahraini government (Rogin, 2012).  
 
A respondent who works for an Arab American organization said that some of its 
members demanded that it request the US government put pressure on Arab Gulf 
states for democratic changes. The organization refused their request on the 
grounds that they do not interfere with Arab states’ internal affairs. 
 
Problem within the Arab American community 
 
In the 1970s, the Arab American influence was expected to grow in consciousness 
and self-confidence and political development. It was backed by the Arab Gulf and 
started to turn public opinion on issues in the Middle East. However, quite the 
opposite happened (Feldman and ʻal Šēm, 1988). AIPAC metamorphosed from a 
lobby to a “super lobby” and enforced its position on Middle East issues (Smith, 
1996). Politics is a factor for disunity in the Arab American community. It also creates 
disagreement with Arab Gulf countries, as was the case with the first Gulf war. Even 
the issue of Palestine, which interests the different Arab American groups, is not a 
uniting factor. The different groups disagree on the approach to solve the problem of 
the Arab Spring. Although it ignited pride among Arab Americans, it enforced the 
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division in the Arab community.  Also different Arab American organizations take 
different attitudes towards the changes in the Arab World. Arab American 
organizations are divided on Syria. The Arab American Anti-discrimination committee 
(ADC) is trying to distance itself from the conflict saying it does not interfere with 
internal issues of Arab government. This has created discontent with many Arab 
American groups who see the need for intervention to stop the bloodshed. The Arab 
American Institute (AAI) has focused on the protection of minorities in Syria. Internal 
disunity has been the main problem of the Arab American community (Feldman and 
ʻal Šēm, 1988). Dr. Geoffrey Kemp from the Carnegie Endowment Fund for Peace 
said of Arab-American lobbying that in contrast to AIPAC the attempts of Arab 
organizations to embrace a collaborative Arab view is weighed down by internal 
disagreement.  
 
The most important issue facing the Arab community in the US is the issue of 
common identity. A common identity is not clear given the differences in religion, 
common cultural heritage, history, and physical look. Not everyone identifies with the 
Arab identity and heritage, to start with. Some Lebanese will say they are 
Phoenicians and not Arabs, for example (Khoury, 1987). Some think of themselves 
as Arabs while others adopt a more local or religious identity. Many Lebanese 
Christians think of themselves as Lebanese and not Arabs, many Christians 
Egyptians think they are Copts (Shain, 1996). However, the new wave of immigrants 
coming from the Yemen Maghreb and Iraq are Muslims and identify more with their 
Arab heritage. Given the different factions, Arab Americans have different views on 
politics in the Middle East. They do not all share the same interests. For example, 
right wing Lebanese Christians will not have the same priorities on Palestine as 
Palestinians and Syrians. In fact at various times during the Lebanese civil war era 
there have been hostilities between Lebanese Americans and Palestinian 
Americans. This is why one respondent said that the organizations that are the most 
successful are the ones that are focused on a specific country and hence have a 
more cohesive target audience, such as American Task for Lebanon or Task Force 
for Palestine. The organizations that have premised their lobby on an overall Arab 
cause such as the National Arab American Association (NAAA) did not survive. The 
NAAA reached its peak with the AWACS, however once this episode was closed and 
227 
 
the foreign money dried up, they were not able to be self sustainable. In 1982, at the 
height of NAAA activity the various Arab American organizations could not gather 
more than 2.5 % of the total Arab-American population (Goott and Rosen, 1983). 
According to respondents who worked in the organisation, NAAA did not have a 
popular base large enough that was interested in Pan Arab issues. In 2000 the 
NAAA merged with the Arab American Anti-Defamation Committee (ADC).  
 
In addition to the fact that different factions have different views on American foreign 
policy in the Middle East, the way they view politics differs between recent and 
earlier immigrants. These two waves have different perspectives on Middle East 
affairs. The new generation that has stronger ties tends to replicate the conflicts 
existing in the Middle East, while the early immigrants who came to the US at the 
turn of the century have no connection with these conflicts.  
 
Earlier immigrants look at the Middle East from the point of view of heritage. They 
have a “larger” view of the region. One respondent gave the example of the current 
turmoil in Lebanon. While some recent immigrants sided with Geagea and some 
sided with Nasrallah, the third and fourth generations of Lebanese-Americans do not 
know who these politicians are and they do not take sides. They don t care whether 
one faction in Lebanon wins over the other, they care more about the end of the 
conflict and the prosperity of the country. One respondent stated that the internal 
problems that faced the NAAA board and led to its failure are mainly due to the fact 
that the board had two different waves of Arab Americans who had very conflicting 
views on the region. The second and third generations of Arab Americans look at the 
Middle East from an American perspective on how the policy should be in 
conjunction with America’s democratic values. They do not look at it from the 
perspective of the interests of the Arab World.  
 
As discussed in the literature review chapter, Middle East affairs differ in salience 
from one faction to another (Wald, 2009).Therefore, donating to promote the welfare 
of the Arab World is not a very appealing cause to Arab Americans. They are more 
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interested in advocating issues directly related to their own well-being. One 
respondent who is a strong advocate of the Palestinian cause said that when he 
went to Arab American groups in Detroit and asked them to talk to their 
representative to support the Palestinian state, his request fell on deaf ears, as they 
are more interested in requesting a new road in the suburb of Detroit than in asking 
for support for a Palestinian state.  
 
In contrast, Sheldon Adelson, one of the main contributors to the Mitt Romney 
campaign, said that his core belief is Israel (ZELENY, 2012). Very few Arab 
Americans will say their core belief is the Arab world or Palestine! This is why the 
issue of foreign policy has low salience among Arab Americans. It is interesting to 
Arab Americans only from the angle that a better view of the Arab world will reflect 
on their image and standing as a community in the US. However, foreign policy as a 
stand-alone issue is not of interest to them. 
 
 Another feature of the Arab American community that hinders the formation of a 
lobby is that political activism is as alien to them as it is alien to Arabs themselves. 
Abdel Nasser once asked whether lobbying was legal (Terry, 2005). Arab-Americans 
think of lobbying as a “cabal’’ or as a conspiracy to manipulate or to interfere in US 
internal affairs. However, in the American political system, lobbying is a legal 
institutionalized activity, a manifestation of democracy. Although the Arab American 
community is economically successful--it has a high rate of professionals and enjoys 
an above average income (2010a) --it does not donate much to Arab American 
political organizations. This is due to two factors:  first, Arab Americans are 
assimilationists and foreign policy issues have low salience to them; second, Arab 
Americans do not have a culture of involvement in politics. Most Arab Americans 
came from societies where political activism is shunned (Lebanon is an exception) 
and most Arab Americans have historically not been politically active and this seems 
to be engrained in the Arab culture; whenever they make financial contributions or 
donations, these revolve around charities. They will rarely contribute to political 
causes. One respondent, active in several Arab American organizations, said that 
they would give money to Saint Jude to cure children who have cancer, to the poor 
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in Detroit, or send money to Syrian refugees, or to rebuild destroyed homes in Gaza 
but very rarely will you find an Arab American who will go to a fund raiser and write a 
check to a US political candidate and tell him: “Here is your check congressman, I 
really appreciate your position supporting this or that issue”.  Given  this apolitical 
culture and given that it is  difficult to get political issues on which to unite the 
community, funding Arab American organisations has been a difficult task and most 
organisations struggle with it.  
Indeed, all Arab American organisations are struggling. One respondent, the head of 
an Arab American organisation, said: “Even though we are not a lobby organization 
we do government relations. We have contacts with the White House and  Congress. 
We used to have a lobbyist but we could not afford her. We could do more but we 
have limited resources. We have over 700 cases of discrimination but only have 
three lawyers to handle them. Our government department relations does not exist .It 
is sad when you think about it.” 
 
The lack of fund has a created a state of  competition among Arab American 
organisations which aggravated the problem of disunity and further weakened the 
community . This also  existed among black organisations (Ainsworth, 2002). The 
problem is that the lack of financial resources creates a state of competition over 
funds. Each organisation wants to prove that it is the legitimate representative of 
Arab Americans. One of the respondents said in the course of the interview:“I am the 
' ‘legitimate’ representative of Arab Americans”. This statement shows the level of 
competition among Arab American organisations on legitimacy, because ultimately 
the one that can prove itself as “legitimate” is the one that is going to attract most of 
the scarce funds . This eventually weakens the already weak group of organizations.  
 
Another problem is the political maturity of the Arab American community. Some 
communities such as the Chinese are very prominent in business but have a low 
involvement in politics. This applies also to Arab Americans (Sayigh, 1991).  
 
Another factor that creates cohesion among a group is the fear from an existential 
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threat. One of the reasons for the unity of the Jewish community around Israel is that 
they feel that the maintenance of the State of Israel is the only guarantee for the 
survival of their race. The holocaust memory is still alive in their national 
consciousness. The maintenance of the state of Israel means their preservation as 
people.  
 
One interviewee said that in the Arab world there have been many pogroms but not 
one holocaust that mobilizes everyone.  Another respondent said that, while Jews 
had the holocaust and the Armenians had the genocide by the Turks, there is no 
similar tragic event in the Arab recent history.  Arab Americans may feel some 
sympathy towards their Palestinian, Iraqi, Syrian, or Lebanese kinsmen, but in no 
way feel that their existence or identity is in jeopardy. Palestinian Americans 
represent the only exception. They are afraid to become forgotten people if the issue 
of Palestine ever slips out of public discourse. This is why Palestinian Americans are 
the most active among Arab American groups. 
 
Also Arab Americans face a problem of leadership. They feel they have no real 
leadership to represent them and no one to address their concerns in the media or 
protect them from the FBI investigation that followed the Patriotic Act (Salaita, 2005). 
Though the community has the potential to be really influential, they do not see a 
strong organization with a strong leadership that can represent them and protect 
them. 
 
One problem is that there is no infrastructure to rally the different organisations. 
There is no umbrella organization from which the different organizations take cues; 
each one operates in an independent mode. Also there has been no effective or 
consistent leadership in organizations like the NAAA. One respondent, previously a 
member of Arab American organisations, said that NAAA had times when it had 
strong leadership and times when it had weak leaderships. But there has been no 
strong leadership to attract the different factions. 
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Verification of theoretical framework 
 
I will discuss two kinds of implication in this chapter. The first kind consists of 
conclusions drawn from the case studies. I will label the conclusions that can be 
linked to the theoretical framework and those that can be proven with high level of 
evidence as dense theories in Arab Gulf lobbying. As discussed in the methodology 
chapter, a dense theory is a general theory that can be proven in a particular case.  
To illustrate, we can take the theory of Olson and the need for incentives to mobilize 
people. The AWACS case study shows how unions and businesses incentivized by 
the potential economic gain were mobilized, and therefore it validates the theory of 
Olson. However, the scope of my study does not extend to cases where Arab 
Americans were mobilized in response to an incentive, and I therefore do not have a 
case that validates the theory regarding Arab Americans. This is the reason why I 
could not come up with a dense theory stating that Arab Americans need incentives 
to be mobilized. I could only extrapolate from the AWACS case study and from the 
success of Arab American social services organizations to come up with a 
conclusion that Arab Americans need incentives to be mobilized. From this research 
I was able to come up with five dense theories regarding: need for grassroots, need 
for incentives, effectiveness of social services organization, barriers to entry and the 
possibilities of breaking these barriers. I also came up with proposition regarding 
patronage, the role of Arab American and the link between political and social 
services organizations. 
The first dense theory entails the domestic base: the most important conclusion this 
research offers is that in order for Arab Gulf states to effectively lobby on major 
policy issues in the US, a domestic lobby with a sustainable constituency is 
fundamental. The two case studies show the necessity of the domestic element: a 
grassroots constituency was a main factor leading to success or failure of the issue. 
Therefore, as deduced from the AWACS case and from grounded theory and the 
literature, the most successful lobbying is when the Arab Gulf states have been able 
to align an American partner as in the cases of the arms deals. This allowed them to 
have a constituency to support their lobbying. Even Bard stated that on arm deals 
the Arab Gulf was at times able to beat the pro-Israel lobby (Bard, 1991).. The 
second dense theory we can deduct that Arab need to offer incentives in order to 
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mobilize people the two case studies directly prove this proposition. In the AWACS 
case, the arm deal generated its own constituency consisting of the contractors, 
subcontractors and the individuals whose jobs were involved. On the other hand, in 
the DP World case did not present any direct incentives for anyone to support it. The 
deal involved the acquisition of existing operations and not the creation of a new 
company or a large order of goods that could generate business and jobs for 
Americans, From this dense theory we can extrapolate to the proposition that in 
order for the Arabs to mobilize Arab Americans they need to offer them incentives. 
This can be inferred partially from the case studies that show us that people are 
motivated to support an issue when they are getting a direct benefit and partially 
from the success of the pro-Israel lobby that beyond the political ideology offers 
social services to its members.  
 Looking at the universe of Arab American organizations, one can see that the most 
successful organizations are the ones that focus on social services and hence bring 
direct benefits to their members in return for their contributions. The organsations 
that receive the most funding also tend to be non-political; they are social 
organisations such as the Arab Community Center  for Economic and Social 
Services (ACCESS) . ACCESS has grown steadily and today it has 270 employees. 
It even started an allience called the Network for Arab 
American Communities (NNAAC), that gathers 23 Arab American community-based 
organizations. ACESSS has been able to raise substantial funds for its projects, 
among which 20 millions for the Arab American museum in Detroit, an amount that 
none of the politically oriented organizations was able to raise. Moreover, 60% of this 
money was raised from individuals.  
 However, the Arab American social services organizations are regional community 
entities that are not connected to the political Washington based organizations. 
When examining the success of AIPAC, we can see that the Jewish model brought 
direct benefits to its constituents by establishing councils, schools, and country 
clubs. Those establishments brought immediate benefit to the individual as well as 
strengthening the community. On the other hand, NAAA had nothing but a political 
aim. It represented no immediate benefits to its members. Comparing the success of 
AIPAC versus the failure of NAAA  confirms Olson’s theory stating that lobbies that 
have nothing but a political objective tend not to have a very committed constituency. 
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Our third dense theory concludes that traditional Arab American organizations do not 
have a captive active membership because their mandate is limited to a political goal 
and does not involve any direct services the theory also concludes that the 
organizations that can mobilize Arab Americans are the ones that offer direct 
benefits such as ACCESS. 
The conclusion we discern from the failure of NAAA the success of ACESS and the 
success of AIPAC is that the first step to a strong structure for a lobby is to create a 
link between political and social services organizations. A structure is needed to 
coordinate the activities of both types of organizations. A link between the 
organizations that provide social services and the political organizations will result in 
a more motivated constituency that can be mobilized and hence will lead to the 
empowerment of the Arab American community. 
The failure of NAAA partially confirms Walker’s theory of patronage. According to my 
interviews, Saudi Arabia’s support was only linked to the AWACS deal and was not 
long term. After the deal was sealed, the support Saudi Arabia directly offered 
decreased and with it the domestic money that mainly came from companies that 
had interests in the Arab Gulf. Though the inconstancy of the Arab Gulf support 
contributed to the failure of the NAAA, this was not the main reason behind it. On this 
point, the answers in my interviews were not all consistent. However, the feedback 
received was that, after the AWACS episode, Saudi Arabia as well as American 
companies who have interest in the Arab Gulf decreased their support for NAAA. 
Here Walker’s theory that patrons need to support the organization for an extended 
period of time in order for the revenues to be sufficient and the organization to 
become self-sustainable is partially relevant. It is not totally relevant because, as 
explained in the problems section, foreign policy as a stand-alone issue has low 
salience among Arab Americans. Therefore, even if it were generously funded by an 
outside patron, if the organization offering is not appealing enough it will not be able 
to generate a constituency. In addition to the fact that the model was not appealing 
to the average Arab American due to the low salience of foreign policy, the board 
had internal problems. One interviewee who was involved with Arab American 
organizations said that the Lebanese war created differences among the board. 
Another interviewee who was involved with the organization said that differences 
emerged between members of the board who were third generation Americans and 
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recent immigrants. The earlier immigrants were totally assimilated and looked at the 
Middle East as part of their background and with a more impartial view of the region, 
whereas Arab Americans who had recently immigrated carried the drain of the 
problems of their ancestral homeland and took sides in the inter-Arab conflicts. This 
echoes research that  says that the main reason behind the failure of the pro-Arab 
lobby at the time of the NAAA was factionalism (Goott and Rosen, 1983), (Feldman 
and ʻal Šēm, 1988). Therefore, even if the support of the Arab Gulf had been 
consistent, NAAA might still not have been able to succeed. The conclusion we 
could partially induct from the Arab case reaffirms Walker theory that for an 
organization to be successful the support should be sustainable and not linked to a 
short term goal. 
The fourth dense theory that can be inferred from this study is that the negative 
image of Arabs and Muslims creates a barrier that hinders their ability to lobby 
effectively and to plead their case to the American administration as well as to the 
American public. The real barrier to entry is the negative image of Arabs and 
Muslims in the mind of the average American (Paul and Paul, 2009), as it is very 
difficult to lobby for an issue when the issue or the group carries a negative stigma 
(Baumgartner et al., 2009a). DP World demonstrated the prevalence of the negative 
image of Arabs and their association with terrorism 
The fifth dense theory regards the breakdown of policy subsystems and changing 
the status quo. The current situation as inferred from interviews, as well as from the 
case studies, is that public discourse on the Middle East has been captured by the 
pro-Israel lobby. The pro-Israel lobby has been able to dominate the public discourse 
on the Middle East and has created a barrier preventing the Arab Gulf from voicing 
its views on the matter (Findley, 1989), (Mearsheimer and Walt, 2007). According to 
interviews, as well to the hearings, testimonials and the available literature I have 
examined, the pro-Israel groups want to “drive a wedge’ between the Arab world and 
the US in order to be the sole reference for matters on the Middle East. Those 
established relations with policy makers leave very little room for a pro-Arab lobby to 
voice its concerns. However, the AWACS episode shows that when the issue is 
properly marketed to the American public by raising its salience and framing it in the 
proper way and when enough pressure is exerted, policy makers can change their 
positions. The conclusion regarding Arab Gulf lobbying is that the real barrier to entry 
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is not the pre-established relationship with the pro-Israel lobby, which wants to have 
a monopoly on issues pertaining to the Middle East. The case of AWACS proved 
that this subsystem can be broken by raising the salience of the issue and framing it 
properly to the average American. When AWACS was framed in a way that 
appealed to the average American, the Saudis found groups that were willing to 
support it. In addition to framing it as an issue of containment of communism they 
hyped the economic benefits, and new groups and people took interest and pushed 
for the policy in a certain direction. 
 
This also links to the theory of Kruger and Olson that in order to change the rent 
seeking behavior that some lobbies have over certain policy areas, which is 
represented by the benefit one group has at the expense of the rest, a larger group 
should be introduced to counter the effect of the dominant group This rent seeking 
behavior is represented by the control that the pro-Israel lobby has over the public 
discourse on Middle East issue, where they are the dominant voice at the expense of 
other groups (Findley, 1985). To reverse such behavior a larger number of people 
should be interested. The AWACS episode proves this theory: as shown in the 
various publications pertaining to it (Simpson, 2008), (Emerson, 1985), Prince 
Bandar went and spoke to everyone, even the florists were targeted and were lured 
into the economic benefits this deal would bring to them, in order to reverse the rent 
seeking behavior the Israeli lobby had over Middle East policy.  Ironically, the DP 
World case illustrates this, albeit the outcome was not in the Gulf States’ favor. The 
acquisition was a technical issue that was controlled by established actors. When 
awareness about the issue increased and it reached the public discourse, those 
established actors lost control over the issue. Such transactions are normally 
handled by a closed system that includes the Treasury and other agencies involved 
in approving foreign acquisition. Here the view of Graziano is validated regarding 
issue networks where issues have vast policy implications and the actors are not 
well defined (Graziano, 2001). For the issue of DP World, the media, Eller &Co, a 
commercial company, the Congress, and the cities all ultimately had a say in the 
transaction. The issue did not stay confined to the established actors.  
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The Arab case of lobbying and its failure to create a lobby allows us to induct 
proposition about lobbying .On the theoretical front, I can conclude from the Arab 
case that lobbying is a discipline that is very much linked to the culture. One main 
hurdle for the Arab lobby is that lobbying is alien to the Arab culture therefore Arab 
Gulf countries are reluctant to lobby at the same time the Arab American are not 
politically active. This is also visible in other communities such as the Chinese 
community. Though relatively large and economically strong inside the US, and 
though the US and China have important relationships the, Chinese community does 
not constitute a lobby. This is the same case as the Arab one. Lobbying is alien to 
the Chinese policy makes as much as it is alien the Chinese American. The second 
theoretical conclusion we can infer from the Arab case is that in order for a 
community to lobby they need to identify with the government they lobby for. The 
Arab American in addition to the fact they don t identify culturally with the Gulf there 
is no government they identify with. This is why we see that though the Iranians 
constitute an important community in the US they do not lobby for the Iran simply 
because they have no affinity with it government. In the Cuban case, the lobby works 
against the government of Cuba and is a prime reason for keeping the embargo on 
the Cuban regime (LEOGRANDE, 2013). 
The third theoretical conclusion I can make from the Arab case is that for a diaspora 
to lobby they cannot lobby for a country that is seen negatively by the American 
public. On the contrary the diaspora will tend to dissociate itself from that country’s 
government. It was hard for the Arab American group to lobby or to show association 
with the government of Saudi Arabia given the terrorism stigma that marked the 
country following the tragic September 11 events. The same applies to the Iranian 
American; the Iranian community cannot lobby for the Iranian government that 
openly takes an antagonist position to the US.  
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Implications 
 
To start a lobby and prior to seeking to solve the different problems this task faces, 
the Arab Gulf should most fundamentally perceive the need for a lobby and the need 
for collective action. Beyond that, most importantly they should, first, understand the 
crucial role of a long term lobby that can cement the relationship between the US 
and the Arab Gulf and they should understand the value of collective approach when 
dealing with the US, second they should make an effort in engaging Arab Americans, 
thirdly they need to address the general public and work on their image and not 
solely rely on support from the president.  
 
 
Need to understand the value of grassroots and of collective action 
 
 In short, to start a lobby the main element that is missing is the domestic base. 
Though many scholars and journalists have pointed out the need to have a lobby, 
none have signaled that Arabs do not have the foundation to start such a lobby. For 
example, an article in the Daily Star, under the title “I have a dream” starts by stating 
the need for a lobby in order to have leverage with the US. However, on starting the 
lobby the author says: “You may ask, how do we start with such a big endeavor? 
Head hunt a lobbying executive and his team from one of the best firms in town; slap 
them with good incentives, rent out office space, and start. That simple”(Rifai, 2010).  
The previous chapters have shown that the task is not as simple as that. Creating an 
organization and hiring a few experienced lobbyists is the easy part; the hard part is 
creating the constituency behind it. AIPAC and AARP (American Association of 
Retired People) are strong not because they have in-house lobbyists but because 
they have constituencies behind them. Therefore when the AARP goes and speaks 
to a legislator, the legislator knows this lobbyist represents 38 million members . The 
Arab Gulf needs to understand this fact and the need to engage Arab Americans if it 
seeks to influence the US foreign policy towards the Middle East.  
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Additionally, the various Arab Gulf states should understand the need to adopt a 
common approach when dealing with the US. As inferred from interviews with 
American respondents, currently  inter-Arab rivalries lead to an inconsistent narrative 
when dealing with the American government and this leads to confusion on the 
American front (although it characterizes all Arab countries and is not specific to the 
Arab Gulf (Findley, 1989)). The AWACS episode represents an exception as the 
different Arab countries had 25 registered lobbyists who were all geared to lobby for 
one issue (Simpson, 2008), whereas in the DP World episode the other Arab Gulf 
countries did not make any effort to help the UAE defend its position. 
 
Engaging Arab American 
 
In order to cement a grassroots base, Arab Gulf states need to engage Arab 
Americans and need to go through Arab American organizations that have a captive 
audience. One interviewee for this dissertation, the head of an Arab American 
organization focusing on the social services, said that many organizations that have 
adopted some grandiose mandate failed because they had no constituency behind 
them. In his opinion, the key for Arab Gulf state is to help Arab American 
organizations work on their grassroots and the maturity of the political agenda as this 
is what constitutes the foundation of a lobby. If this foundation does not exist, 
creating an organization and hiring lobbyists will be void, will not generate any 
results, and will lead the Gulf to further mistrust Arab American organizations and 
their community. Therefore, in order to engage Arab Americans Arab Gulf States 
need to change their attitude towards Arab American organizations. Looking at other 
success stories, namely the pro-Israel lobby, their support has been consistent for an 
extended period of time, irrespective of the issues at stake. Support that is 
conditional and based on quid pro quo will not result in a sustainable base. The 
focus should be the relationship of the US with the Arab world, namely the Arab Gulf 
and not limited to a specific issue. Therefore the Arab Gulf should change its quid 
pro quo attitude towards the Arab community and look at the relationship with them 
from the perspective that a stronger Arab American community would give the Arab 
Gulf leverage with the US and would improve the Arab-Gulf image. 
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However, funding effective Arab American organizations and helping them gather a 
large captive constituency might not directly materialize in a constituency that is 
ready to promote Arab Gulf issues, however. This is due to a fact that was 
highlighted in the Problems section: First of all, Arab Americans do not identify with 
the Arab Gulf. As discussed in the problems chapter, the earlier wave came from the 
Levant and its members were mainly Christians. Though the second wave of 
immigrants that came from Morocco, Egypt and Yemen were mainly Muslim and 
have a stronger identification with their Arab roots they do not identify with the Arab 
Gulf.  
The AWACS case study shows this fact. Though Saudi Arabia supported and 
mobilized Arab American organizations, the constituency that was mobilized was not 
Arab Americans. The mandate of Arab American organizations was to liaise with the 
business community and not to mobilize the Arab American constituency. The 
answer from one of the interviewees who worked for NAAA at the time was: “We did 
not have to do it all”. Though in the case of AWACS, Prince Bandar understood the 
importance of a constituency and engaged the unions and the business community, 
he did not work on a long term constituency, which was a difficult long term task that 
required a lot of education and effort to engage a community that did not identify with 
the Gulf. It was easier to address companies and unions that had a direct interest in 
the deal. 
This fact creates a  Catch 22: Arab Americans are the best conduit for a lobby and 
they are the base that can make a constituency for a pro-Arab Gulf lobby, however 
they do not identify with the Arab Gulf. The way to solve this problem is by 
presenting the Arab Gulf to Arab Americans as part of the overall Arab world and by 
framing the pro-Arab Gulf lobby’s mandate as the promotion of overall US relations 
with the Arab world. Arab American will be more responsive to the idea of a pro-Arab 
Gulf lobby if its mandate is to promote the relationship between the US and the Arab 
world, because, as shown in the literature review chapter, the Arab element remains 
a strong component in the identity of different factions of Arab Americans.(Nassar‐
McMillan et al., 2011) 
Even if the Arab Gulf presents a pan Arab narrative, the different states have to be 
realistic about the degree to which Arab Americans identify with the Arab world. The 
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identification of Arab Americans with the Arab world cannot be compared to the 
degree to which American Jews identify with Israel, whereby they see the 
maintenance of their identity and “peoplehood” in the maintenance of the state of 
Israel (Ben-Moshe and Segev, 2007). Arab Americans are very different from 
Jewish-Americans: whereas Jewish-Americans look at the state of Israel as a source 
for their identity, Arab Americans look at the Arab world as part of their heritage. 
Therefore an AIPAC model or an organization that solely focuses on foreign policy 
will not have enough appeal to attract Arab Americans. 
 
In this scenario, Catch 22 strikes again. Even if Arab Gulf states invested in Arab 
American organizations that embraced the whole range of Arab Americans, such as 
NAAA and focused on the US relationship with the Arab world, this might not 
mobilize Arab Americans. Even if the funding continued and was not linked to 
specific issues, such organizations might not be successful due to the fact that there 
are not enough Arab Americans who are interested in foreign policy. As discussed in 
the AWACS and problems chapters, NAAA represents an example of an 
organization that is solely dependent on inconsistent and conditional external 
support and is unable to generate a substantial base cannot survive (Chetkovich and 
Kunreuther, 2006). 
 
Additionally, the different factions have different views on US foreign policy in the 
region. Therefore, investing in an organization similar to NAAA might not necessarily 
be a worthwhile achievement as it would not be appealing to Arab Americans. From 
the diverse interviews conducted for this research, the theme that emerged is that 
the issues that can unite the Arab American are not issues related to foreign policy, 
but issues related to their own welfare as a community, such as discrimination and 
racism. I conclude that the way to break this Catch 22 and to appeal to Arab 
Americans is to present foreign policy from the perspective that a better view of the 
region and having a positive image in the world will improve their image as a 
community in the US.  
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However, one respondent, the head of a successful Arab American social services 
organization, said that in order for a pro-Arab lobby to be successful, foreign policy 
should be part of an overall agenda to promote Arab Americans as a community 
inside the US. Therefore, in addition to promoting the fact that a better image of the 
Arab world will reflect on their image as a community, Arab Americans should feel 
that the lobby will lead to their empowerment as a community. 
This can be shown in the case of AIPAC and the Jewish community. In his book 
From Beirut to Jerusalem, Thomas Friedman tries to analyze why American Jews 
are such ardent supporters of Israel and why the American Jewry’s political focus 
shifted from championing liberal issues to backing Israel. He notes: “A Jew gets 
invited to the White House not to discuss prayer in schools but ...he finds himself 
consulted about a foreign bill.” He notes, “American Jews realized that they could 
ride Israel and the Soviet Jewish issues into the corridors of power” (Friedman, 
1995). 
Engaging the Arab Americans also indirectly improves the Arab image in the US and 
hence the image of the Arab Gulf. Arab Americans are the best conduit to change 
public opinion. As discussed in the literature review chapter, they are assimilated 
and the average American relates to them. The average American will relate much 
more to Ray Lahoud and Paula Abdul then he will relate to Sheikh Mohammed bin 
Rashid Al Maktoum or to Sheikha Mozah Bint Nasser Al Missned, who, regardless of 
their achievements or philanthropic undertakings, remain alien to him.  
 
Need for a broader communication 
 
At the time of the AWACS, Reagan used the appeal of the Soviet threat to sell the 
deal to the American public. As discussed in Chapter 5, at the time of the Cold War 
the national interest was a clear concept in the mind of the average American. 
Therefore the Arab Gulf could rely on its strategic importance and on the relation 
with the White House and the administration. The President and the State 
Department are more sensitive to the strategic value of the Gulf States as they have 
a more general view on foreign policy and are concerned with the entire country 
(Baumgartner et al., 2011). However, these close relations with the president have 
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frequently been criticized, as in the case of George W Bush with Prince Bandar after 
September 11. The criticism became the center of the narrative of a movie by 
Michael Moore that displayed Saudi Arabia as using business to build a close 
relationship with the Bush family in order to get favors with the US government 
(2004). 
The president’s strategic value is a strong argument when dealing with the executive 
branch but it is not as strong an argument when addressing the Congress, which is 
influenced by domestic preferences. Ultimately, the administration is accountable to 
the Congress. The extent to which Congress influences foreign policy has differed 
from president to president. Experience has shown that Congress has greater power 
in times of peace. In times of foreign threats, Congress is more likely to rally around 
the president and defer its powers in foreign policy to him (Lindsay, 2003).  
 
While Congress opposed President Clinton on his major foreign policy initiatives, 
President Bush had a cooperative congress (Lindsay, 2003). The difference in the 
extent of cooperation between the Congress and the Presidents Reagan and Bush 
was mainly due to the fact that the US was directly attacked under the Bush 
administration. Ironically, the concept of national security that allowed Bush to rally 
the Congress on major policy issues such as going to Afghanistan or to Iraq, and 
that allowed him to increase spending in Iraq (CRUTSINGER, 2007), was used 
against him in the DP World case (OXLEY, 2006). By the time DP World occurred 
Bush’s authority had diminished. Though initially in 2001 Bush had a cooperative 
Congress, this tide had turned substantially by 2006 and it led to his loss of his 
majorities in the 2006 elections. It occurred after Hurricane Katrina, when Bush was 
in his second term and his popularity had dropped significantly. This decline in 
popularity emboldened the Congress, in contrast to the case of Reagan who was 
popular and had high approval on his foreign policy (Holsti, 2009) which helped him 
garner concurrence from the media and the political elites.   
 
In general, the strategy that the Gulf has adopted of focusing on the president and 
the administration and keeping the relationship confined to diplomatic country-to-
country channels, works mostly in times of a fragmented Congress, where 
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presidents have more power to act unilaterally and issue executive 
orders.(Baumgartner et al., 2011). However, the DP World experience shows that, 
even in times where the president had a cooperative Congress, focusing solely on 
the president is not enough. This is why, in the case of DP World, the UAE was not 
able to position itself as the strategic ally of the US in its war on terror, despite the 
fact that President Bush advocated the deal and tried to highlight its strategic value 
as an ally in the war on terror. On the contrary, opponents of the deal used the 
argument that allowing the UAE to manage ports would make these facilities more 
likely to be subject to terrorist attacks.  
 
Bush had to bow to the Congress on the DP World issue, which had negative 
repercussions on the US. It rendered the country more protectionist and sent a 
negative signal to the Arab world (2006j). In the case of DP World, the Treasury as 
well as Homeland Security departments testified that the deal posed no security 
threat but Senator Schumer used his clout with Congress and fear appeals to reach 
out to the American public and was successful in blocking the deal (curtiss, 2006). 
 
Despite the fact that the strategic value argument does not pan out, the alliance 
between the US and the Arab Gulf seems fragile as it is based purely on common 
interest and not on common values, as interests change (Huwaidin, 2013). The 
strategic value of the Arab Gulf stems from the fact that the region sits on large 
reserves of oil. This might change with the discovery of shale oil as the Arab Gulf 
might lose its strategic advantage (2012c) and hence would lose its clout with the 
American administration. If the Arab Gulf loses its strategic value, it will not even be 
able to reach out to the administration and the president. A consistent narrative 
based on values on which the average American can identify is needed to cement 
the relationship with the US. Israel for example, positions itself as the only 
democracy in the Middle East. Additionally to this common value with the US, it 
highlights the different facets of life in Israel with which the average American 
identifies.  The Israelis make sure positive stories about daily life in Israel are all over 
the media; even agricultural magazines in the US carry features on agriculture in 
Israel (Friedman, 1995). Though this is a different task as the Arab Gulf culture is 
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different, even alien, to the Western, the Arab Gulf needs to put in more effort to 
reach out to the American public at large. 
 
Breaking the subsystem is possible 
  
A representative in Congress can currently vote favorably for the pro-Israel lobby on 
issues pertaining to the Middle East without fearing repercussion, as the subject has 
low salience to the rest of his constituency. However, he might change his attitude if 
his constituency became informed and interested in this issue, and if the entirety of 
his constituency and not only a faction of it judged him based on his votes on Middle 
East issues. Therefore raising the salience of US foreign policy in the Middle East 
and its implications for the US national interest is needed in order to have a more 
balanced American approach to the region. Here the role of communication is also 
paramount, including possibly changing the framing of national interest, as was the 
case with AWACS, where the deal was framed as falling in line with the national 
interest of the US by contributing to the containment of the Soviet Union.  
 
Therefore to reverse the current course of US policy towards the region and in order 
for the US to adopt a more balanced approach, in addition to increasing public 
awareness about the Middle East, additional groups should be enticed to take part in 
the discourse  
 
Therefore raising the salience of an issue is a two-edged sword. In the case of 
AWACS, raising the salience of the issue generated support for the deal and public 
awareness of the importance of equipping the Saudi Arabian military in order to 
insure it could contain the Soviet threat. It also put the opponents under scrutiny, as 
the loyalty of pro-Israeli groups was put into question. Here the slogan “Reagan or 
Begin” was very powerful as it framed the issue as a choice between loyalty to 
America and its president, who was fighting communism, versus loyalty to Israel. In 
the case of DP World, raising the salience of the issue had the opposite effect.  The 
circumstances were different, as DP World happened a few years after September 
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11th, when the relationship with the Arab Gulf was put into question and therefore 
the salience of the issue was raised while framing the UAE as an unreliable partner 
and as a country that is soft on terrorism. 
 
Paradoxically, the issue of national interest and national security was used in favor of 
the Arab Gulf in the case of AWACS and against it in the case of DP World. 
Therefore to change general American policy in the Middle East, more groups should 
take part, the salience of the issues at stake should be raised, and the implications of 
current American policy in the Middle East should be publicized to the average 
American.  
 
Limitations of the research 
 
The scope of this research is limited to two case studies and to a series of interviews 
from which the grounded theory emerged. I tried to increase the evidence by 
resorting to triangulation in order to offset the deficiencies limiting the research. For 
example, I checked the propositions about Arab Americans and their role in Arab 
Gulf lobbying, trying to reconcile what Gulf Arabs said with the views of the head of 
Arab American organizations. In this research I resorted to methodological 
triangulation. The propositions inferred from grounded theories were tested in the 
case studies.  
 
Another limitation to the research is that it cannot constitute a comprehensive study 
of Arab Gulf lobbying. As explained in the methodology chapter, I could not analyze 
in detail all aspects of Arab Gulf lobbying. For example, though the research tackles 
the problems facing an Arab American base, it does not go into detail in studying the 
typology of the Arab American organizations and their internal relationships. 
Therefore the findings of this study remain broad and do not offer a complete 
solution but merely give guidance on how to build a lobby. For example, the DP 
World case as well as the different interviews, reveal that Arabs have a negative 
image that raises a barrier to lobbying. However, my research does not say how to 
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overcome this negative image. I propose the involvement of Arab Americans but 
such a project involves many intricacies. 
Even regarding certain aspects of lobbying such as communication, the research 
offers conclusions but not full answers. For example on the front of communication, I 
make several propositions, such as that Arabs need to highlight features of the Arab 
Gulf with which the average American identifies, that they need to promote Arab 
Americans as representative of the Arab Culture but those remain individual 
propositions and do not constitute an overall plan of action. 
 
In a nutshell, the limitation is that my research does not offer a straight answer; it 
merely paves the way to future research and points to the problems facing Arab Gulf 
lobbying without giving a direct pointer to the actions they should take. 
 
Outlook for the future 
 
Possible geopolitical changes 
 
The need for an Arab American lobby is growing by the day. The recent Syrian 
episode proved this fact, as the Arab Gulf was unable to push the US to strike the 
Assad regime following his use of chemical weapons on his own people. One 
Kuwaiti scholar commented on the attitude of Obama towards Assad by asking 
whether the Arab Gulf can really trust the US for future protection. He asked what 
would happen if Kuwait got attacked again and whether Kuwaitis really trust the 
president if every decision he makes has to go through Congress. The Gulf knows 
that he has no leverage with the Congress. 
 
On the other hand, the emergence of shale oil as a rival to conventional fossils fuels 
might weaken the Gulf states’ strategic position with the US (Cordesman, 2013). 
Though in the coming ten years the demand for oil from the Gulf will not be affected, 
(Niyadi, 2013)  the average American as well as American policymakers are no 
longer terrified by the idea of being cut off from the oil supply coming from the Arab 
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Gulf (Ignatius, 2013). The National Intelligence report on how the world will look in 
2030 shows that in the future, with the discovery of shale oil, the US will become the 
main energy exporter and oil producing countries will witness a sharp decline in their 
income (2012c).This might have repercussions on the willingness of the US to be 
actively engaged in the protection of the Arab Gulf from potential threats such as 
Iran. 
 
In addition to the energy component, several factors signal a slow American 
disengagement from the Arab Gulf. Christopher Harmer, a former deputy director of 
future operations at the US Navy's 5th  Fleet based in Manama said, “We’ve 
withdrawn totally from Iraq. We are in the process of withdrawing from Afghanistan. 
We have substantially curtailed our naval presence in the Middle East. And the US 
president has announced a foreign-policy pivot to Asia." He added, "Those are four 
actions that say to the GCC that, whatever the situation, you have to deal with it 
without a lot of help from America," (Dickinson, 2013). From this perspective, 
American support for the Gulf seems shaky. The Arab Gulf states are starting to feel 
the American disengagement. The first alarming signal was the attitude of the US 
towards their long term allies such as Mubarak with the Arab spring uprising; the 
second alarming signal was the treaty that the US signed with Iran. The US 
perceived that the thawing of relations with Iran might push Arab Gulf states to enter 
into a more collaborative mode—even some prominent figures such as Prince Turki 
Al Faisal are now calling to promote the GCC from a cooperation structure to a 
Union (Toumi, 2013). The perceived external threat embodied by the emboldening of 
Iran might create enough pressure to break the security complex through which the 
different Arab Gulf states compete and monitor each other. As a result the different 
countries may cooperate and embrace a common foreign policy towards the US. 
This would solve the first problem facing the prospect of an Arab Gulf lobby: 
consensus among Arab Gulf states. 
 
Given that the geopolitical scene is changing, it is important to see how others have 
adapted. In the case of Israel its strategic value emerged with the rise of the Soviet 
empire. With the threat of Soviet influence on the Arab world, Israel was promoted as 
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a surrogate fortress to prevent communism from reaching the oil fields in the Gulf. 
This was Israel’s strategic value to US. However, by the time the Soviet empire 
collapsed, the Israelis had already worked on an alternative plan. They cemented a 
relationship that cannot be uprooted by the winds of strategic changes (Mearsheimer 
and Walt, 2007). The polls conducted by Gallup in February 2012, found that 61% of 
Americans sympathize with Israel. In a nut shell, they were able to engage America, 
both as a people and as a government. The core to this integrated and 
comprehensive effort is the pro-Israel lobby. Therefore, the lobby protected the 
interests of Israel in the US, even when its strategic value decreased.  
 
Changes in the Arab American community 
 
The nature of Arab American organizations is changing. Following September 11th, 
Arab American organizations that had solely focused on the issue of Palestine 
became more focused on improving their standing in American society and this 
resulted in the spreading of social service organizations. Social service organizations 
are community based and do not focus on a political objective but on immediate 
benefits to their constituencies. Examples include the Arab American Association of 
New York, that teaches English to newcomers, or the Network of Arab American 
professionals that helps young professionals find jobs.    www.naaponline.org. The 
memberships of these organizations are more captive then those of organizations 
that solely focus on politics. Two respondents, heads of these social service 
organizations, said they are based on the Jewish model.  
 
The most prominent among those social service organizations  is the Arab 
Community Center for Economic & Social Services (ACCESS)   , which has a strong 
grassroots base. Currently, the Arab American community is witnessing a wave of 
cohesion. In March 2013, the White House invited representatives of Arab American 
organizations to a meeting with President Obama. The representatives felt that they 
were not given enough importance by the administration as they were not granted an 
independent meeting; they were invited to meet along with some Muslim groups and 
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some Jewish peace activists. They felt that the community will be diluted unless 
there is a serious effort to coalesce and come up with a strong unified voice.  
Therefore, the Arab American Anti-Discrimination and the Arab American Institute, 
two organizations that have been in a state of competition for  the last thirty years 
over who is the real representative of the Arab Americans, have combined efforts to 
bring the community together. Every month there is conference call that gathers 
around thirty organizations, where the different participants share ideas and 
coordinate their activities. However, this effort is still in its early stages and this 
coalition is not structured or formal.  
 
If this coalition materializes into a solid structure, especially if social service 
organizations are included, it could change the current attitude of the Gulf. The Gulf 
might see in it a potential winning horse and might be encouraged to support it. At 
the same time, the Arab Gulf fears being perceived as interfering in American politics 
and tries to be apolitical as much as possible and would be much more comfortable 
contributing to social services rather than to a political organization. 
 
In a nutshell, the success of lobbying requires the mobilization of a domestic base 
and this base is most likely to be mobilized when members see benefits to their 
relations with the organization trying to mobilize them. The support should also be 
sustainable in order to result in a success. In addition, to succeed in changing 
general foreign policy towards the region, and for the mistreatment represented by 
the DP World incident not to be repeated, the average American needs to have a 
better understanding of the region. However, to accomplish that changing the 
negative image of Arabs is key. 
 
Raising the salience of Middle East issues, if not coupled with enhancing the image 
of Arabs, is likely to produce a counter effect on American foreign policy towards the 
region. Arab Americans are the best actors to change the prevailing negative image 
as the average American relates to them. 
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Future research  
 
The research in this thesis depicts the factors for the success of lobbying and points 
to the deficiencies in Arab Gulf lobbying that need to be addressed. Additionally to 
the “content” value of this research, it has a transferrable value as the methods and 
tools used could be utilized for research on other lobbies in the US. For the overall 
structure of the research is applicable to other lobbies and could be replicated: 
starting with a theoretical framework that tackles the foundation of a lobby, then 
conducting research using two combined methods, and then merging this proposition 
with existing theories in order to come up with a dense theory regarding the lobby 
under research. Though this study looked at components of lobbying for the Arab 
Gulf states the components themselves are the same in other lobbies, e.g., the 
domestic base, strategy, issues, image, and funding.   
The theoretical framework that tackles the foundations of any lobby in terms of a 
domestic base and the need to get it mobilized, and the hurdles that may prevent 
this base from getting mobilized could be replicated. The sampling as well the 
methodology mix to study the Arab American community could be used to study 
other communities... The case study which shows how the different elements of 
lobbying interact together can negate or validate assumptions made about lobbying 
by individual respondents. Additionally, the research questions, the method could be 
applied to study other countries’ lobbying, such as the patterns behind Indian 
lobbying and what contributes to Indian lobbying successes and failures.  
In addition to the usability of the method for other research on lobbying, the 
methodology mix can be used to further research on the topic of Arab Gulf lobbying. 
Though the research used case studies of Arab lobbying, further research could use 
case studies of other lobbies and try to reconcile it with the Arab case in order to see 
what can work in the case of Arab Gulf lobbying. For example the Indians, similarly 
to the Arabs, have different factions, and despite their difference they were able to 
put together a lobby. Here, future research can elaborate on our research by looking 
on the winning formula of other lobbies and checking whether it is valid in the Arab 
Gulf lobby case. Though the methods used are transferrable for future research on 
the topic of Arab Gulf lobbying, coming up with more concrete answers to the 
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question on what is the winning formula to have an Arab Gulf lobby requires 
qualitative research. 
 
In addition to methodological guidance for future research, additional substantive 
research is still needed. As discussed before, although this study depicts the basis 
for the success of lobbying, it does not offer all the answers regarding the 
establishment of a long term pro-Arab Gulf lobby that has an influence on public 
policy. Research is still needed to cover the following areas: 
Starting a lobby is worth investigating. As discussed before, there are strong rivalries 
among Arab Gulf countries and these attitudes have spilled over to Arab Gulf 
relations with the US, where states compete on excelling in relations with the US 
instead of cooperating to achieve better bargaining power. Such an attitude will lead 
ultimately to the failure of any “lobby”. Coordination is essential, as having several 
Arab Gulf competing lobbies is worse than not having a lobby at all. If the different 
Arab Gulf countries support different groups and jockey for position so that each 
country selfishly improves its relations with the US and scores points with its 
neighbors, the effort is doomed to fail. This attitude will also increase the 
fragmentation of the Arab American community. The key is to keep the focus on 
general American policy toward the Arab world and to promote the relationship 
between the two, which will ultimately benefit the overall Arab world, the Gulf 
included.  
 
More research is needed on who can start a lobby. The research should tackle 
whether the different GCC countries agree among each other and then start a lobby, 
or, given the rivalries among them, one country should start building the foundation. 
Once this country scores some success, it will entice others to join. A country 
undertaking such a role will automatically increase its leverage with its neighbors in 
increasing its leverage with the US. 
 
Also further research is needed to see how to encourage the different Arab American 
organizations to coalesce. Such research would revolve around the structure that 
would integrate the different organizations. As explained before, having an umbrella 
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organization similar to AIPAC from which the different organizations take cues is not 
viable as foreign policy has low salience among Arab Americans. An alternative to 
integrate the different organizations needs research. The viability of a structure 
comparable to the AFL-CIO, the federation that brings together the different unions 
in America, is worth exploring. 
 
Also the research in this dissertation has proved that benefits entice people to 
become active in organizations. However, further research is needed into the 
structure of the Arab American community to see what sorts of benefits are needed 
to mobilize Arab Americans. This should be linked to identification with the Arab Gulf 
and Arab identity. The possibility of engaging Arab Americans and the right formula 
that will make them tick is still to be researched. Researching a comprehensive 
program on how to engage Arab Americans is needed. 
 
Though American foreign policy and public opinion regarding the Arab world has a 
direct effect on the Arab American community, research is needed to see how much 
the average Arab American is aware of this fact. A study to gauge the average Arab 
American awareness of this fact is worth conducting as well as exploring why it is 
low and testing different ways to raise it. Also additional research is needed to see 
how can we build a domestic coalition of Arab American organizations and how can 
we mobilize it to constitute a base for a pro-Arab Gulf lobby.    
 
 Research is also needed on what could be the pillar around which to unite Arab 
Americans and to create a link with the Arab Gulf. Looking at American Jews, who 
represent a prime example in community cohesion and dedication towards Israel, 
one can see that what unites them is not the settlement or the peace process or the 
lack of it: what unites them is the heritage. Research is needed to see what can 
galvanize Arab American and what can be the foundation on which to unite the 
different factions and on conceptualizing a model that can provide the inspiration to 
Arab Americans. The Arab Spring is still in a state of turmoil and the Arab world is 
witnessing a wave of violence fueled by sectarianism. Though initially it represented 
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a spring of democracy it has turned into a dark period of internal conflicts. The Arab 
world has few cases of success and Dubai is a prime success story. If any exchange 
is to be done between the Arab world and the Arab American, the UAE is the ideal 
place. The UAE could be the place to invite Arab American youth to do internships in 
a state of the art government department, for example. However, further research is 
needed to see if it can constitute a model for Arab Americans to identify with. 
 
The purpose, that I hope this study will achieve, is to demonstrate to Arab Gulf 
governments the benefit of having a domestic Arab American lobby in promoting 
relations with their important ally, the US. Though starting a lobby is a difficult long 
term task, if it succeeded it would definitely be worth the effort, as it would bring a 
new dimension to the US-Arab Gulf and ultimately to the US-Arab relationships. 
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i The two main books are The Arab lobby by Mitchell Bard and The Arab Lobby and 
the Two States Solution by Khalil Marar 
ii  Yin used the explanatory method approach to show how town meetings in 
Bordertown, USA, in 1992, led to a decrease in drug abuse. The problem was that 
the town had experienced a high and increasing rate of homicide, drug use, and drug 
related crimes. He showed how community meetings helped to fight drug abuse. He 
investigated how collaboration was planned, who was involved (residents, public 
works officials, police), activities, strategies to identify targets, and the outcomes .In 
1994, the collaboration resulted in 1278 arrests, 311weapons confiscation, and the 
seizure of $678972  worth of narcotics. Arrests increased by 150% between 1992 
and 1993, of which 43% were attributable to collaboration. Yin also resorted to 
validation by checking how crime that was unrelated to drugs evolved in Bordertown 
at the same time. This rate remained the same or increased. This shows that 
community collaboration was the reason behind the decrease in drug use and 
related crime YIN, R. 2003a. K.(2003) Case study research: Design and methods. 
Thousand Oaks, California: Sage Publications, Inc.. 
iii Discourse analysis has been used to depict people’s perceptions in the situation of 
a rocket fall. Discourse was used as a means to analyze the psyche of people in the 
Altai territory in Siberia regarding their perceived risk from the rockets launched from 
the Baikonur province in Kazakhstan. In this case, analysis of the discourse 
assembled from the various interviews and in discussion with inhabitants of the area 
showed how people perceived the risk involved (Profeta et al., 2010). 
iv Jennifer Cohen resorted to discourse analysis to show how the media classifies 
teachers in the US. Teachers’ identity was framed in terms of caring and 
accountability, but in her analysis she also took into consideration the general 
economic and political debate. She shows how accountability was more important 
than caring in terms of shaping education policy COHEN, J. L. 2010. Teachers in the 
news: a critical analysis of one US newspaper's discourse on education, 2006–2007. 
Discourse: Studies in the cultural politics of education, 31, 105-119.. Similarly, from 
interpreting representation in the media, we can depict the general conceptions that 
framed the DP World issue. 
v Otan Ez and  Stanton Glantz conducted a study to show how the discourse of 
tobacco companies, who were in a position of power relative to farmers, distorted 
reality and used it to influence opinions. They used films about the tobacco industry 
to push their political agenda that aimed at opposing tobacco control measures. 
Critical discourse analysis shows how these companies used films that portrayed 
tobacco farming as a family and a national tradition in order to overshadow the 
health hazards of tobacco, and the fact that it created dependency and the 
subordination of farmers and led to poverty and child labour, in addition to its impact 
on the environment OTAÑEZ, M. G. & GLANTZ, S. A. 2009. Trafficking in tobacco 
farm culture: Tobacco companies' use of video imagery to undermine health policy. 
Visual anthropology review, 25, 1-24.. 
vi The Sunlight Foundation is a nonprofit organization that posts online government 
information in order to insure greater transparency and openness. It has been acting 
as the lobbying watchdog. SUNLIGHT FOUNDATION [Online]. Available: 
http://sunlightfoundation.com/about/.ProPublica is an independent, non-profit 
organization specialized in generating investigative journalism on issues of public 
interest. The focus is on reporting abuses of power by government officials and 
businesses. Pro-republica [Online]. Available: http://www.propublica.org/about/. 
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